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Summary 
 
 
This paper discusses the policy characteristics of a transition management (TM) process that 
was introduced by the Flemish government in 2006 with the goal of reorienting its waste 
policy towards a sustainable materials policy and stimulating a transformation of the 
waste/materials system. Part 1 of the paper concisely describes the background of the TM 
approach and introduces the research questions. The paper interprets TM as one particular 
type of a broader set of transition governance approaches. Typical characteristics of TM 
include working with an arena of frontrunners and the development of a long-term vision 
upon which transition pathways and transition experiments are based. TM has first been used 
in the Netherlands as a way of trying to influence and reorient socio-technical systems (such 
as the energy, mobility and agrofood system) in a more sustainable direction. Inspired by the 
Dutch example, the Flemish government decided in 2004 to experiment in its environmental 
policy with transition management, first in the domain of sustainable living and building (a 
process called DuWoBo), two years later in the domain of waste and sustainable materials 
management (a process called Plan C). This latter process Plan C is the empirical focus of 
the paper. The goal of the paper is to investigate the position and role of Plan C in the 
reorientation of waste policy, how and why such a TM process has influence (or not), which 
characteristics this influence has, and what the interaction is between this TM process and 
the broader political and societal context. A basic assumption of the analysis is that 
transitions are intrinsically political: they change long-established structures, institutions, 
actors and actor relations, policy discourses and ways of thinking, patterns of action and 
behaviour. As a consequence, policy initiatives such as TM that want to stimulate change in 
socio-technical systems, will unavoidably meet with resistance, power struggles, questions of 
trust and legitimacy. A better understanding of processes, mechanisms and patterns at work 
in TM processes, can help politicians and practitioners (such as civil servants and societal 
actors)  in dealing with the politics of transitions. 
 
The analytical framework that is used in the paper is clarified in part 2.  The analysis of Plan 
C builds in fact on a combination of two frameworks. The first, the multilevel perspective 
(MLP), is well-known in transition studies. It describes transitions as a result of interactions 
between a so-called socio-technical regime at meso-level, innovative niches at micro-level, 
and trends and pressures at macro- or landscape level. The MLP is useful for describing the 
context in which a TM process such as Plan C has to find its way, but the MLP does not have 
a good conceptualisation of politics in transitions. Therefore, to analyse change and stability 
of policies on the level of substance as well as organisation, the MLP is combined with the 
policy arrangements approach (PAA). A policy arrangement has four dimensions, where 
three refer to organisational elements of policy (actors and actor coalitions, resources, rules 
of the game) and one refers to substantial elements (discourse). Understanding how a TM 
process functions as a from of policy innovation can then be answered through questions such 
as: Do actor coalitions change under influence of Plan C? What is the influence on discourse? 
Does Plan C change the access to and availability of resources in the system and policy 
domain? Are the rules of policy-making influenced by Plan C? And how and why does all of 
this happen (or not)?  
 
Part 3 starts the analysis with a description of the context in which the TM process Plan C 
had to play its role when it started in 2006. In terms of the analytical framework: what are the 
characteristics of the waste regime that Plan C wants to have influence on and what are 
important landscape trends? And more specifically for the policy context: what does the 
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policy arrangement look like? Part 3 sketches the growth of the current Flemish waste system 
and its policy arrangement. The start of waste policy as a separate policy domain is usually 
situated in the late seventies, early eighties. Due to the reform of the Belgian state structure in 
1980, waste policy was one of the first domains to be developed under the new Flemish 
environmental competences. Although from the start the policy discourse prescribed a policy 
based on the waste hierarchy (as stated in the Waste Decree of 1981), in practice almost all 
efforts were focused on getting control over the situation through legislation, planning and 
organisation of infrastructure around landfilling and incineration. Selective collection and 
recycling were supportive of these policies. All of this happened through a form of planning 
that was strongly top-down, with the Flemish government and its agency OVAM in control. 
Once the basics were more or less in place, the next steps could be taken. In particular from 
the mid-nineties onwards, a reorientation is visible from the end towards the beginning of the 
waste chain. The waste hierarchy (prevention, re-use, recycling, incineration, landfilling) 
becomes the basic logic of the regime, strengthened by concepts such as the principle of 
producer responsibility and the polluter pays principle. The Waste Decree is thoroughly 
updated in 1994 and over the years a system of plans is developed that covers all waste 
streams. OVAM remains the central government actor, but municipalities play an important 
role in policy implementation. With the development of a waste market and a recycling 
industry, the private sector becomes structurally involved in the waste chain. Due to the 
increasing role of the private sector, the relative power of government actors has decreased. 
While in the eighties, resources were mainly controlled by government actors, from the 
nineties onwards the private sector gets an important position, certainly in the industrial 
waste segment.  
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Flanders has succeeded in creating a well-performing 
waste system and it is considered top of the European class in selective collection and 
recycling. However, the total amount of household waste has remained virtually constant 
around 550 kg per person since 2000. Furthermore, industrial waste is difficult to get under 
control. These kind of factors led to a realisation with several OVAM officials that, in order to 
further reduce waste amounts, a new step in waste policy was needed. The Strategic Plan of 
OVAM for 2005-2009 introduced a new policy field, namely materials policy, alongside waste 
management. As one of the strategic goals of the plan, OVAM wanted to contribute to the 
introduction of thinking in terms of material streams in economic and environmental policy. 
One way of operationalising this goal was through the introduction of a transition process. 
 
The Plan C process itself is analysed in depth in part 4. It is first shown how not only the 
internal reflections within OVAM on a reorientation of waste policy are important for 
understanding the introduction of Plan C, but also the opportunities created by a huge reform 
of the Flemish administration, and developments in environmental policy to start 
experimenting with new policy approaches. The analysis then continues with a reconstruction 
of the history of Plan C on the basis of the main events between 2003 and 2011, and a 
discussion of the policy characteristics of Plan C. During the first two years the transition 
management approach was successful in creating a  policy niche with some clearly distinctive 
characteristics. In contrast with the waste regime, in the Plan C discourse waste has become 
a small part of an overarching materials system. Production and consumption activities and 
related policies are reoriented towards closing of material loops and a life cycle approach. 
The involvement of frontrunners – actors that are usually not in the driving seat when policy 
is developed – is an essential element in this reorientation of the discourse. The time and 
space they were allowed to develop as an arena in the shadow of regular policy, was 
instrumental in formulating a transition agenda (with a leitbild, transition pathways, 
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proposals for experiments). In the first two years, financial means were more or less adequate 
for coaching the process. The legitimacy of the process seemed high with the participants 
(around 60 persons mid 2008) and they sided with an ambitious mission statement for the 
further development of Plan C. Certainly until 2008, Plan C was the main voice in Flanders 
on sustainable materials management.  
 
Over the last years, Plan C has not really been able to keep that position. As shown in part 4, 
this can partly be explained by problems in the internal functioning of the network: the trial-
and-error process of organisation and substance development has been hindered by factors 
such as a lack of funding to support the process and the development of experiments, a search 
by involved actors to define their role and position vis-a-vis each other, the difficult 
translation of the discourse into action, and uncertainty about the future status of the network.  
 
While part 4 focuses mainly on the internal dynamics of the Plan C process, in part 5 the 
analysis is broadened to the position of Plan C in the context of ongoing evolutions at the 
landscape, regime and niche levels of the waste/materials system. This context is at least as 
important for explaining the influence and the problems of a new policy approach such as 
Plan C, as is its internal functioning. Part 5 first discusses developments at landscape, regime 
and niche level that put the existing waste regime under pressure. It then analyses how the 
combination of these trends has an impact on the Flemish waste regime and its policy 
arrangement, and it tries to trace the influence of Plan C. At Flemish level, the change in 
discourse from waste to sustainable materials management is undeniable. It is not only 
propagated by OVAM as main government actor, it also seems to find support with all actors 
involved in the waste/materials system: advisory councils, different sectors of the industry, 
knowledge actors and ngo’s. This change in discourse finds a translation in the rules of the 
Materials Decree (the successor of the Waste Decree) that was approved by the government 
in June 2011. However, for the moment the hard requirements of the Decree remain at the 
level of the requirements of the EU Waste Framework Directive, but several openings have 
been made in the Decree that allow for the development of policy on the basis of a materials 
orientation. Meanwhile, new actors are entering the policy arrangement (such as the 
influential technological and chemical industry), while the old ones are reformulating their 
position. In the case of OVAM this also led to an internal restructuring which should better 
prepare the organisation for the challenges of the governance of the materials system. The 
traditional waste industry is trying to reposition itself as suppliers of secondary materials. As 
a consequence of this repositioning and the involvement of new actors, the resources and 
distribution of resources in the system are changing. New actors bring in important financial 
and lobbying power. Furthermore they succeed in attracting support from traditional 
innovation funds. This seems less the case with the actors that until now dominated the waste 
system. In particular OVAM, which is currently taking the lead in the materials orientation, 
cannot count on extra financial means for the moment, even though its tasks are expanding 
and getting more complex.  
 
What may reinforce the ongoing developments towards sustainable materials management is 
a noticeable translation of both the sustainable materials discourse and the transition 
discourse to other policy areas such as the socio-economic innovation project of the Flemish 
government ViA and the new sustainable development policy. In this translation, sustainable 
materials management is not only a new approach to waste, but it is being regarded as an 
essential component of a greener, innovative economy and thus of a broader socio-economic 
agenda. There are several indications however that in this translation process to the 
economic and innovation field, the transition concept also loses some of its flavour of radical 
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change and becomes embedded in a rather business-as-usual competition and productivity 
discourse.  
 
In all these developments, it is obvious that Plan C is one influence among many. In 
particular structural transformation processes at the landscape level, such as EU policy 
initiatives on resource efficiency and raw materials, and the growing competition worldwide 
for resources, are hugely influential for current and future system developments. Still, the 
analysis also shows that Plan C has had influence on Flemish level, in particular on the 
discourse that is being used at several places. Further, several actors have found inspiration 
in the Plan C approach to sep up their own initiatives. Although the Minister of the 
Environment and OVAM did not succeed in inscribing a legal structure for Plan C in the 
Materials Decree, the Decree still contains a form of cooperation between OVAM and several 
administrations to support and further develop Plan C.  
 
Part 6 draws attention to the mechanisms that underlie the role that a TM process such as 
Plan C plays in influencing change and stability in policy. These mechanisms help to 
understand how policy change is happening and/or how stability is maintained. The 
importance of converging policy streams for the breakthrough of the sustainable materials 
agenda shows several times in the Plan C case, as does the role of so-called policy 
entrepreneurs for tying together dynamics at different levels and smartly making use of policy 
windows. Different discourse mechanisms can also work in favour of change. The new 
sustainable materials storyline that was developed by Plan C, was influential in redefining the 
policy problem, which next led to a redefinition of the interests of actors involved in the 
waste/materials system. However, the analysis also shows that when the new materials and 
transition discourse is embedded in policy domains with long established and broadly carried 
storylines – such as in innovation and socio-economic policy – the more transformative 
elements may disappear from view in order to fit in a competition and productivity discourse. 
Finally, prevailing modes of administrative logic and of policy-making work as a stabilising 
force and hinder the institutionalisation of a transition approach and the Plan C agenda. Part 
6 ends with policy recommendations, in particular on the role and positioning of Plan C in a 
fast changing policy context.  
 
The paper concludes in part 7 that with the start of Plan C five years ago, OVAM showed its 
early awareness of the new upcoming developments in the waste/materials system. The 
transition management approach that was used to initiate Plan C succeeded in creating a new 
discourse for Flanders about sustainable materials management and in starting a network of 
frontrunners that, certainly until 2008, was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable 
materials management. However, in particular during the last two years, political and 
societal dynamics in the materials system have accelerated and have more or less overtaken 
the TM-process Plan C. The result of these dynamics is that a lot of actors have moved 
towards Plan C’s position and also occupy part of the sustainable materials terrain, 
invariably supported by more financial resources and organisational capacity. From the lone 
player on a previously almost unoccupied field, Plan C has become one small player among 
many in a field that quickly gets crowded. The analysis suggests that there is still a place in 
the Flemish context for a transition process such as Plan C. This requires a new focus and a 
repositioning (including a conception of transition governance that goes beyond TM), which 
can then launch Plan C for a new round of learning how to do transition governance in 
practice.  
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1. Introduction and problem definition 
 
 
This working paper reports on the Plan C process, a policy process introduced in 2006 by the 
Flemish government with the goal of reorienting its waste policy towards a sustainable 
materials policy and stimulating a transformation of the waste/materials system. Essentially, 
the idea behind this policy innovation is to move from a linear materials stream – starting with 
the extraction of resources, manufacturing of products, consumption, and finally discarding of 
waste – to a closed loop system where materials remain in the system and waste is minimised 
and/or almost reduced to zero. The approach that is followed to innovate waste policy and 
transform the waste/materials system is inspired by the research field of transition studies and 
the practice of transition management such as it has been introduced by the Dutch government 
since 2001.  
 
The research field that over the last decade has become known as research into ‘system 
innovations’ and ‘sustainability  transitions’ takes as a starting point that a more sustainable 
society will to a large extent depend on a fundamental reorientation of the socio-technical 
systems that are at the heart of our societies, such as the energy system, the mobility system, 
the agro-food system and the materials system. The field of transition studies is focused 
around two broad themes of inquiry (Grin et al. 2010): firstly, how to understand, describe 
and analyse transitions and transition dynamics; and secondly, how to shape and influence 
transitions towards a more sustainable society. This paper focuses on aspects of the second 
theme, i.e. the governance of transitions.  
 
Let me first clarify how terms such as ‘transition governance’ and ‘transition management’ 
are used in this paper. In the paper, I use the term transition governance to refer to all kinds of 
efforts to consciously influence a socio-technical system in a more sustainable direction. 
There are different approaches to transition governance, such as strategic niche management 
(Kemp et al. 1998, Geels and Schot 2007), the functions approach of technological innovation 
systems (Hekkert et al. 2007), a dual-track governance approach inspired by reflexive 
modernisation (Grin 2010), and transition management (TM – Rotmans 2003, Loorbach 
2007). Transition management is undoubtedly the best known approach to influencing 
transitions. It is usually associated with the method developed by people like Jan Rotmans, 
Derk Loorbach and René Kemp, first at the research institutes ICIS and MERIT in Maastricht, 
and currently at the research institute DRIFT of Rotterdam University. Their typical TM 
approach employs a so-called ‘transition arena’ with niche-players and forward-thinking 
regime-players to develop a common problem structuring of the societal system under 
discussion, and then moves on to develop a transition agenda. This transition agenda contains 
a future vision for the system, transition pathways towards that vision, and a series of 
experiments to test and initiate the pathways in reality. The underlying rationale is one of 
“goal-oriented incrementalism” (Rotmans et al. 2007): controlling a transition is not possible, 
but transition management processes are meant to influence, modulate and accelerate changes 
along sustainable paths, through processes of learning and experimenting. 
 
TM was first introduced in policy-making by the Dutch government around 2001 (VROM 
2001). Inspired by the Dutch transition management policy, the Flemish government decided 
in 2004 to experiment in its environmental policy with transition management. Two transition 
processes, one in sustainable living and building (called DuWoBo) and one in sustainable 
material management (called Plan C), were initiated by the Flemish government in 
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respectively 2004 and 2006. As said, this working paper discusses the experiences with the 
Plan C process1.  
 
Over the years, the term ‘transition management’ has often been used as a synonym for all 
kinds of governance efforts to influence contemporary socio-technical systems, certainly in 
the Netherlands. This has led to considerable confusion of tongues and initiated a debate 
about the meaning of transition management. In particular non-Dutch researchers have 
stressed that multiple possibilities exist for influencing transitions, that consequently not all 
efforts at influencing transitions should follow the particular DRIFT-approach and thus that 
this TM-approach should be seen as but one example out of a broader palette of transition 
governance approaches (see e.g. the discussion between Shove and Walker (2007, 2008) and 
Rotmans and Kemp (2008)). Furthermore, the term ‘transition management’ has received 
some opposition because of the connotations of the word ‘management’, that suggests the 
presence of managers that have the ability to steer a system at will – a suggestion in flagrant 
opposition to the connotations of ‘governance’ and to the insights of transition studies in 
general. Anyway, in line with the current international scientific debate on the influencing of 
transitions, I only use the term ‘transition management’ when I refer to the particular DRIFT-
approach (with its typical ingredients of an arena of frontrunners, visioning, transition 
pathways and experiments), which is also the method that was used to start the Flemish 
transition processes Plan C and DuWoBo. For referring to the influencing of transitions more 
in general, I use the term ‘transition governance’. 
 
Transition governance processes – of which TM processes are thus one particular case – are 
meant as forms of innovation in governance that purposefully try to steer a socio-technical 
system in a more sustainable direction, by influencing the speed and the direction of the 
developments going on in and around that system. While TM advocates claim that TM is a 
suited governance approach for initialising systemic innovations, empirical research will have 
to show whether and how this works in practice. Of course, such processes do not develop in 
a vacuum: while they try to exert influence, they are in turn influenced by the broad societal 
and political context in which they are embedded.  
 
Different conceptual angles are possible for analysing the practice and the influence of TM. 
Researchers have focused on how visioning functions in TM (Sondeijker et al. 2006), which 
role networks play in TM (Nooteboom 2006), how experiments function (Van den Bosch 
2010), etcetera. Since TM is a governance approach, the political characteristics of TM are of 
particular interest. These are the focus of analysis in this paper. Which role does transition 
management play in the reorientation of policies towards sustainable development? Does it 
lead to innovation in governance, and if so, how? Which processes and mechanisms can be 
recognised? Which characteristics does TM and its influence have: what happens for example 
with actors and actor coalitions, power relations, discourses and the rules of policy-making in 
the studied policy domain? Can this teach us something for the further development of 
transition governance in general, and for Flanders in particular? 
 
These kind of policy-related questions are all the more relevant since it is on its political 
characteristics that TM has received most criticism. In particular research into TM processes 
in the Netherlands shows that these processes wrestle with problems of power and political 
choices, and with a policy context that is adverse to ‘reflexive governance’ (Voss et al. 2009). 
TM aims at initiating structural, deep changes in socio-technical systems such as the energy, 
                                                 
1
 A case study of the DuWoBo process will be published in a separate working paper. An early discussion of the 
two processes is to be found in Paredis 2009. 
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mobility or food system, but for the moment remains restricted to ecological modernisation. 
Although TM succeeds in creating a new discourse around the need for system thinking and 
transitions, and although it stimulates learning and experiments with new forms of governance 
(Kemp and Rotmans 2009), Scrase and Smith state that “the political strategies and tactics it 
advocates are inadequate for the task it has set itself” (2009, p. 724). In his analysis of the 
Dutch energy transition, Kern finds that the ambitious storyline has been narrowed down 
“through the capture of the process by incumbent firms and the persistence of existing 
institutional norms such as polder model practices”, and that, consequently, “it is doubtful 
whether this policy initiative will achieve its ambitions but it is too early to formally assess 
the success of this initiative” (Kern 2009, p. 122). Kenis and Mathijs (2011), building on 
Mouffe, uses the term “post-political” to qualify TM as an approach that hides conflicts, 
power struggles and a bias for a neoliberal market paradigm under a ‘neutral’ managerial 
cloak. These findings and comments reinforce earlier criticisms that TM underestimates the 
political dimensions of its endeavour (Shove and Walker 2007). 
 
My position on these topics is inspired by Grin’s position that transitions are intrinsically 
political. Since transition governance (and TM) aims at transforming long established patterns 
of actions and their structural context in a more sustainable direction, it will unavoidably meet 
with resistance, power struggles, distrust and questions of legitimacy. Instead of seeing 
politics as a problem for transitions, the awareness that transitions are intrinsically political, 
should motivate researchers and practitioners to try to understand the political mechanisms at 
work in transition processes and in that way help them to deal with the politics. “An 
understanding of the root causes of the politics specifically associated with such efforts may 
help to address it” (Grin 2010, p. 225).   
 
This paper takes an in-depth look at the Plan C process. The goal of the paper is to investigate 
the position and role of Plan C in the reorientation of waste policy, how and why such a TM 
process has influence (or not), which characteristics this influence has, and what the 
interaction is between this TM process and the broader political and societal context. The 
purpose of this kind of analysis is to shed more light on the political characteristics of 
transition management and on how the approach works in the practice of policy-making. And 
that it can thus serve to develop insights for policy-makers that wish to employ a transition 
governance (and TM) approach to policy, and for societal actors that are part of these 
processes. 
 
First, in part 2 I introduce the theoretical framework with which Plan C is analysed. The 
framework leads to an analysis in different steps. The first step in part 3 consists of an 
analysis of the current waste system and its policy arrangement. Part 4 makes a detailed 
analysis of the history and the characteristics of Plan C itself. Part 5 looks at the changes the 
waste system is currently undergoing under influence of different processes, not only Plan C, 
but also a series of context factors that range from international concern over availability of 
resources, European waste and materials policies, to socio-economic and innovation policies 
at Flemish level. Part 6 discusses the main insights derived from the analysis.  
 
In all this, it is presupposed that the reader has some basic knowledge of transition studies and 
transition management. For example, I do not explain in detail what the multilevel perspective 
(MLP) is or what the different starting points of transition management are. Readers are 
referred to previous working papers for the Steunpunt DO where this is treated in detail 
(Paredis 2008, 2009, 2010) and of course to the international literature (good starting points 
are Grin et al. 2010, Loorbach 2007, Geels 2005). 
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2. Analysing the politics of transition management: a 
glance at research design and analytical framework2 
 
 
2.1. The multilevel perspective and policy dynamics 
 
The analysis of Plan C builds on a combination of two frameworks: the multilevel perspective 
and the policy arrangements approach. The most used framework in analysing transitions is 
the multilevel perspective (MLP). It captures the complexity and multiple dimensions of 
transitions: with its three levels of analysis (regime, niche, landscape) and the interaction 
between these levels it helps to understand how transitions come about. The main lesson from 
MLP analysis is, that “transitions come about through interactions between processes at 
different levels: (a) niche-improvements build up internal momentum, through learning 
processes, price/performance improvements, and support form powerful groups, (b) changes 
at the landscape level create pressure on the regime, (c) destabilisation of the regime creates 
windows of opportunity for niche-innovations. The alignment of these processes enables the 
breakthrough of novelties in mainstream markets where they compete with the existing 
regime” (Geels and Schot 2007, p. 400). 
 
Transition studies, and in particular studies using the MLP as an analytical framework, 
usually take technologies at regime level or technological alternatives at niche level as a 
starting point for analysis. However, also non-technological niches can and will play an 
important role in a transition. One example are “policy niches”, a term introduced by Van der 
Brugge (2009). A policy niche gives room to individuals, often residing in co-called power-
networks, to break away from their role as representative of an organisation, reframe 
problems and solutions, and develop innovative policies that may be reintroduced in the 
mentioned power networks.  A policy niche is thus “a shadow process, running parallel to 
regime processes attempting to influence the regime by developing innovative perspectives” 
(ibid., p. 97). 
 
Although this interpretation of niches broadens the possibilities of MLP analysis, it has 
repeatedly been remarked that, while the MLP has proven to be useful in painting a broad 
picture of how transitions come about and which mechanisms play a role, it is less suited for 
analysing and explaining processes, roles and strategies of actors. The MLP does not have a 
good conceptualisation of politics in transitions. While the policy regime is present in the 
MLP as one of the factors in the reproduction of socio-technical regimes, it is unclear how 
exactly policies and policy innovations play a role in regime change and multi-level 
interactions. Geels (2010) states that politics and power are usually integrated “in an ad hoc 
way. Because the MLP does not provide detailed explanations of the sources and changes of 
power, it could benefit from richer, multi-faceted views of power and conflict” (p. 506). In 
their discussion of the MLP and a future research agenda, Smith et al. (2010) state that the 
MLP will have to be further developed in dialogue with other disciplines such as political 
science. They select “the politics of transitions” and “opening the black-box of public policy” 
as important research themes. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For a more detailed discussion of the analytical frame, see Paredis, E., Block, T. (2010), “Transition 
management and its influence on existing policy arrangements: explaining the dynamics of policy change”, 
paper for the EASST10 Conference, 2-4 September 2010, Trento, Italy. 
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2.2. Policy arrangements to conceptualise politics and policy 
innovation 
 
A potential candidate for better conceptualising politics, power struggles and policy 
innovations in transitions is the ‘policy arrangements approach’ (PAA), developed by Arts, 
Van Tatenhove and Leroy (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004, Arts et al. 2006, Arts and Leroy 
2006a). Originally, the PAA was developed to study policy change in environmental politics 
and it has been applied in a lot of studies in that domain. The PAA is primarily an analytical 
framework that draws on insights from political science and sociology, mainly structuration 
theory (Giddens), modernisation theory (Beck) and different strands of new institutionalism. 
 
A policy arrangement is “the temporary stabilisation of the content and organisation of a 
policy domain, in a bounded time-space context” (Arts and van Tatenhove 2004). The concept 
is meant to analyse substance and organisation of a policy domain, as well as change or 
stability of that domain. A policy arrangement has four dimensions: actors and actor 
coalitions, resources, rules of the game, discourses. The first three are organisational elements 
of policy, the last one refers to substantial aspects. 
• Actors and actor coalitions: relates to the different players involved in the policy domain, 
e.g. from different administrations, business, ngo’s, experts, scientists, civilians etc.  
• Resources: the division of resources among actors (such as money, personnel, knowledge, 
authority, technology, relations and interpersonal networks) is one of the determinants of 
their capacity to influence policies and policy results.  
• Rules of the game: formal procedures of decision making and implementation as well as 
informal routines of interaction within institutions. Rules determine which actors are in 
and out of the game, and how actors can get in. They relate to norms, procedures, 
legislation, divisions of tasks etc. in a policy domain. 
• Discourse: interpretative schemes, ranging from formal policy concepts to popular story 
lines, by which meaning is given to a policy domain. Discourses can be considered at two 
levels (Liefferink 2006): discourses about the concrete policy problems at stake (its 
character, causes and possible solutions), and discourses about the relationship between 
state, market and civil society, and thus the preferred mode of governance.  
The four dimensions are intricately connected, so that change in one of the dimensions (e.g. 
entrance of new actors) influences the other dimensions (e.g. new actors may lead to a 
different distribution of resources, new discourses, different rules to engage the players), but 
this influence is not an automatism. 
 
So how do policy arrangements change and policies innovate? This happens essentially 
through two kind of processes. The first are “ongoing processes of structural transformation” 
(Grin 2010)3: processes such as globalisation, individualisation, Europeanization of politics, 
the societization of science and technology, etc. These kind of structural societal trends are 
outside the direct grasp of policy actors, but they have an important impact on how a policy 
domain evolves. A second kind of processes that lead to policy innovation are the day-to-day 
strategic behaviour and practices of actors involved in daily policy interventions. Grin (ibid.) 
makes a distinction here between two kind of activities: activities that are deliberately geared 
toward redesigning structures in the regime, or activities that try to develop innovative 
practices.  
 
                                                 
3
 Arts et al. (2006) use ‘political modernisation’ but because this is a somewhat confusing term, I prefer Grin’s 
terminology. 
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In fact, it is not difficult to recognise the similarities between processes identified in the AAP 
and MLP-levels in these formulations: processes of structural transformation are the political 
aspects of the landscape level, the existing policy arrangement is the political part of the 
socio-technical regime, and innovative practices are the niche level. Figure 1 tries to visualize 
the analytical framework. ‘Policy’ in the regime is made explicit and detailed through the 
dimensions of a policy arrangement. The political dimensions of the landscape that exercise 
pressure on the regime arrangement, are made explicit as processes of structural 
transformation. A TM process such as Plan C is framed as a policy niche that tries to 
influence the regime – with its own ‘embryonic’ discourse, actor coalitions, rules and 
resources. 
 
Since a TM process is meant to have impact on and reform the existing policy regime, an 
essential question is how this happens. Based on their case studies in various environmental 
policy domains, Arts and Leroy (2006, p. 272-274) observe that the emergence of new policy 
arrangements can be grouped in three types:  
1. the full or partial integration of existing and originally juxtaposed policy arrangements. In 
this case, two existing arrangements merge (or merge partially), for example because 
arrangement A becomes embedded and hierarchically nested within a broader 
arrangement B.  
2. the discursive and/or organisational renewal of existing policy arrangements. In this case, 
a new discourse or institutional changes are introduced, which then lead to further changes 
in the existing arrangement. 
3. the introduction of new arrangements that should then be able to perform and 
institutionalise. In this case, a new policy arrangement is introduced that succeeds in 
maintaining itself as a more or less autonomous arrangement, and possibly replacing the 
existing arrangement. 
These types of renewal are also included in figure 1. Of course, it may not always be possible 
to strictly separate them. What is meant as a type 3 renewal, may over time become integrated 
in a broader arrangement (type 1). Or it could fail as an autonomous arrangement but have a 
discursive or organisational influence on an existing arrangement (type 2). And perhaps other 
combinations are possible.  
 
In their discussion of the energy transition in the Netherlands, Kern and Howlett (2009) 
remark that efforts to reform existing policy regime “are always embedded in pre-existing 
policy contexts with earlier policy histories sedimented in existing policy paradigms, 
institutions, practices and established actor networks” (p. 392). For understanding the renewal 
of policy arrangements (such as through TM), this implies at least two things. First, a 
contextualization of the renewal process (in this case the TM process Plan C) is necessary. To 
understand its potential influence, it is necessary to have an idea of the main features of the 
regime and landscape the process is confronted with, but possibly also of the broader societal 
and political context in which it is embedded. Second, policy renewal will often be a messy 
exercise, influenced as it is by the existing context. Kern and Howlett distinguish four 
processes that determine the outcome of efforts for policy renewal (p. 395): 
• Replacement: a re-creating or fundamental re-structuring of policies through the 
replacement of old goals and means by new ones that are coherent, consistent and 
congruent4. This is often the aim of reform efforts, but in reality the following three 
processes are more often observed. 
                                                 
4
 Coherency refers to whether policy goals are logically related to the same objectives or whether different goals 
are contradictory. Consistency refers to whether policy tools work together to support a policy goals or whether 
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• Layering: new goals and instruments are added to old ones in an existing regime without 
abandoning previous ones. 
• Drift: new goals replace old ones without changing the instruments used to implement 
them. 
• Conversion: new instrument mixes evolve while holding old goals constant. 
The result are often policy mixes that are “complex arrangements of multiple goals and means 
which, in many cases, have developed incrementally over many years (…) in which new 
instruments and objectives have been piled on top of older ones, creating a palimpsest-like 
mixture of policy elements” (ibid.).  
 
Figure 1. The MLP and the policy arrangements approach. The PAA highlights the political aspects of 
a system in transition. The policy dimension of the regime is made more explicit as an arrangement of 
dominant discourses, actors, rules and resources. New policy arrangements are built in and around 
niches. Policy innovation happens through processes of institutionalisation of a new policy 
arrangement, renewal of existing arrangements and/or integration between policy arrangements. Of 
particular importance for policy innovation are landscape trends of political modernisation and 
structural transformation. 
 
 
2.3. Transition management in the analytical frame 
 
So, when keeping in mind the discussion so far, how can we interpret transition management 
in the perspective of policy arrangements and MLP? TM can be framed as a policy niche, set 
up alongside regular policies, with the ambition of introducing a new style and practice of 
governance that aims for innovation in the policy field on the level of substance as well as 
                                                                                                                                                        
they work against each other and provide diverging incentives. Congruency refers to the relationship and the fit  
between policy goals and the means used to attain them. 
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organisation. A quick glance at the different dimensions of TM as a policy arrangement can 
further clarify this. On the level of discourse, the need for socio-technical system innovations, 
sustainability transitions, long-term thinking and transition experiments becomes prominent. 
When looking at actors, there is a plea for involvement of frontrunners and forward-thinking 
regime players. The resources of these actors can be strengthened vis-à-vis incumbents 
through building new networks, mobilising financial means, generating common knowledge 
about problem perceptions and future visions and transitions pathways, strengthening 
sustainable niches through experiments. New rules under TM could relate for example to new 
(formal or informal) procedures to involve innovative actors or adjustments to financial 
mechanisms in order to favour more sustainable practices. TM usually takes a normative 
stance towards governance: multi-actor settings, expanding networks with frontrunners, 
approaches such as participatory visioning are deemed necessary instruments to influence 
transitions. 
 
Important questions then arise as to what extent TM really represents an innovation in 
governance, under what conditions it can further institutionalise, and how this process and the 
resulting policy can be characterised. This can only be analysed by doing empirical research, 
such as research into the Plan C process. Do actor coalitions change under influence of Plan C? 
What is the influence on discourse? Does Plan C change the access to and availability of 
resources in the system and policy domain? Are the rules of policy-making influenced by Plan 
C? And how and why does all of this happen (or not)?  
 
Using the described analytical framework in the case study of Plan C implies a series of 
different steps: 
• Describe the properties of the dominant or regime policy arrangement and how they came 
about, namely its discourses, actors, rules, resources and power relations (mainly part 3); 
• Describe the new policy arrangement around the TM process Plan C, based on discourses 
used, actors, rules, resources and power relations (mainly part 4); 
• Determine which structural trends are relevant for the waste and materials domain and 
how they exert influence (through different parts); 
• Describe the interaction between the different levels, determine patterns and mechanisms, 
how and why the dominant policy arrangement changes (or not)? (mainly part 5 and 6). 
 
In summary: building on the combined framework of MLP and PAA, it is possible to define 
Plan C as a policy niche that runs parallel to regime policies and attempts to influence the 
regime by developing innovative policy perspectives. To understand the policy characteristics 
of this niche and its interaction with regime policies, the policy arrangements approach can be 
employed. This allows for an analysis of the political characteristics of a TM process and its 
context in terms of discourses, actors, rules and resources. It also draws attention to the 
embeddedness of new policy arrangements in ongoing processes of structural transformation. 
 
The following case study of Plan C follows a qualitative research approach. To gather 
empirical data, different type of data sources are used: policy documents and legal texts, 
secondary literature, semi-structured interviews5, participatory observation and a feedback 
seminar on interim results (14 March 2011). The dimensions of the PAA are used to structure 
data. An important method to understand how change happens is through reconstruction of 
processes or process tracing. 
                                                 
5
 See the annex for the interviews 
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3. The Flemish waste system and its policy arrangement 
 
As mentioned a few paragraphs earlier, understanding the role that a transition management 
process such as Plan C can play in the renewal of policies, demands a contextualization of that 
process: what are established structures and patterns of action with which it is confronted? 
What are relevant long-term trends? In terms of the MLP: what are the characteristics of the 
regime that Plan C wants to have influence on and what are landscape trends? And more 
specifically for the policy context: what does the policy arrangement look like?  
 
Since Plan C was introduced by the Flemish government with the aim of reorienting its waste 
policy towards a more broader sustainable materials policy, the analysis in this part 3 gives a 
concise overview of, first in 3.1. the growth of the waste regime, and second in 3.2. of the 
current waste regime and its policy arrangement. It is not my intention, within the constraints 
of the research project, to present a comprehensive analysis of the current waste regime and 
its historical growth, but still, the analysis aims to highlight those aspects that make a 
comparison possible with the features of Plan C and with the changes that seem to be 
currently underway in the direction of a more sustainable materials orientation. The start of 
waste policy as a separate policy domain is usually situated in the late seventies, early eighties. 
I mark the first phase of waste policy with a first policy arrangement from 1981 to 1994 
(discussed in 3.1.), and a second phase with a new policy arrangement from 1994 to the 
present (discussed in 3.2.). Such a delineation has some arbitrariness to it: there is always a 
certain continuity between different periods, with policies and all kinds of initiatives crossing 
these dividing lines. Still, it can be argued that since the mid-nineties, the different dimensions 
of the policy arrangement (discourse, actors, rules, resources) differ from that in the eighties 
and have since then shown some consistency and robustness. The criteria for distinguishing 
between periods are thus a relative consistency in discourse, actors, rules, and resources 
configuration. Figure 2 shows where the following analysis should be situated in the 
analytical framework. 
 
Figure 2. The focus of the analysis in part 3 is on the current waste regime and its policy arrangement. 
This is mainly discussed in paragraph 3.2. Paragraph 3.1. goes back further in time and discusses 
some of the historic developments in waste policy, leading up to the current policy arrangement 
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3.1. 1981-1994: A system focused on waste removal 
 
Like most other industrialised countries, until the late sixties, early seventies Belgium had a 
waste system that was locally organised. Waste collection was the responsibility of 
municipalities and most waste was carried off to landfills. By the early seventies, mainly due 
to booming economic activity and changing production and consumption patterns, waste 
volumes had grown considerably, with a lot of qualitatively different waste (e.g. more 
plastics). The locally limited storage and processing capacity induced environmental and 
public health problems and triggered the first steps towards new waste policies. From early on 
the European policy level played a role, for example with the introduction of an EEC 
Directive in 1975 (C75/442/EEG) that obliged member states to create authorities for control 
of waste, planning, policy coordination and granting of permits.  
 
The form waste policy was to get in Belgium was decisively influenced by the reform of the 
Belgian state structure in 1980, which transferred a lot of environmental and nature policy 
towards the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels). Waste and water policy were the first 
domains to be developed under the new Flemish environmental competences. The basic rules 
of the new policy domain were laid down in the Decree Regarding Prevention and 
Management of Waste of 2 July 1981, usually labelled as the Waste Decree. It was the first 
environmental Decree approved by the Flemish Parliament. From the start of waste policy, the 
discourse on waste mentioned the waste hierarchy6. In its Article 2, the Waste Decree states 
that its goal is to protect man and the environment against the harmful influence of waste, by 
preventing waste, by stimulating the re-use, recovering and recycling of waste, and by 
organising the removal of waste. The Decree distinguishes between two man categories of 
waste: household waste and industrial waste. As the local and provincial level were regarded 
as too small scale to tackle the waste problems, the Waste Decree of 1981 established a new 
actor at Flemish level, the Public Waste Agency of Flanders (OVAM). OVAM becomes the 
central government player in the waste system, but municipalities retain an essential role for 
implementation at local level. 
 
In spite of the intentions of the Waste Decree, during the eighties policy in practice almost 
exclusively focused on waste removal and processing. The priority during the first five years 
was “creating order out of chaos” (Bachus et al. 2007, p. 50): Flanders had more than 400 
landfills, of which a lot were illegal and badly exploited; municipalities followed their own 
rules; infrastructures such as for incineration installations were spread unevenly over the 
territory and were far from sufficient. One of the first tasks of OVAM was to gather data that 
could inform planning of processing capacity and regional distribution of infrastructures.  
This kind of information also allowed for the start of a permits policy for installations and 
companies. The Waste Decree had abolished the old permits and thus allowed for a 
reorganization of the sector (Loorbach 2004). In line with the Decree, the Flemish 
government developed a first Waste Plan 1986-1990 (published in 1987). This plan continued 
the systematic collection of data in order to get waste removal under control. It focused on 
household as well as industrial waste, and it introduced the principle of environmental levies 
on landfilling and incineration.  According to Loots et al. (2008), in that way “the waste sector 
got its own legislation, its own organisation, and its own rules and procedures for policy 
development and implementation: institutionalisation in a nutshell.” 
 
                                                 
6
 In Flanders and the Netherlands, the waste hierarchy is often named “Lansink’s ladder”, referring to a motion 
from the Dutch politician Ad Lansink that was passed in the Dutch Parliament in 1979. 
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And the institutionalisation continues. In the second Waste Plan 1991-1995, the waste 
problem is framed more broadly and the discourse on problem analysis and objectives shifts 
from the end of the waste chain towards the beginning. Most measures are still directed at 
waste removal, but selective collection acquires a full place and the first traces of prevention 
and re-use policy appear, although these remain vague in goals and implementation. 
Communication and media campaigns focus predominantly on selective collection. This new 
focus must also be seen in connection to the increasing incineration of waste: incineration still 
struggles with a limited capacity and with toxic emissions, so a strategy of increased selective 
collection yields less residual waste, and thus less incineration (Bachus et al. 2007). The 
implementation of the second waste plan is supported by an environmental covenant with 
municipalities that the Flemish government concludes for the period 1992-1996. 
Municipalities can subscribe to the covenant on a voluntary basis and when they do, they are 
subsidised for setting up specific initiatives. Although the covenants want to stimulate local 
environmental policy in general, most initiatives in the first covenant are related to selective 
collection of waste fractions, such as glass, paper and vegetable, fruit and garden waste.  
 
Meanwhile, specific attention was also devoted to industrial waste, inter alia because of 
industrial waste import from the Netherlands (after several scandals with toxic landfills – see 
Loorbach 2007) and because of a growing need for disposal of industrial waste from industry 
around the Antwerp harbour. This led amongst other things to a duty to report on industrial 
waste (1981), better monitoring and a ban on landfilling for imported waste (1993). In order 
to increase processing capacity, the NV Indaver was created in 1985, a collaboration between 
the government and industry to handle problematic industrial waste streams. 
 
As different observers have noted (Geeraerts et al. 2005, Bachus et al. 2007), it can be 
concluded that although the discourse prescribes a waste policy that starts from prevention 
and moves down to incineration and landfilling, in reality policy begins at the lowest rungs of 
the ladder and tries to work its way up. Waste policy started by getting control over the 
situation through legislation, planning and organisation of infrastructure around landfilling 
and incineration. Selective collection and recycling were supportive of these policies. Once 
the basics were more or less in place, the next steps could be taken. All of this happened 
through a form of planning that was strongly top-down, with the Flemish government and its 
agency OVAM in control. The focus is also mainly on implementation and less on strategic 
long-term planning and coordination.  
 
 
3.2. 1994-2010: Reorienting the system on the basis of the waste 
hierarchy  
 
The reorientation from the end towards the beginning of the waste chain that was already 
visible in the second waste plan, accelerates from the mid-nineties onwards. During the 
implementation of the second waste plan, several bottlenecks had surfaced (Bachus et al. 2007, 
51-52): the efforts for selective collection were not efficient enough because there was 
insufficient processing capacity in Flanders and almost no market;  there is still a too limited 
incineration capacity and a lack of category-1 landfills (for dangerous waste, mainly from 
industrial sources); the societal cost for removal of waste is higher than what is effectively 
charged; and there are not enough people and resources for developing a prevention and 
recovery policy. These kind of problems lead to the conclusion that the Waste Decree from 
1981 has to be thoroughly updated, which happens on 20 April 1994. The waste hierarchy not 
only becomes much more prominent in the discourse, but it is strengthened with concepts 
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such as producer responsibility and the polluter pays principle. New formal rules under the 
form of new legislation and new policy instruments are introduced, including a series of 
sectoral implementation plans to tackle separate waste streams.  
 
This evolution runs in parallel to and is strengthened by another development, namely the 
growing consciousness that the fragmentation of environmental policy in Flanders and the 
available organisational and financial means are insufficient to tackle the increasing 
environmental problems. The first attempts at more strategic, integrated and long-term 
planning already dated from 1989 and 1990 when the then Minister of the Environment 
Kelchtermans launched two plans in a short period of time7. On 5 April 1995, the Flemish 
government approved the Decree General Provisions Relating to Environmental Policy 
(DABM, Decreet Algemene Bepalingen Milieubeleid). The DABM stipulates that henceforth 
Flemish environmental policy takes its shape through a combination of environmental plans, 
environmental yearly programmes and environmental reports. The environmental report 
(MIRA) has to provide scientific support for policy. The environmental plan (MINA-plan) 
defines the outlines of environmental policy at Flemish regional level and at provincial and 
municipal level, and in that way also enhances the effectiveness, efficiency and internal 
congruency of policy at all levels. The environmental yearly programmes are the 
operationalisation of the plan in terms of timing, organisation and priorities. 
 
The consequence for waste policy is that the separate waste plans from the previous period are 
abolished, because the strategic lines of waste policy are now integrated in the MINA-plans. 
The MINA 2-plan 1997-2001 continues the orientation towards prevention and stipulates that 
the objective is to reduce the amount of waste to the unavoidable minimum, while the 
remaining waste stream must reach a sufficient quality so that it can serve as a secondary 
material for the same or another product or production process (De Bruyn et al. 2003). 
Whereas the MINA-plan formulates the strategic outline of waste policy, the 
operationalisation of waste policy happens through sectoral implementation plans, as already 
foreseen in the Waste Decree 1994. Starting from this basic logic, since the mid-nineties 
waste policy has become more and more refined in its combination of rules and instruments to 
orient the system on the basis of the waste hierarchy.  
 
Of course, not only the events at the level of the Flemish waste regime explain the evolutions 
in policy. These are also a consequence of what can be labelled landscape developments and 
processes of structural transformation. The early nineties is the time when sustainable 
developments policies increasingly receive attention in the follow-up of the 1992 UNCED-
conference and the European policy level increasingly influences environmental policy, with 
amongst others a packaging directive in 1994, a directive concerning integrated pollution 
prevention and control in 1996, and a landfill directive in 1999. Between the start of the 
Flemish waste policy in 1981 and the present, “more than 50 Directives, Decisions and 
Regulations have been adopted. They relate to a whole range of themes, from the landfilling, 
incineration or transboundary movement of waste to the selective collection and recycling of 
batteries, packaging waste, end-of-life vehicles and electric equipment. In addition, a number 
of thematic strategies and action plans on waste-related topics have been developed at the EU 
level. Subjects covered in such action plans and strategies are waste prevention and recycling, 
                                                 
7
 The Mina-plan 2000 (February 1989) was mainly written by the Minister and his cabinet and had a rather 
internal government character. The Milieubeleidsplan en Natuurontwikkelingsplan (February 1990) built on 
contributions from different administrations and for the nature part on the expertise of non-governmental experts. 
It was the first important document in the political and societal discussion on the headlines of environmental 
policy. See Loots et al. 2008. 
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sustainable consumption and production, sustainable use of natural resources and 
shipdismantling” (OVAM website). 
 
As said above, it is not the intention of this paper to make a full analysis of the current waste 
regime or current waste policy, but to select a series of important features on the basis of the 
policy arrangements approach that can serve as comparative material with what happens 
under the Plan C process and the attempt at a shift to a sustainable materials regime. 
 
 
3.2.1. Discourse 
 
As mentioned already, the basic logic of the regime and its policy arrangement is the waste 
hierarchy: policy should first focus on waste prevention, followed by re-use, recycling of 
products and materials or valorisation by conversion in compost, incineration with energy 
recovery, incineration without energy recovery, and finally landfilling. Adhering to the waste 
hierarchy is not obvious, however. In their evaluation of 15 years of prevention policy, 
Bachus et al. (2007) find that prevention is the most difficult aspect of waste policy, because  
it is the aspect that is most influenced by context factors such as the evolution of consumption 
patterns, the evolution of technology, the evolution of European policies, all of which do not 
necessarily stimulate prevention. Within that context, Flemish prevention policy has several 
merits, according to Bachus et al.: it has created a legal base for prevention, it has influenced 
industrial practices (in particular under the form of eco-efficiency practices), it can boast 
several successful projects (such as in the area of composting). But on the other hand, 
prevention policy is still in its infancy and has a huge potential for improvement. Reasons for 
the low impact include: a lack of clear, strategic goals and a lot of ad hoc initiatives, a small 
budget for prevention activities, low political priority with a lack of willingness to interfere 
directly in consumption or production activities. In reality, then, the system predominantly 
remains a selective collection-recycling-incineration instead of a prevention system. Still, the 
policies that have been developed, has brought Flanders amongst the top regions of waste 
management worldwide, with one of the lowest landfilling rates and one of the highest 
recycling rates in Europe (EEA 2009). 
 
While the waste regime and its policy arrangement converge around the idea of the waste 
hierarchy, the discourse contains other elements as well, which are mostly an extension or a 
complement to the waste hierarchy principle. Examples are the principle of producer 
responsibility, which states that producers are co-responsible for the products they bring to 
market, also when these have reached the waste phase; the polluter pays principle which states 
that the actor who causes pollution should pay for its removal; or the principal of self-
sufficiency with regard to final disposal, which states that Flanders should try to handle its 
waste within its own borders. These kind of discourse elements are of course not unique for 
Flanders but fit within the European discourse on waste. But the way they are translated in 
rules and actor involvement has an important influence on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the different waste systems. 
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3.2.2. Rules 
 
Until June 2011, the basis for waste policy remained the Waste Decree of 1981/19948. Since 
this was a framework decree, implementing orders were necessary that clarified certain 
definitions, regulations, recognitions, compliance rules. Since 1997, these are bundled and 
regularly updated in VLAREA (Flemish Regulation relating to Waste Prevention and 
Management – Vlaams Reglement Afvalvoorkoming en –beheer). Changes in VLAREA often 
represent changes in thinking about waste and secondary materials. For example, in 2003 
important changes were carried through in VLAREA with amongst other things new rules on 
waste incineration and changes about which waste streams can be taken in consideration as 
secondary materials (Claes et al. 2007).  
 
As mentioned, waste policy planning is on a strategic level integrated in the MINA-plans, that 
set out the policy lines for Flemish environmental policy in general. The MINA 2-plan 1997-
2001, the MINA 3-plan 2003-2007 and the MINA 3+-plan 2008-2010 continue the trend of 
increasing attention for waste prevention in the chapters on waste. Because policy and actions 
on household waste are relatively successful, MINA 3 pays more attention to prevention, re-
use and recycling of industrial waste and to prevention through process and product policy 
(such as promotion of eco-design)9. MINA 3+ mentions the need for an additional policy line 
that focuses on a broadening of traditional waste policy to sustainable materials management. 
In parallel to this broader policy approach it mentions “the start of a transition process 
towards sustainable materials management that focuses on radical innovations” (LNE 2008, p. 
42). 
 
While the MINA-plans formulate the strategic direction and the outline of waste policy, 
policies related to specific waste streams are further detailed in a series of different 
implementation plans. On its website, OVAM talks about “a system of plans” that covers all 
relevant waste streams. These currently include amongst other things implementation plans 
for household waste, organic-biological waste, sound materials use and waste management in 
the building sector, small company industrial waste, wood waste, sludge, high-caloric waste. 
The actual realization of the plans is done through employment of different sorts of policy 
instruments at Flemish level. Furthermore, the municipalities keep their supportive role 
through new covenants and cooperation agreements. 
 
One of the main policy instruments at Flemish level is the acceptance obligation, which is a 
translation in rules of producer responsibility. Under the acceptance obligation, companies 
remain responsible for the products they bring to the market and they are thus obliged to set 
up a selective collection and processing system once these products have become waste. 
Instead of doing this on an individual basis, most companies participate in so-called voluntary 
Environmental Policy Agreements, which is an agreement between the government (OVAM) 
and an industrial sector that makes the sector collectively responsible for realising prevention, 
selective collection and processing. Such agreements exist for example for batteries, tires, 
packaging material10, electrical and electronic equipment, cars, medicines etcetera. They are 
always executed through specific sectoral management organisms (such as Bebat for waste 
                                                 
8
 On 24 June 2011, the Flemish government approved the Materials Decree. See in particular part 5. 
9
 MINA 3 also introduced the concept “capital stock management” and announced the start of a project to 
operationalise this concept as a framework for long-term environmental policy. This will provide the opportunity 
to initiate two transition management processes, one in sustainable materials management (Plan C) and one in 
sustainable housing and building (DuWoBo). See 4.1.1. 
10
 For the packaging sector, the term ‘take back obligation’ is used instead of ‘acceptance obligation’.  
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batteries, Fostplus for packaging waste from households, Val-I-Pac for packaging waste from 
industry , Recytyre for waste tires, Valorfrit for used frying fat and oil, etc.).  
 
Another policy instrument that is characteristic of Flemish waste policy are bans on 
landfilling and incineration. In order to divert as much waste as possible to recycling or re-use, 
over the years several kind of bans have been installed. Waste that can be recycled and/or that 
has been selectively collected (such as paper; glass, metal and plastic packaging; vegetables, 
fruit and garden waste) may not be landfilled or burned. From unsorted waste, first recyclable 
materials are removed, before it is burned or landfilled. In the last step, only waste that cannot 
be burned, will be landfilled. 
 
In addition to bans, the government also actively makes use of environmental levies on 
landfilling and incineration. Landfills and incineration installations pay a levy per ton of 
waste that is landfilled or burned to the Flemish government. The sum of the levy is 
dependent on the kind of waste and the way it is treated. This levy is of course passed on 
down the chain, so that it is in the end the producers of waste (households, companies…) that 
pay the levy.  
 
In their study on waste prevention policy, Bachus et al. (2007) find that the combination of 
bans, levies and acceptance obligations are to a large extent responsible for the success of 
recycling in Flanders. But their effect on prevention is limited because they were never really 
conceived as instruments for prevention, only as steering instruments for moving from 
landfilling/incineration up the ladder towards selective collection and recycling. Prevention 
policy has mainly made use of communicative instruments (sensitisation campaigns, 
information, seminars, website…). 
 
 
3.2.3. Actors 
 
Government at several levels has always played a crucial role in the waste regime and its 
policy. From the nineties onwards private actors become more important, but all in all the 
system remains dominated by government actors. Waste policy is inside the competence of 
the Minister of the Environment, with OVAM as the central government actor in the 
administration, responsible for policy preparation and implementation. Municipalities play an 
important role in policy implementation, in particular for household waste, since they are 
responsible for the collection and processing of household waste. Almost all municipalities 
(306 out of 308) cooperate in intermunicipal associations. The role of these associations has 
grown in importance over the years. When waste policy started in the early eighties, some 
municipalities already cooperated in the construction and exploitation of incineration 
installations (Geeraerts et al. 2005). Over the years, this form of cooperation has spread over 
the whole of Flanders, with momentarily 25 associations. The relation between municipality 
and association differs between cases: sometimes the association dominates local waste policy, 
while in other cases the municipality still outlines its own waste policy (ibid.). Since 1996, the 
associations in cooperation with the association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (VVSG) 
have formed their own representative coordination unit (Interafval) that functions as 
spokesperson for their interests towards OVAM and other political bodies. Also the provinces 
play a role in waste policy, mainly in a supporting role for municipalities and associations. 
 
With the development of a waste market and a recycling industry, the private sector has 
become structurally involved in the waste chain. Private companies sometimes participate in 
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the capital of intermunicipal associations and execute tasks such as collection, recycling or 
processing. But the industrial waste sector is much more important than the sector of 
household waste and it thus most interesting for private companies. Although some 
municipalities still collect waste from small and medium enterprises, over the years collecting 
and processing industrial waste has become a sector for private enterprises (ibid.). There is a 
strong tendency towards vertical integration, with operators offering a package of services 
covering each link in the chain, from waste collection to processing of waste matter (Claes et 
al. 2007). International groups have entered the market, with a growing integration of the 
Flemish waste market in a European market. 
 
Producers (of products, and thus of waste) play a role mainly through the series of 
management organisms that they have set up as part of their duties under the acceptance 
obligation 
 
 
3.2.4. Resources 
 
While in the eighties, resources were mainly controlled by government actors, from the 
nineties onwards the private sector gets an important position, certainly in the industrial waste 
segment. The main government actor OVAM has around 80 million Euros available to do its 
job (an important part of this is spent on soil remediation and the prevention of soil pollution). 
Due to the increasing role of the private sector, the relative power of government actors has 
decreased. In December 2006, the Flemish government sold its majority share in Indaver to 
the Dutch group Delta Milieu and retreated from the private industrial waste market.  
 
 
3.2.5. Towards a next step 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Flanders has succeeded in creating a well-performing 
waste system and it is considered top of the European class in selective collection and 
recycling. Landfill taxes and bans have reduced dumping from almost 50% of total household 
waste in the early nineties to 3% in 2009. The recycling rate has increased from almost 20% 
to 75% in the same period (VMM 2008, 2010). However, the total amount of household waste 
has remained virtually constant around 550 kg per person since 2000; 150 kg of this waste is 
“definitively removed” (usually incinerated). With these figures Flanders reaches the goals it 
formulated in the MINA 3+-plan, it is also among the least household waste producers in 
Europe, but it still remains an impressive waste heap (around 3,4 million tons in 2007), and it 
is far from obvious how this can be further reduced with current policies. Furthermore, 
industrial waste is difficult to get under control. Total amounts fluctuate but remain constantly 
higher than in the beginning of the century. In 2008, they were at 21,8 million tons, almost 3 
million tons above the MINA 3+ goal, of which around 63% went to a form of material 
recycling. The period 2002-2008 showed no decoupling of industrial waste from the Flemish 
gross regional product. 
 
These kind of trends were already visible for several years and led to a realisation with several 
OVAM officials that, in order to further reduce waste amounts, a new step in waste policy 
was needed.  
“The feeling was that there was a standstill in policy. We were not going to reach 
our goals by better selective collection and more recycling, but we had to work 
much more upstream in the chain (…) We realised we also had to look at 
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production processes, at the design phase, and that’s how the idea of materials 
policy grew. You always want to see an evolution, you want to progress. That was 
one of the main factors, the conclusion that we needed new projects and a next 
step in policy. Unless of course you are satisfied with what you have: we are the 
best sorters in Europe and now we are going to rest on our laurels” (civil 
servant). 
 
This realization becomes visible in the Strategic Plan of OVAM for 2005-2009. Alongside 
waste management, a new policy field is introduced, namely “materials policy”. Materials 
policy is meant to lead “to an effective and far-reaching decoupling of economic growth 
and environmental pressure”. As one of the strategic goals of the plan, OVAM will 
contribute to the introduction of thinking in terms of material streams in economic and 
environmental policy. One way of operationalising this goal is through the introduction of a 
transition process. To fully understand this step to the introduction of a transition process, 
two other developments should be added. This will be further discussed in 4.1.1. 
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4. The TM-process Plan C: history and characteristics 
 
 
In 2006 OVAM takes the initiative to start a transition management process, called Plan C. 
This part of the paper makes a detailed analysis of the characteristics of this process. In terms 
of the analytical framework, figure 3 illustrates the focus of this part. 
 
Paragraph 4.1. first gives a chronological description of the main events. I divide the history 
of the Plan C process in six parts: a predevelopment phase, four phases between mid 2006 and 
mid 2011, and the future situation. Figure 4 gives an overview of the main activities, 
processes and context events related to Plan C. Paragraph 4.2. discusses Plan C as a policy 
arrangement in embryonic form. 
 
 
Figure 3. The focus of analysis in part 4 is on Plan C as a TM process. Paragraph 4.1. describes the 
history of the process, while 4.2. makes an analysis of Plan C as a policy arrangement. 
 
 
4.1. A history of Plan C 
 
4.1.1. Context and predevelopments: how and why TM was introduced 
 
As discussed in 3.2., the internal reflections within OVAM on policy development formed the 
first important element that led to the start of Plan C. Two other political developments 
converged that made possible the start of the transition management process. The first was 
related to the development of Flemish environmental policy in general. Although mainly 
focused on sectoral environmental policy, the Third Flemish Environmental Policy Plan 
(MINA-plan 2003-2007) also left some room for a broader policy focus on sustainable 
development. In the process leading up to the plan, a few studies had been produced that all 
hinted at the potential of system innovation and transition management as anchoring points 
for sustainable development, without however going into any detail as to how these should be 
applied to Flanders. Although these studies were written in different fields and for different 
purposes, the researchers and civil servants involved were closely connected to the field of 
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environment and/or sustainable development and usually knew each other personally. 
Between 2002 and 2004, several of them also went to visit Jan Rotmans and his team at ICIS 
Maastricht to discuss the new concept of transition management. The study of De Jonge 
(2003), a preparatory study for the MINA-plan 2003-2007, discusses how environmental 
resource policy and capital stock management can be embedded in a wider framework that 
focuses on system innovation. Based on Dutch examples, he proposes an “ad hoc framework” 
to initiate system innovation and transition management in Flanders. Van Humbeeck (2003), 
in a paper for the Flemish socio-economic advisory council SERV on the relation between 
industrial policy, innovation policy and the environment, also points out the necessity of 
system innovation to tackle environmental problems and to simultaneously renew the 
economic system. He states that incremental innovations will not suffice to solve 
environmental problems and discusses the importance of radical technological innovations 
and transitions on a systems level. In 2003 and 2004, two papers from the Flemish innovation 
institute IWT, written in the context of an OECD project on horizontal innovation policies, 
both refer to innovation, transition management and sustainable development (Van Humbeeck 
et al. 2003, Larosse 2004). And finally, two advisory councils to the Flemish government (the 
socio-economic council SERV and the environment and nature council MINA-Raad) 
pronounced themselves in favour of experimenting with transition processes. In 2002 during 
the public consultation for the MINA-plan 2003-2007, both councils pleaded for radical 
innovations under the form of long-term system innovations and asked the government to 
study the possibilities of framing these as transitions and transition management. 
 
Inspired by these kind of studies and the support from the advisory councils, the MINA-plan 
2003-2007 in its project 1 identified “capital stock management” as an important track for 
developing long-term policy goals and realizing sustainable development. In 2004, this 
project was made operational in the Environmental Year Programme 2004, where “system 
innovation” and “transition management” were identified as necessary for reaching goals such 
as factor 10. For the first time, “sustainable building” is mentioned as a possible case to test 
the approach of “system innovation”. This choice was reinforced when the then Flemish 
Minister of the Environment, Kris Peeters, in his Policy Note 2004-2009 formulated the need 
for an “innovative environmental policy” with as strategic long-term objective “preparing 
Flanders for transitions” (Peeters 2004, 81). The note states that in the long term radical 
transitions may be necessary that go beyond system optimisation and that require system 
innovations. The Flemish Region should therefore identify long-term and legislature-crossing 
objectives, which can then serve as orientation points for short and medium term policy. In its 
operational objectives the policy note then formulates the need to study the feasibility of the 
concept of transition management in a Flemish context “with sustainable housing and 
building as testing ground.” (ibid., 79). In 2004, a transition process started in sustainable 
housing and building (the so-called DuWoBo process). Plan C followed two years later. 
 
The last political development that was important in the choice for a TM process, was a huge 
reorganisation of the Flemish administration, called Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid (BBB – Better 
Administrative Policy), implemented by the Flemish government since 2001. One of the main 
aims of this reorganisation, inspired by the principles of New Public Management, was to 
restructure the public administration in thirteen homogenous policy domains. In order to 
overcome policy fragmentation, clearly defined tasks were assigned to departments and 
specialised agencies. This led to considerable nervousness within the various administrations 
about the division of these tasks and responsibilities. The OVAM management was concerned 
about the assignment of the competence ‘prevention of waste’, because existing activities on 
eco-efficiency and eco-design need not strictly be classified as belonging to a waste 
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management agency. In mutual agreement with the cabinet of the minister of the environment, 
it was suggested that OVAM be assigned a new task, alternately called “stock management” 
and “resource flow management”, which would include prevention. Nobody really knew what 
the exact meaning of these new terms was, but they were picked up from the above-
mentioned scientific report of De Jonge (2003) that was written as a preparatory study for the 
Environmental Policy Plan 2003-2007. An interviewee recalls that: 
“Frank Parent11 was concerned that the BBB reform would lead to the loss of the 
competence ‘prevention of waste’, a concern that was apparently shared by the 
cabinet of the Minister. The head of cabinet opened up the report of De Jonge and 
encountered the term ‘resource flow management’. This seemed an appropriate 
steppingstone so as not to lose prevention”. (civil servant) 
 
In the following months, OVAM official Walter Tempst prepared a note in which he 
suggested to interpret the new terms as “materials policy” and to reformulate the new task as 
“development and management of the subsystem materials”. Tempst was one of the civil 
servants who had visited Jan Rotmans at ICIS and who had become intrigued by the concept 
of transition management and its potential for policy innovation. During 2004, under his 
impulse OVAM ordered an internal study from ICIS Maastricht because TM seemed a good 
framework for thinking about the long-term policy development of OVAM. In this study 
(Loorbach 2004, Loorbach et al. 2004), the concepts of transitions and the approach of 
transition management were defined as promising concepts for OVAM to tackle sustainable 
materials management. In an advisory note for the Board of Directors of OVAM, these 
conclusions were extensively linked to the new OVAM tasks under the BBB reorganisation of 
the Flemish administration. Initiating and supporting the transition were defined as possible 
tasks for OVAM. In June 2004 the Board adopted the conclusions of the report, and even 
though there were some controversies about the necessity of starting a transition process, 
OVAM officials were commissioned in 2005 to start working on a transition arena. This 
would eventually evolve into Plan C.  
 
 
4.1.2. Phase 1: The transition arena Plan C, June 2006 – May 2007 
 
So, three interconnected developments converged that made the start of the Plan C process 
possible: internal reflections within OVAM on the developments of waste policy, the 
opportunity created by the BBB administrative reform to fill in a new task on ‘resource flow 
management’ for OVAM, and the developments in environmental policy to start 
experimenting with new policy approaches. After the OVAM Board of Directors permitted to 
set up a transition process, OVAM officials started the preparation mid 2005 with the 
selection of two consultant agencies (Resource Analysis, Pantopicon) to coach the process. 
These first screen potential Flemish participants from business, knowledge institutions and 
ngo’s. Early 2006,  two group discussions are organised around the theme ‘broadening waste 
policy to materials policy’ and the participants that seem most interesting and forward-
looking are asked to participate in the first transition arena. There is some contingency in this 
selection, “although we prepared it, the selection was not that methodical”, according to one 
of the interviewees: some people do not find themselves capable enough or have no time, 
others are stumbled upon more or less by accident, but in the end a balanced group of fifteen 
people is composed, from government, business, academia, consultants and ngo’s, with 
backgrounds in amongst other things materials, waste, chemicals, environment, consumer  
                                                 
11
 At the time, Frank Parent was administrator-general of OVAM. 
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Figure 4. A reconstruction of the Plan C process. Underneath the time line, the picture shows the main events such as transition arena’s and conferences. 
Above the time line, it shows important elements of the process (such as the policy bodies, strategic discussions, consultants) and elements of the Flemish 
policy context (such as environmental and socio-economic policy of the Flemish government). See the text for details. 
affairs, distribution and innovation. In transition management terminology: the group consists 
almost entirely of forward-looking regime players. In line with TM theory, they are also asked 
to participate as individuals and not as representatives of their organisations.  
 
In June 2006, the arena is officially installed. The representative of the Minister of the 
Environment and the Administrator-General of OVAM address the participants and urge them 
to develop a long-term transition vision for sustainable materials management that can also be 
translated in short-term actions. In September 2006, the transition arena meets for the first 
working meeting. Karel Van Acker (materials scientist from KU Leuven) and Paul De 
Bruycker (industrial waste group Indaver) are chosen as presidents. OVAM has also reserved 
a limited budget for two experts in groups dynamics and multi-party collaboration (prof. 
Tharsi Taillieu, Marc Craps) to follow the process, draw lessons and when needed give advice 
on how to conduct the process. The management and coaching of the process is done by a 
transition secretariat made up of the consultants, OVAM officials (with Walter Tempst as 
central figure), the process experts and one of the presidents (Van Acker). Except for the 
president, these people try to stay clear from substantive discussions during the arena 
meetings, so as not to mix different roles. “This was one of the lessons learned from the 
DuWoBo transition process: you create an enormous confusion when you wear two hats”, 
according to an interviewee.  
 
The working pace is high: the transition arena meets five times between September 2006 and 
January 2007. The meetings start from a preliminary system analysis, prepared by the 
consultants, which could partly benefit from the work that had been done almost two years 
earlier by Loorbach et al. (2004). The analysis is thoroughly discussed during the first two 
meetings of the transition arena. Problems identified include the environmental consequences 
of current production and consumption patterns, growing scarcity of resources and materials, 
social effects of these patterns, unequal North-South distribution, and the current culture of 
spending. These trends undermine welfare worldwide and necessitate the search for radical 
changes in the system of material use and management. 
 
Then the group moves on to the formulation of a future vision of sustainable material use (the 
term leitbild is used), selecting key themes on which to focus in Flanders, defining solutions 
and identifying levers for change. The leitbild sketches an image of how the Flemish society 
should ideally deal with resources and materials. “Central in this picture of the future is a 
high-grade closing of the material loops. We will not use less material products, but the new 
resources needed have to decrease drastically. This can be realized either by closing the loop 
in the biosphere and/or in the technosphere” (Van Acker 2009). Society will handle resources, 
materials and energy responsibly and with care, and resources and materials will be regarded 
as common goods. Materials are managed and controlled over the whole of the life cycle in 
cooperating networks or clusters of producers, processing companies and consumers. The 
materials system will function as a subsystem of a service economy: people do no longer 
measure their happiness on the basis of the property of material products, but on access to 
services that are embedded in the social and natural environment. Flanders is a trend setter in 
material management, with a high level of knowledge about wise material use and the 
development of new materials and services. These developments also offer new opportunities 
for the Flemish economy as the cradle of sustainable material management.  
 
The leitbild is more or less finished in January 2007. According to TM theory, the challenge 
is now to open up the original transition arena and invite new participants to align themselves 
with the process. The original arena members, as well as the consultants and OVAM draw on 
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their networks to create this broadened arena. In order to facilitate discussions with the 
broadened group and to be able to start working groups that can develop transition pathways, 
the leitbild is made more concrete in the definition of five key themes for change. The 
transition arena defines these rather roughly. It is the task of the working groups to develop 
them further, to translate them into transition paths and then start formulating 
projects/experiments. The five themes around which working groups will be formed, are: 
• Smart Closing of Cycles: materials are managed as common property. Closing of circles 
becomes possible thanks to intelligent infrastructures which facilitate material flows. 
• Tailor-made Materials: access to materials is guaranteed, but this is only possible when 
materials and products are drastically renewed (made from renewables, multifunctional 
and flexible in usage, easy to disassemble and to reuse or recycle, intelligent materials). 
• At Your Service: people do not measure quality of life on the basis of property, but on the 
basis of access to services. A service economy develops with completely new type of 
companies. New functions and services are integrated in products. 
• Alert Public: consumers take on responsibility for their consumption choices and take 
conscious and informed decisions. They evolve from unconcerned choosing towards 
conscious caring. 
• Green Synthetics: an important Flemish industrial sector which makes use of new 
opportunities to become market leader in sustainable synthetics. 
 
 
4.1.3. Phase 2: Broadening and deepening Plan C, May 2007 – May 2008 
 
After finishing the leitbild in January, it takes a few months to mobilise the networks of the 
different arena members and to compose the broadened arena. In May 2007, about 60 persons 
meet in Leuven, where the original arena members introduce the new members to the work 
that has been done and invite them to participate in one of the five working groups. In a video 
message for the broadened transition arena, Kris Peeters, the Minister of the Environment, 
tells the participants that they “are part of a unique process. You are offered a refuge to 
search, experiment and learn. Alternative, innovative solutions that contribute to sustainable 
management of materials in Flanders are central to this (…) We urgently need a radical 
alternative. A Plan B seems a logical name for this new step in the process. But we are more 
ambitious. We are convinced that we have to think further, dare to do more and that’s why we 
go for a Plan C”. 
 
The working groups are mostly headed by members of the original arena and start meeting on 
a regular basis until autumn 2007. Their first task is to flesh out detailed transition pathways 
for their themes: describe the desired future in a transition image and describe the transition 
pathway, the necessary steps between the current situation and that future. During two 
meetings in autumn 2007, the working groups present their first work to each other. In 
particular the meeting in October 2007 in the conference room of the Flemish Parliament is 
very lively and draws a lot of participants from business. At the end of the meeting, the new 
Minister of the Environment, Hilde Crevits, promises that the Flemish government will keep 
on investing in the process, while pointing out that a larger budget will be necessary to keep 
the process going. She also calls on other parties involved in the process to make explicit how 
they will translate the necessary changes in their own organisation.  
 
The coordination and management of the process has meanwhile been transferred to a Task 
Force. This Task Force is essentially a merger of most members of the original arena with the 
presidents of the working groups and it is meant to make it easier for the transition secretariat 
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to keep an overview of the process, and to watch over the coherence between the vision 
developed in the original transition arena and the work in the working groups. In the Spring of 
2008, the Task Force develops a mission statement for the Plan C network with high 
expectations for the process. Within 5 years, by 2013, the network should have become the 
reference in Flanders for sustainable material management, with a portfolio of 20 talked-about 
transition experiments, of which at least half have been initiated by private actors. By then, 
Plan C should succeed in creating societal awareness for a materials transition, realise some 
institutional changes that support self-organisation of the process and Plan C should have 
become an esteemed partner in European and international networks (Van Lieshout 2008).  
.  
Simultaneously, the working groups continue their work and try to define transition 
experiments that fit into the pathways. By May 2008, all working groups have succeeded in 
defining five transition pathways with 33 experiments linked to them. During a new collective 
meeting of all working groups in Leuven, the results are presented and discussed. At the 
beginning of the meeting, all participants get a document on paper of almost 185 pages, 
entitled the Reference document, that contains the system analysis, the leitbild, a mission 
statement, and the written down transition pathways and experiments. The Reference 
document is meant as an internal working document, later to be developed in different 
communication products. Apart from the substantive discussion that confirms the results so 
far, the meeting also devotes times to how the arena members evaluate the status of Plan C as 
a network. The meeting supports the mission statement of the Reference document. 
 
During the meeting in May 2008, the administrator-general of OVAM declares that Plan C is 
very important for her organisation in terms of broadening the scope of work and for 
networking with innovative actors, but she also wishes for deliverance of concrete results and 
successes after the phase of envisioning. Plan C will get further support until half 2009, but 
she calls on other parties to contribute as well in order to transform plan C into an 
independent network of excellence 
 
 
4.1.4. Phase 3: Going public and defining a business plan, May 2008 – early 
2009 
 
With a complete transition agenda (vision, pathways, experiments) and support from the arena 
members for the mission of Plan C, the time is ripe to go public and present the work and the 
process to the public. In October 2008, the Plan C network goes public and presents its results 
to an audience of around 120 participants from different sectors. The moment is also used to 
collect new ideas for experiments and to connect people, organisations or companies. This 
results in a new series of ideas, but “entrepreneurs” who can really initiate experiments are 
difficult to find. The participation of companies is relatively low and by now, the network 
seems to consist more of “thinkers” and “networkers” than of “doers”.  
 
Meanwhile, the Task Force is confronted with a series of tasks such as the development of a 
strategy for further extension of the network, the development of criteria for good transition 
experiments and the start-up of experiments. The process management becomes time 
consuming and the first members of the original arena drop out, often due to time constraints. 
Within the group, differences of opinion exist on the strategy that should be followed: 
concentrate mainly on further development of the vision and set up of experiments, or devote 
most time to organisation development. During these months, the Task Force has a series of 
discussions on criteria for projects and experiments, but most energy goes into the 
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development of a business plan for Plan C. With the business plan, the network wants to 
develop a governance structure that is able to function as a motor, a source of inspiration and 
a coach for far-reaching innovations in materials management. An important concern is to 
develop an organisation with a lot of flexibility and speed in decision making in order to be 
able to easily adapt to ongoing change processes. During the discussions in the Task Force, 
the conviction has grown that therefore it is necessary to develop Plan C as an autonomous 
network, which in point of fact means that it is not dominated by a government actor such as 
OVAM, nor by other institutional actors (such as companies). The draft business plan states 
that “Plan C is made up of active individuals, for Plan C departs from individual engagement 
instead of representativeness. Preferably, these individuals are (formally) backed-up by their 
organisations. This means that all members of the network, out of their individual 
involvement, also ensure to watch over the autonomous course of Plan C. Plan C is a self-
organising network that offers a platform for radical renewal” (unpublished document). The 
business plan also poses that Plan C does not have the ambition to act as a financing 
mechanism for experiments, but that the network wants to work towards cooperation and a 
consultation platform with existing funding channels. The label “Plan C experiment” should 
become recognised as a value-added in evaluation procedures for funding.  
 
 
4.1.5. Phase 4: Trying to develop along several lines, early 2009 – mid 2011  
 
The fourth phase of Plan C starts early 2009. Between early 2009 and mid 2011, two main 
and difficult tasks have characterised the Plan C process. The first is getting experiments off 
the ground: selecting suitable ideas, developing a methodology to bring these ideas to the 
stage of an actual experiment, finding funding and partners to start the experiments. The 
second task is developing a suitable governance structure for an autonomous Plan C, 
convincing actors to step into the new organisation, and finding financial means for the daily 
activities of the new structure. Several elements mark the beginning of this phase: the 
administrator-general of OVAM who announces the start of the autonomy process, the 
appointment of a new consultant, and the instalment of a provisional structure that has to 
guide the process through the interim stage to full autonomy.  
 
For this provisional structure, the former coordinating body (the Task Force) is abandoned 
and replaced by two complementary bodies: the Strategisch Comité Organisatie Ontwikkeling 
(SCOO – strategic committee for organisation development) and the Strategisch Comité 
Inhoudelijke Afstemming (SCIA – strategic committee for substantive coordination). SCOO 
becomes responsible for the development of a new business plan and the preparation of all 
necessary steps towards an autonomous organisation. SCIA becomes responsible for the 
further realization of the transition vision through setting up of experiments. A new consultant, 
i-propeller, is selected to support the work of these two bodies and to develop a series of 
activities along these two paths. The start of the new structure also leads to further drop-outs 
of original arena members in the decision-making bodies, but a few new members enter; no 
business representatives remain. 
 
 
The process of organisation development 
 
2009 starts with a “2009 kick-off meeting” in January at the OVAM offices in Mechelen 
where the administrator-general of OVAM formally announces the start of the autonomy 
process. Over the following two years, the different aspects of this process will absorb 
 34 
considerable time of the members of the SCOO and from mid 2010 onwards also from the 
SCIA. Two main questions guide the work: first, which juridical structure fits the new 
organisation best and what is it relation with government authorities? Second, what will the 
business plan of the  new organisation consist of in terms of members, funding and activities?  
 
On the juridical front, a legal consultant (Stibbe) is contracted to help analyse different 
possibilities. After a comparison of different legal forms, the decision is taken to develop the 
autonomous Plan C as a so-called vzw structure (non-profit association). The most difficult 
puzzle to solve is how government bodies (such as OVAM itself) should be involved. On the 
one hand, Plan C members do not want to be dominated by government actors and want to 
develop a flexible organisation, but Plan C is also in need of a stable source of funding and 
this can be provided by government. On the other hand, although OVAM supports autonomy, 
internally in OVAM discussions start about its own involvement because it does not just want 
to loose all control and let Plan C drift away. In the discussions during the months that follow 
the idea of a double structure arises.  
 
On the one hand, the vzw Plan C is intended to group the existing actor network, with the 
organisations of the original arena as founding members. This switch from individuals to 
organisations as members is meant to strengthen the legitimacy of the vzw Plan C, while it 
also opens possibilities for developing an income model for the vzw. The core business of the 
vzw Plan C is further development and dissemination of the vision, definition and 
management of experiments, maintenance and animation of the learning network. Financial 
receipts will come from member contributions and specific support and consultancy of 
innovation trajectories with members. This should allow for the appointment of an operational 
director. The proposed business plan departs from a yearly budget of around 200.000 Euro. 
 
On the other hand, the involvement of different public authorities and administrations is 
meant to be coordinated in a legal structure called Eigen Vermogen Plan C, which will be 
added to OVAM. The core business of this structure is the support of the Plan C network, 
through process support and facilitation of organisational matters. Participating authorities 
will group their financial contributions in the Eigen Vermogen Plan C, thus allowing for the 
employment of several people that will be at the service of the vzw. The structure Eigen 
Vermogen will become a member of the vzw Plan C, with OVAM as its representative. In this 
way, the government will be on equal footing with other members of  the vzw Plan C, as one 
of a series of members. The proposed business plan for the EV departs from a yearly budget 
of around 465.000 Euro. 
 
Obviously, the coordination and arrangements between the two organisations will be of 
crucial importance: the vzw Plan C is meant to take the lead and define the strategic 
objectives, while the Eigen Vermogen is supposed to aid in the implementation of the plans. A 
memory of understanding between the two organisations should put the cooperation on the 
right road. 
 
In the autumn of 2010, the implementation of the revised European Waste Framework 
Directive (2008/98/EC) opens up a possibility to give this double structure a legal basis. The 
Minister of the Environment and OVAM propose to translate the directive into a Materials 
Decree, instead of a Waste Decree, thus taking it a few steps further than strictly demanded in 
the Directive12. As part of this orientation, the proposal of Materials Decree also provides for 
                                                 
12
 See 5.2. and 5.3. for more details on this evolution. 
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the double structure vzw Plan C / Eigen Vermogen Plan C. However, this part of the proposal 
encounters opposition from the Financial Inspector of the Flemish government, and thus also 
from the Minister for Budget. They state that the proposal for an Eigen Vermogen looks like 
an unnecessary proliferation of public bodies. The advice is to bring the proposal more in line 
with the principles of the BBB-reform of the Flemish administration (see also infra 4.1.1.) and 
to investigate whether the institutions created during this reform are not better suited as legal 
structure. Early 2011, Plan C and OVAM make a comparison of different alternative 
structures with support of legal consultant Stibbe. They conclude that, although typical BBB-
structures such as IVA’s and EVA’s13 are not to be excluded as legal structure, the Eigen 
Vermogen structure is best suited for Plan C’s ambitions, mainly because of its higher 
flexibility in seeking cooperation with the vzw Plan C.  
 
Several advisory councils pronounce themselves in favour of the inclusion of Plan C in the 
Materials Decree, although they are not always explicit about the legal structure. The VRWI14 
advice does not mention the legal structure. The SERV/MINA15 advice mentions the need for 
a specific, suited structure for transition processes, but does not make an explicit choice, 
seemingly due to lack of information on the exact consequences. In a remarkable advice from 
the advisory council on administrative matters (VLABEST, Vlaamse adviesraad voor 
bestuurszaken) it is stated that the council regrets the fact that a structure outside BBB is 
chosen, but VLABEST understands the motivation for the choice because “new societal 
challenges, in particular in the field of sustainability, require a policy domain exceeding 
approach (…)  Such new policy challenges  demand flexible frames for policy support and 
financing (…) These possibilities do not exist in the current BBB Decree and they oblige 
sectoral policy domains to set up legal structures that are strange to BBB. Consequently, the 
BBB-structure has to be broken up so as to be able to embed the way of dealing with this 
complex problem in a legal structure that provides space for flexibility, experiment and the 
contribution of different partners” (VLABEST 2011, p. 2). 
 
When the Minister of the Environment Schauvlieghe brings the proposal of Materials Decree 
to the government’s table on 24 June 2011, the Eigen Vermogen Plan C has been removed 
from the Decree. The opposition within the government coalition of the N-VA ministers16 
could not be overcome: they stuck to the view that the EV would have created a kind of 
shadow agency outside the BBB-structures and that this was not in line with government 
policy for the development of its public administration. An additional argument was that such 
a construct could also possibly circumvent the stop in recruitment of personnel that the 
Flemish government approved of. Instead of a formal legal structure such as the EV, the 
Materials Decree now contains a Chapter 6 that a installs a cooperation between OVAM, the 
departments EWI and DAR, and VITO17. OVAM takes the presidency of the new cooperation; 
other government agencies can later be included. The cooperation has three tasks: operational 
support for Plan C (but in principle also other organisations with a similar goal can be 
                                                 
13
 IVA’s are internal autonomous agencies (Intern Verzelfstandigd Agentschap), EVA’s are external autonomous 
agencies (Extern Verzelfstandigd Agentschap). 
14
 VRWI, Flemish Council for Science and Innovation (Vlaamse Raad voor Wetenschap en Innovatie) 
15
 SERV, the Socio-Economic Council Flanders (Socio-Economische Raad Vlaanderen) and the MINA council, 
the Environment and Nature Council (Milieu- en Natuurraad Vlaanderen), wrote a common advice. 
16
 N-VA, Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie, one of the three government parties in the Flemish Government. 
17
 EWI, department Economy, Science and Innovation (departement Economie, Wetenschap en Innovatie); DAR, 
Services of General Government Policy (Diensten Algemeen Regeringsbeleid), is the administration that is 
directly accountable to the Minister-President. DAR contains a Cell Sustainable Development that is involved in 
the Plan C process and that also provides a partial funding (see 4.2.4.). VITO is the Flemish Institute for 
Technological Research (Vlaamse Instelling voor Technologisch Onderzoek). 
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supported), stimulating information exchange and cooperation between government agencies 
with similar goals, and participating in projects where the expertise of OVAM and the other 
agencies can be useful. to coordinate the government agencies and the government funding. 
At the moment of finishing this paper (October 2011) OVAM and the Plan C SCIA are still 
discussing the way forward (see also 4.1.6.).  
 
 
The process of developing and starting experiments 
 
As described above, by the end of 2008 the Plan C process had produced a problem analysis 
of the current waste and materials system, a leitbild for a more sustainable materials system, 
different transition pathways towards this vision, and a lot of proposals for experiments. A 
first series of ideas for experiments was delivered by the working groups in May 2008; an 
additional series of proposals was gathered during the public presentation in October 2008. 
Under impulse of the new consultant i-propeller, the substantive work now focuses on 
selecting the best and most mature ideas, finding suitable partners to help execute the ideas, 
and turning them into transition experiments. Over the course of two years, different 
initiatives are developed to bring the process further. While in phase 1 and particularly in 
phase 2, part of the work (such as writing texts, organising meetings and discussions) was 
done by the participants themselves, most of it is now taken over by the consultant.  
 
First, a methodology is developed to bring ideas to the stage of a feasible experiment. The 
methodology starts with a visioning workshop where the original idea is further elaborated. 
The workshop has the ambition to build a broad coalition around the idea by bringing together 
participants from business, research, design, public authorities, social movements. In a next 
step, a planning workshop develops an action plan and works towards a collective contract in 
which the initiator, other participants and Plan C engage in a cooperative partnership to realise 
the experiment. In a third step, the partnership assembles all necessary resources and makes 
sure all preconditions are fulfilled to start the experiment. Finally, the experiment is set up, 
striving for a ‘proof of concept’ that the experiment may be marketable. From step 3 onwards, 
experiments-in-development would also be allowed to carry a ‘Plan C label’. During 2009, 
this methodology is developed by coaching four project ideas (chemical leasing, leasing of 
comfort, sustainable festivals, closing of local production and consumption loops through 3D-
printing). However, it is difficult to bring the ideas further than step 1 or 2 and deliver a label. 
Still, in 2011 the chemical leasing and the comfort leasing idea are translated in proposals for 
MIP3-projects18 by different consortia. Only the chemical leasing project is approved (as the 
TABACHEM project – Take Back Chemicals). In spite of the non-approval of comfort 
leasing, plans remain to further develop the idea. Meanwhile, also a project on enhanced 
landfill mining (Jones et al. 2010) is labelled as a Plan C transition experiment, although it did 
not follow the methodology. 
 
This is related to the fact that during the coaching of these projects, the impression grows that 
the TM-logic of vision-pathways-experiments follows a too causal innovation trajectory, 
while the problem of transition innovation is its unpredictability and uncontrollability. I-
propeller therefore starts experimenting with what they call “an effectual innovation strategy”: 
“Instead of the causal approach of transition innovation where one establishes first a transition 
                                                 
18
 MIP (Milieu- en energietechnologie Innovatie Platform - the environmental and energy technology innovation 
platform) is a funding programme that was launched in October 2010 and that provides 5 million Euro for 
research institutes and companies that want to develop sustainable technologies and products. See also part 5.5. 
for MIP. 
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vision for an experiment, a transition path and, finally, defines a concrete transition 
experiment, the effectual approach starts with the means present in its coalition (…) The 
consequence of the effectual approach is that the paths to entrepreneurial transition success 
expand in the future rather than converge (one-to-many, in contrast to causation’s many-to-
one approach towards ‘the goal’)” (Paredis et al. 2010, 236). The methodology thus becomes 
“radical bottom-up” and leads to a series of so-called ‘ideation’ sessions throughout 2010 and 
2011 where stakeholders are gathered around a theme that is relevant for the Plan C vision, 
and where coalitions are sought to bring experiments to life. But despite interesting sessions 
with a number of new people that are involved, the step towards entrepreneurial action 
remains a problem.  
 
Second, in parallel to the methodology development, i-propeller is also commissioned to 
develop several on-line tools. One is an internal workplace, a ‘virtual office’, where 
documents can be posted and shared, experiments coordinated and managed, visions 
discussed. Another is an idea management system, that allows to list ideas, connect between 
people with comparable ideas and also to score ideas according to a list of criteria based on 
the Plan C vision.  
 
Furthermore, thanks to additional funding from the division of sustainable development (part 
of the DAR, Diensten Algemeen Regeringsbeleid), it becomes possible in 2011 to develop two 
more projects. One is mainly devoted to communication, with more active development of the 
public website (www.plan-c.eu), a Twitter account and a LinkedIn group, which had around 
300 followers by June 2011. The second is an attempt, in cooperation with the ngo Netwerk 
Bewust Verbruiken, at examining the possibilities of developing consumer experiments, in 
follow-up of the earlier working group around the transition pathway Alert Public. 
 
In the course of 2009, an opportunity had already presented itself to attract funding through a 
common project with the other Flemish TM-process DuWoBo. Under the European EFRO-
program a project gets approved to develop common instruments to upscale experiments and 
position them as part of the growing green economy and clean technology sector. This ISSI-
project (‘Innovation System for System Innovation’) makes it possible during 2010-2011 to 
test the methodology in several thematic stakeholder workshops, to connect with and visit 
other existing Flemish innovation networks (‘ISSI on tour’) and to organise an ‘ISSI 
Academy’ to exchange on methodology development and application with diverse innovation 
networks. These different activities attract new people and form a basis on which new projects 
can grow. 
 
Apart from all the work on experiments and network building, Plan C also undertook a few 
attempts at positioning itself in the Flemish innovation landscape, and in particular at 
presenting itself as an interesting partner in the so-called Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA – Flanders 
in Action) project. ViA is an ambitious program of the Flemish government to rejuvenate the 
Flemish economy and society and position Flanders in the top 5 of Europe by 2020: make it 
more competitive, growth-oriented and technologically at the front of Europe, but also 
greener and more social.  In a position paper for ViA in Octobre 2009, Plan C asserts that it 
can fulfil a role in the breakthroughs that are envisaged by ViA, not only through its leitbild 
and assorted pathways and experiments, but also because of its systemic approach to societal 
problems and its experience with new forms of governance. The interaction with the ViA-
process never fully develops, but when in the Spring of 2011 all Flemish Ministers have to 
propose one “flagship initiative” for the ViA-process, the Minister of the Environment 
proposes the theme of sustainable materials management. This results in a Round Table on 
 38 
Sustainable Materials Management (6 June 2011) where government, industry, knowledge 
centres and other stakeholders discuss a whole series of aspects of the shift to a materials 
economy (see also 5.2.2.) During the Round Table, Plan C tried to underline its position as an 
innovation partner by presenting an ambitious new project, iMade. Its goal is to turn Flanders 
into the first experimental garden worldwide of local custom-made production, using 3D-
printing and rapid manufacturing. 
 
 
4.1.6. Standstill or take-off: mid 2011 – … ? 
 
The account of phase 4 shows that a series of different steps and activities were taken to 
further develop the Plan C process, on the organisational level as well as on the substantive 
level. Still, by mid 2011, the feeling prevailed with SCIA members that a crucial time had 
arrived. If the autonomy process did not succeed and if no structural funding became available, 
it would be very hard to keep the process alive. The prevailing analysis is that the informality 
of the network has become an obstacle for further development, on the one hand because it 
hinders ownership of the process and in that way undermines the responsibility for the 
dynamics of the network. On the other hand because the informality and the associated lack of 
a legal structure also hinders the acquisition of stable funding. As mentioned above, the 
original arena members have been asked to persuade their organisations to become founding 
members of the new vzw Plan C. These contacts have clarified, however, that such an 
engagement in a new structure is dependent on how the public authorities will organise 
themselves. An Eigen Vermogen structure would have stabilised the government involvement 
in a legal structure and provided a stable funding base. However, as seen above, this structure 
has not been approved by the government and has been removed from the Materials Decree. 
Instead, a form of cooperation has been inscribed in the Decree that starts with OVAM, the 
innovation department EWI, the general policy department DAR and the technology institute 
VITO. In a later stage, other government agencies may join in.  
 
At the moment of finishing this report, the implications of this decision still have to crystallize 
out. First, it has to be clarified what the implications are for the different government agencies 
and for the form their cooperation will take. During the summer 2011, OVAM has invited the 
other institutes to discuss three concrete tasks for the cooperation: operational support of Plan 
C (including personnel and finance), deliberation about the participation of government 
agencies in the Round Table on Sustainable Materials Management that was installed in June 
2011 (see 5.2.2.), and the follow-up of the new scientific Research Centre on Sustainable 
Materials Management that will start in January 2012 (see 5.5.). Negotiations are still ongoing. 
Second, there are the implications for the willingness of societal actors to participate in a vzw 
Plan C. Also here, negotiations are ongoing. 
 
 
4.2. The characteristics of Plan C as a policy arrangement 
 
Until now, I have presented a history of the TM process Plan C on the basis of the main 
events since the first preparations of the process in 2003-2004. This gives some idea of the 
dynamics, potential and problems of the Plan C process. Still, this is only part of the story and 
it is  necessary to go beyond this description to better understand the position of Plan C and its 
potential role and influence as a TM process in a quickly changing policy context. As said 
above, a TM process such as Plan C can be framed as a policy niche, set up alongside regular 
policies, with the ambition of introducing a new style and practice of governance that aims for 
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innovation in the policy field on the level of substance as well as organisation. The different 
dimensions of the policy arrangement approach then allow us to describe in more detail the 
policy characteristics of Plan C. The following analysis remains largely restricted to the inner 
workings of Plan C, while part 5 delves deeper into its relation with regime policies and the 
broader political and societal context.  
 
 
4.2.1. Discourse 
 
Plan C was introduced as a process that should contribute to a reorientation of waste policy 
towards sustainable materials policy. The discourse dimension defines the substantive side of 
this renewal. An analysis of the problem analysis, the leitbild and the transition pathways of 
Plan C that were developed in phase 1 and 2 (between September 2006 and  May 2008) shows 
that these can be characterised as a mixture of what can be called ‘ecological modernisation’ 
elements and ‘transformation’ elements. Ecological modernisation has confidence in reaching 
a more sustainable society through market mechanisms, technological innovation, industry. 
Typical ecological modernisation elements of the Plan C discourse include: getting the prices 
right, fast technology development and diffusion, new types of materials and products 
(renewable, reusable, modular), product-service combination, closed materials loops, not less 
consumption but better consumption, strategic availability of resources for the Flemish 
economy, Flanders as expertise centre in sustainable materials management. Some elements 
of the leitbild refer to more radical change and can be characterised as ‘transformational’: 
they require changes in the economic and power structures of our society and also in cultural 
attitudes (Hopwood et al. 2005, Paredis 2010, Crivits et al. 2010). Elements of this 
transformational vision include: materials as a commons with new property regimes, integrity 
and common responsibility for materials, materials and technology development as functional 
for societal needs, absolute decoupling of economic growth from resource use, common 
knowledge infrastructure, no social or ecological burden shifting worldwide. Parts of the 
discourse also refer to new governance models that should build on “synergetic interaction” 
between government, companies, science and society.  
 
Bouwen et al. (s.d.), who studied the group dynamics during phase 1 and 2, find that in the 
formulation of the leitbild “there is a careful crafting of a shared image, so that as much 
elements as possible could be included”. However, “the ultimate discussion between radical 
societal reform versus innovative industrial flexibility as mechanisms to reach material 
management sustainability went under-explored. Most participants expressed their regret of 
this afterward” (p. 11). This becomes a pattern in the following months. Because the process 
has to constantly move forward and show interim results, there is a lack of time and space to 
discuss fundamental differences. At the end of 2008, the substantive part of the discussion 
process was temporarily “frozen” in order to be able to move to the phase of experiments and 
organisation development. People who join in during phase 2, 3 and 4 are asked to brainstorm 
on ideas that can further develop the formulated pathways and experiments, but the essence of 
the vision is fixed.  
 
Currently, several interviewees express this as a problem and it also surfaced as an issue 
during the feedback seminar on interim results of this research (14/03/11). In 2007-2008, Plan 
C was at the front of the discussion on materials, but things have changed rapidly since then. 
More and more companies, in particular multinationals, have become aware of the pivotal role 
materials, strategic materials availability and the environmental impact of materials are going 
to play in the next decennia and are adjusting their strategies accordingly. The European 
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Commission is quickly launching new initiatives around resource efficiency, raw materials 
and ecodesign. The OECD is also working on sustainable materials management. The 
discourse of ‘green economy’ and ‘low carbon economy’ is rapidly gaining ground and seems 
to become one of the spearheads of innovation worldwide. Several involved actors seem to 
think that if Plan C wants to preserve a place in this rapidly moving environment, it will have 
to reposition itself and create a more distinct profile for itself19, and more in particular, it will 
have to be able to translate the vision to concrete actions.  
“What I find positive about Plan C is that it has developed a good vision, it’s 
relatively strong with good concepts, but I’m not sure Plan C will be able to 
realise its vision because the business sector is absent. (…) the big problem is that 
you need a translation from vision to concrete actions, and that’s not self- evident 
(…) You can have a beautiful vision but if you don’t know how to get there and 
through which initiatives, you get stuck. A vision can be confronting and can 
encourage people to think (…) but momentarily, it doesn’t have enough links to 
reality, because Plan C does not have enough information about the economic 
reality.” (societal actor) 
 
“We are convinced that a reflection process that is somewhat detached from daily 
discussions is meaningful (…) we accept that it is sometimes a bit far from our 
reality, it is very fundamental, but that’s not the problem as such. Sometimes it is 
necessary to start thinking this way. Still, a second remark is that we have the 
feeling that consciously one does not want to make the link with daily practice.” 
(societal actor) 
 
At least part of the problem seems to be a lack of people, time and resources to move ahead 
and proof how transition experiments work in practice (see also 4.2.4.). But the problem is 
more subtle. The TM-approach uses a discourse on transition experiments that characterises 
experiments as projects contributing to the societal challenge of transition, with high potential 
but also high risk, and with learning as a central goal. However, 
“It is difficult to explain what transition experiments are exactly, what they have 
more to offer than the innovation projects that are already being supported. Of 
course there are differences: what we try to do, starts from a common vision or 
leitbild, while innovation in Flanders strongly builds on bottom-up without any 
guidance. Another point is that the level of risk is very high, which they find 
difficult to cope with, because one wants to see results: how much Euro does it 
yield within the one or two years? And the more societal aspects are also 
integrated in a project, for which we do not really have tools to bring them into 
account. That’s something you see a lot less in current projects, that’s all very 
technologic and economic.” (knowledge actor) 
 
Over the last two years, Plan C has taken two courses to cope with the problem of translating 
long-term vision into short-term action. First, there is an attempt during 2009-2010 at 
developing the experiment methodology in such a way that, after a project has gone through 
several steps, it can gain a label ‘Plan C experiment’. Such a label is meant to be a quality 
mark with which companies or organisations can show their commitment to system 
innovation and/or that might give them some extra access to subsidy channels. The idea is that 
Plan C offers this methodology to interested companies and coaches them in the development 
of the experiment. However, as mentioned above, it is difficult to coach projects through these 
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 For the role that the Plan C discourse itself may have played in some of these evolutions, I refer to part 5. 
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different stages and in practice the label has not yet been used. Furthermore, some SCIA-
members doubt the relevance and usefulness of this line of label development. They propose a 
more pragmatic approach where Plan C tries to align itself to ongoing or starting projects, 
such as in the context of the MIP3 Fund20. 
 
“[The Plan C experiment approach] is a lot of effort for too few results (…). 
While MIP gets 12 applications for research projects and 30 for feasibility studies, 
Plan C keeps on thinking about how are we going to generate ideas, and what are 
the criteria for fixing a Plan C label to it, and watch out ! – if it does not pass the 
whole circuit, we are not going to give this label. Then I think “come on, guys, go 
to MIP” and use of course your criteria list, but those projects that fit the vision, 
why don’t you connect to them (…) I see a knot in too much sticking to principles 
of ‘we must let our own ideas grow into experiments’ (…) It is a rather 
protectionist vision, it can only be Plan C if it fits our criteria” (knowledge actor). 
 
A second course for coping with the problem of relation between long-term vision and short-
term practice shows a partial shift in discourse, with more emphasis on the process aspects of 
Plan C and TM instead of on the substantive aspects of the vision. Here, Plan C tries to 
position itself as a process that has a unique expertise and the methodology for generating, 
selecting and developing ideas towards marketable experiments and projects. This is most 
visible in the initiative ISSI Academy, where under impulse of consultant i-propeller, the two 
TM-networks Plan C and DuWoBo present their approach to other innovation networks and 
exchange experiences with them. The three Academies organised in the Spring of 2011 
generated quite some interest from other networks and received positive comments.  
 
 
4.2.2. Actors 
 
Transition theory usually draws a sharp distinction between regimes and competing niches, 
and their respective actors. The Plan C case shows how the central government actor in waste 
policy, OVAM, initiates the transition process. The regime actor creates the policy niche and 
strategically uses it: on the one hand to help revive and reorient its own policies, on the other 
hand to try and initiate a broader innovation movement around materials, with new 
networking with actors that may become essential in the future materials economy.  
“That’s an added value of Plan C, because without Plan C some of these contacts 
would not have existed. It does not only create more contacts with the business 
world and ngo’s, but also between public services. It’s a kind of meeting place for 
people that look and think forward, also within government (…) I think that 
OVAM will have to make maximum use of Plan C as a network, in order to find 
partners that want to go further than current policies.” (civil servant) 
 
The transition arena of Plan C that was composed in 2006 consisted of mainly forward-
looking regime players. Between 2006 and 2008, this group succeeded in creating a dynamic 
process and engaging around 60 people that enthusiastically shared in the work of visioning, 
formulating transition pathways and experiments. This broader group consisted of 
representatives from government, business, science, ngo’s. People from labour unions were 
not present. Already during 2008, however, the group starts falling apart. One of TM’s ideas – 
that the enthusiasm and the alignment of visions is enough to create a self-organising process 
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– does not seem to work from that point onwards. Different priorities and different strategies 
of members become visible. Some think Plan C has a technocratic edge to it, and they want to 
devote more time to civil society networks that act as a countervailing power to current 
policies21. Others can reserve time in their agendas only as long as the potential added value 
of Plan C is obvious for them. In particular business representatives seem to have a problem 
here after 2008. Throughout the whole Plan C process, there seems to be a lack of 
entrepreneurial actors that can take the process beyond the stadium of ideas for experiments.  
“We created a momentum with industry during 2007, but seemed to lose it 
during 2008. I find it difficult to say what the exact problem was, a lack of 
action and a lack of a clear business case that led to questions about added 
value (…) At a certain moment, the question becomes ‘do I need Plan C for 
what I want to do?’” (societal actor).  
 
Most interviewees agree that since 2009 it is difficult to speak of a stable actor coalition 
and/or lead actors that actively take the process forward. Without the involvement of OVAM 
and the activities of the consultant i-propeller, the process would probably have been very low 
profile over the last two years. Internal documents that argue for the creation of an 
independent vzw Plan C speak of “an untenable situation. Lack of ownership through 
informality undermines the responsibility for the dynamics” of the Plan C process.  
 
Who should take the lead in the process? Different interpretations exist of the role actors are 
currently playing and/or should play. The ministerial cabinet takes the position that it wants to 
continue the Plan C process  
“but it has always been our point that it is not the task of the government to pay 
fully for such a process. It also makes no sense that the authorities would impose 
this from above. It’s something that has to grow from below (…) I think we waited 
somewhat to see: what will come out of this group? But saying ‘stop, it makes 
no…’ that has certainly never happened. 
Q: But has it been a conscious choice to say ‘we keep it somewhat experimental’? 
A: For me certainly, in the sense that this is not something that the government 
alone must do and pull forward; it has to grow bottom-up.” 
 
This comes close to the self-organisation logic that is present in TM theory. It is also the main 
logic behind the autonomy process such as formulated in the business plan of the Task Force 
at the end of 2008. One driver for the plan was a concern for balance between different actors 
involved, and in particular a wariness of a too dominant position for government actors. Plan 
C should remain a flexible organisation that can easily adapt to new circumstances, and 
participants feared that government dominance might suffocate initiatives and kill creativity. 
On the other hand however, societal actors seem to be simultaneously looking for support, 
guidance and legitimacy of the process through the involvement of OVAM and the cabinet. 
Several interviewees express this as the responsibility of the government to guarantee a 
structural funding base on which the process can build.  
“You need that structure. According to me, we should at least expect the 
government to support something like that, for the simple reason that such 
support is about the long-term perspective of the initiative, with high societal 
relevance, but also with high risks. You can only do something like that when you 
tap a collective source of funding, and that’s the government; at least that’s my 
opinion.” (knowledge actor) 
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 One of the results is a “transition network of civil society” that was established mid 2010. 
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The search for a suited form of interaction between government and societal actors is a 
leitmotiv in the process. It culminates in the proposals and discussions of the autonomy 
process, where the proposed solution is a double structure. The different societal actors 
organise themselves in a non-profit organisation vzw Plan C, while the involved government 
actors group themselves and their funding under a legal structure called Eigen Vermogen. 
This Eigen Vermogen is meant to provide a structural basis for the workings of vzw Plan C. 
However, as mentioned above, this form of institutionalisation has not been approved by the 
government. It got opposed mainly because it runs into incumbent administrative structures 
and procedures, in particular those installed under the BBB-reform. In its place, a more 
informal cooperation structure has been approved between OVAM and other government 
institutions. This brings some closely involved actors to the conclusion that politicians are 
willing to initiate and support an experiment such as Plan C, see what happens and use some 
of its results, but that they are unwilling to take a step that takes them beyond a business-as-
usual scenario and changes established structures and procedures. 
 
The problem of interaction between government bodies and societal actors, and the different 
roles they have to adapt to in processes such as TM, is also visible within OVAM itself. As 
mentioned in the Plan C history, the OVAM Board of Directors gave its approval for Plan C 
in 2004 and the transition process is mentioned in OVAM’s Strategic Plan 2005-2009. Still, 
for several years, it remained hard work for the proponents of Plan C within OVAM to defend 
the process and create room for its development. Two factors seem to play a role here. Firstly, 
OVAM needs other actors to make Plan C a success. This creates a tension between providing 
space and “letting others score points”, while simultaneously wanting to keep control over the 
process, making sure that results are useful for OVAM’s purposes and claiming some of the 
results. Secondly, the fact that a TM process is a goal-seeking process, where results cannot 
be defined exactly beforehand. In a rather traditional administration, in its working and 
accountability influenced by New Public Management principles, this leads to a lot of 
uncertainty about the added value of the process. “’When does it deliver concrete results?’ 
was internally one the most heard questions”, according to an OVAM official.  
 
This led to a situation where at the start of the autonomy process in 2009, OVAM did not 
have the ambition to keep on playing a leading role in Plan C. It is only since mid 2010 that 
the process seems to have acquired more legitimacy within OVAM and that OVAM wants to 
remain in the lead. Interviewees mention different, complementary reasons for this shift in 
attitude. First, it has to do with a learning process about sustainable materials management 
within OVAM as a result of internal discussions on positioning and policy priorities during 
the formulation of a new Strategic Plan 2010-2014. Second, Plan C and the materials 
transition are mentioned in the coalition agreement of the Flemish government (2009-2014) 
and in the so-called Pact 202022. This formal recognition raises the strategic importance of 
Plan C and opens up possibilities to link materials policy to the Flemish socio-economic 
agenda. Simultaneously, OVAM has also become aware that the input of Plan C creates 
possibilities on the international level, such as in EU and OECD forums (see also 5.1.2.). 
Third, other government actors and initiatives (such as VITO, MIP 3 and i-Cleantech23), 
launched and supported by the domain of innovation policy, started using a transition 
discourse and assertively positioning themselves. This in turn led to a consciousness within 
                                                 
22
 Pact 2020 is an agreement between the Flemish government, the socio-economic partners and the civil society 
to reach 20 societal objectives by 2020.  
23
 The i-Cleantech initiative aims at coordinating all initiatives in the Flemish cleantech sector. See also the 
discussion in part 5.4. 
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OVAM that it should safeguard its own accomplishments, assert its ambitions in the materials 
domain, and strengthen its position as a partner in innovation for a green economy. Plan C can 
play a role in support of this ambition. 
 
It should be added here that the relationship with VITO – which, by the way, controls the 
MIP3 and i-Cleantech initiatives – has always been a cause of some tension. From the 
interviews, the reasons for these tensions seem to relate to a combination of a lack of 
understanding of each other’s objectives and roles, a lack of trust in each other’s intentions, 
and some personal elements. In 2005, VITO (in cooperation with DRIFT) had applied as a 
candidate for consultancy of the Plan C process, but this was granted to a consortium of 
Resource Analysis and Pantopicon24 . VITO was no member of the first arena and only 
became actively involved from 2009 onwards. Even then, it had difficulty in finding its 
position and sensed a lack of trust in its intentions. For an important institute in the Flemish 
cleantech and environment sector, this seems to have been an unusual and uneasy experience. 
It is relatively well-known that actors outside VITO often regard the institute as a magnet that 
can rely on a lot of political goodwill and attention, easily succeeds in attracting funding, and 
thus has a position of power that makes it difficult to work with, even “arrogant”, according to 
some interviewees. These kind of tensions form the basis for its difficult positioning in Plan C. 
 
 
4.2.3. Rules of the game 
 
The preceding discussion of the interaction between government and the societal actors 
involved in Plan C can also be interpreted as a discussion over the rules of the ‘TM game’.  
TM defines itself as a ‘governance’ approach, where it is not the government that is steering 
the process, but where the government is one actor in a network of change-minded actors. 
What the exact relationships should be within this network is not predefined, and is in a sense 
a question of error and trial, although terminology such as government as ‘initiator’, 
‘coordinator’, facilitator’ or ‘partner’ abound. The discussion about the autonomy process, the 
role of vzw and Eigen Vermogen, and the internal discussions in OVAM about its role testify 
to that. 
 
Although TM does not have formal rules of how interactions should be organised, it does 
have some guidelines. Important guidelines (or ‘informal rules’) include: ‘work with 
frontrunners from niches and regime’, ‘develop and grow in the shadow of policy’, ‘develop 
as a network with government as one player among many’, ‘use the network, vision 
development and experiments to learn about direction and about what works’.  
 
Working with frontrunners was an explicit choice of the initiators and also the minister of the 
environment was aware that this was a departure from the stakeholder engagement rules that 
are usually followed in a policy preparation process and that rely on representation of interest 
groups. During the installation meeting of the Plan C arena in June 2006, the representative of 
the Minister stated that “finding the proper discussion partners, the right participants, is a 
crucial part of the transition approach (…) That’s among other things the difference with 
thinking in terms of ‘representation structures’, which until now has usually been dominant in 
other processes. Status, position or representativeness is not our first concern. The idea is 
that a ‘commando approach’ should also be more effective: bringing together small teams 
                                                 
24
 The first TM process in Flanders DuWoBo (in the field of housing and building) that started in 2004, was 
supported by a consultancy consortium consisting of two Dutch teams (TNO, DRIFT/Rotterdam University) and 
two Flemish teams (CDO/Ghent University, Pantopicon).  
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with people that trust each other and that succeed in combining courage and perseverance 
with creativity (…) Because of its ‘strike power’, this may work better than existing 
organisation structures”. 
  
It is remarkable that after five years the composition of the original arena of 2006 still 
influences the process. An informal rule seems to be that these people and their respective 
organisations somehow retain a form of ownership of the process. This shows itself in the fact 
that the founding members of the vzw Plan C are sought within the original group, even 
though some participants dropped out of the process more than two years ago and even 
though new members entered the SCIA. The main argument is that a line has to be drawn 
between who is invited and who is not, and that falling back on the original composition 
provides the clearest decision. But this in turn causes some tension with SCIA members such 
as VITO, that has an important position in the Flemish innovation landscape but is not invited 
to serve as a founding member because it was not part of the original arena25. 
 
Another informal rule concerns the relation between the TM process and regular policy. TM 
theory usually advises that TM processes function for some time ‘in the shadow of policy’. 
The hope is that this provides some mental space to think freely, not hindered by stringent 
deadlines and touchy political discussions. From the start, this has been one of the working 
principles of Plan C. During the June 2006 meeting, the representative of the then Minister of 
the Environment Peeters explicitly hinted at it when he declared that “there will always be 
pressure to present tangible results in a relative short time, or because outsiders want to 
interfere in the process. To keep pressure away from the transition arena the minister wants 
to provide space and time to deliver good work. You cannot speed up the growth of a plant by 
pulling it, because that’s when it breaks.” Later on, in May 2007, the Minister repeats this 
message in a video message, stating that participants “are offered a refuge to search, 
experiment and learn” (see also 4.1.3.). 
 
Yet, currently not all interviewees are convinced that it was a good idea to stick to this 
strategy after 2008. With the 2008 business plan and the start of the autonomy process, the 
task force wanted to guard over the power balance between participants 
“because the fear was that if we involve the political world too early in the 
process, they will try to capture it, and it will overshoot the mark, and then it 
stops. Looking back, I think it was a mistake that we involved politicians so late in 
the process (…) I think we would have been more exposed to attempts at claiming 
Plan C. But that moment comes anyhow. I hope you don’t think that at the 
moment they do not try to lay their hands on it.” (knowledge actor) 
 
One of the main challenges seems to be that it is difficult to communicate the philosophy and 
logics behind the whole process, in particular the interaction between government and societal 
actors that has grown during the process and the need for a double structure to revive the 
dynamics of it. 
 
Finally, the learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning that is deemed essential in transition 
processes has been a point of attention from the start of Plan C. As mentioned, two scientists 
were engaged to document the experiences of the original transition arena and to reflect on 
them. The analytical framework used was based in multi-actor and inter-organizational 
collaboration theories (Bouwen and Taillieu 2004). This led to several interesting conference 
                                                 
25
 It was the intention to broaden the member base immediately after the founding of the vzw during the first 
meeting of the Board of Directors, and to include VITO at that moment. 
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papers that were also co-authored with some of the involved participants, but the results never 
really served as discussion material for the group. In 2009, one of the consultants wrote a 
short report on the usefulness of the method of ‘learning histories’, but time and money 
constraints hindered further use. This seems to be a constant problem throughout the process, 
although it is not something that participants are unaware of. 
“That’s an aspect that’s been underexposed , to say it euphemistically. I think – 
and it is also something I hear in the political world – that we have to make 
analyses of what happens: what do we learn, also about regulation, the attitude of 
public authorities, other initiatives, and then speak out clearly, without being 
moralising toward policy. That’s also what is expected from us: Plan C should 
not be afraid to take position and make suggestions towards the government (…) 
But that takes time, things have to run for some time before you can start learning. 
But if we could do that now already, it would probably improve political 
goodwill” (knowledge actor). 
 
 
4.2.4. Resources 
 
I mentioned above that when the Flemish government decided in 2004 to start transition 
processes, these were set up as experiments in “innovative environmental policy” (Peeters 
2004, p. 81). The financial means available for the two processes that started – Plan C and the 
housing and building process DuWoBo – have always been quite limited. In the case of Plan 
C: a part-time official from OVAM to support the process, and money to pay for consultants 
to do the daily process management and to set up activities. The yearly support is estimated at 
250.000 Euro direct costs, minimum 60.000 Euro indirectly through OVAM personnel and 
around 25.000 Euro indirectly through personnel from other administrations. Since 2011, an 
additional subsidy of around 90.000 Euro is available from the division sustainable 
development/DAR. All other actors have been engaged in the process on a voluntary basis, 
often as a sideline of the activities in their jobs. This worked relatively well in phase 1 and 2 
of the process when the main task was to develop a transition vision and a network that could 
support that vision. The results of these phases raised high expectations from participants on 
the substantive as well as on the process side. On the substantive side, participants hoped for a 
quick launch of the first experiments under the different transition pathways. On the process 
side, the hope was that the network would grow and turn into a dynamic and influential 
movement that could set the agenda for sustainable materials management. Currently, most 
involved actors seem to agree that the buildup of financial means since mid 2008 has been 
inadequate for the management of such a complex and ambitious process as Plan C.  
 
On the management side, the operational means for maintaining daily activities and coaching 
the process have hardly increased, even though Plan C has become more demanding from mid 
2008 onwards. It is in fact only the activity of the consultant i-propeller that keeps the process 
going. Finding a structural basis for operational means was the main reason behind the Eigen 
Vermogen Plan C construction. It should have allowed the involved government actors to 
group their financial contributions and in that way ensure the permanent employment of 3 to 4 
civil servants. As mentioned above, the proposed business plan departed from a yearly budget 
of 465.000 Euro, which is more or less equal to the present government funding. The vzw 
Plan C hopes to gather budget of around 200.000 Euro yearly on the basis of member fees and 
other revenues. However, as mentioned above (4.1.6.), the Eigen Vermogen part has been 
ruled out by the government decision of 24 June 2011 on the Materials Decree and has been 
replaced by a more informal form of cooperation between OVAM, the departments EWI and 
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DAR, and VITO. What this implies for government funding and for the vzw structure is 
currently unclear, but negotiations are ongoing. 
 
The complicated situation for attracting financial means is illustrated by how, since 2011, the 
extra funding from the division sustainable development/DAR (for the communication project 
and the project on consumption experiments – see 4.1.5.) reaches Plan C. The rules for 
funding from this division stipulate that it can only be granted to non-profit organisations, so-
called vzw’s. However, as extensively discussed, Plan C still does not have the vzw statute. 
Consequently, it was necessary to seek cooperation with the ngo Netwerk Bewust Verbruiken 
(NBV) and find an agreement on how the funding could be deployed for Plan C. Part of the 
deal was that half of the money should be spent on the consumption theme, also the main 
working field of NBV.  
 
Its operational means are limited, but Plan C does not have funding for transition experiments 
either. From 2008 onwards, the option has been to try to mobilise existing innovation funds. 
This option is in fact a necessity, because the environmental policy domain (and OVAM) does 
not have specific funding available for investing in transition experiments, which are 
essentially innovation projects. The consequence is, however, that criteria of existing 
innovation funds might steer potential experiments. There have been a few contacts between 
Plan C members and administrators of innovation funds to discuss the possibility of a 
specialised transition fund or specific criteria for transition experiments in existing funds, but 
these have not yielded results. The recently launched MIP3 Fund explicitly uses transition 
terminology to frame its call for projects. It does not make a difference however between 
‘regular’ innovation projects and transition experiments, and it only contains ecological 
modernisation elements of the discourse. The lack of specific funding for experiments is by 
most interviewees quoted as an essential reason why business involvement has diminished 
after 2008. 
“For me, Plan C stands  in relative isolation. Not because its vision is wrong, on 
the contrary, I find that very strong, but fundamentally the reason is that there is 
no funding mechanism behind it. The reason why MIP succeeds in mobilising 300 
people and companies is simply because money is being distributed. That’s what 
attracts companies. Plan C doesn’t have that and companies come once out of 
curiosity, but not twice (...) I regret that immensely, the fact that we don’t succeed 
in coupling Plan C with a funding channel (…) Coupling is enough for me; Plan 
C does not necessarily need its own means. But those who receive them should 
link with Plan C or DuWoBo, so that the limited resources that we spend on 
innovation are at least directed towards sustainability in a well-founded manner” 
(societal actor). 
 
As shown above (4.1.1.), some actors in Plan C think that a more pragmatic approach of 
connecting with starting MIP-projects might overcome some of the problems of defining and 
financing experiments. 
 
Knowledge is another resource that is needed in transition processes such as Plan C and it 
comes under different forms. One is the technical expertise on new and more sustainable 
materials, closing of production and consumption cycles, replacement of materials by services 
etcetera. This is partly available and growing fast, in the business world as well as the 
academic world. Still, the needed expertise is not always easy to mobilize. In essence, Plan C 
has chosen to be a platform of open innovation, treating commonly build knowledge as ‘open 
source’. However, business representatives have indicated that this may hinder participation 
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of industry, either because they have no experience of working under such an intellectual 
property rights regime, or because they are afraid of sharing expertise with potential 
competitors.  
 
Another aspect of knowledge relates to expertise on transition governance, on the level of the 
process itself as well as on the policy level. At the process level, it demands for example 
knowledge of managing multi-party collaboration, group processes, functioning as a learning 
network and learning from experiences. At the policy level, it demands knowledge of 
integration between policy fields, connecting between different policy streams, decision-
making processes, coping with interest politics etcetera. These forms of knowledge have only 
to a very limited extent been mobilised in Plan C (see also 4.2.3.).  
 
Finally, a crucial resource is the legitimacy that transition processes such as Plan C are able to 
build. Formal legitimacy is relatively well covered. From the start of the process, the Minister 
of the Environment has politically supported the creation of an “experiment space” for Plan C. 
As explained above, the process later found its way into the Flemish government agreement 
and the Pact 2020. Recently, sustainable materials management (which is broader than just 
Plan C) has also been chosen as a “flagship initiative” in the socio-economic Vlaanderen in 
Actie agenda. And as will be described in part 5, sustainable materials management is an 
essential part of the new Materials Decree, the Flemish translation of the EU Waste Directive. 
Paradoxically, in spite of this growing formal legitimacy, the ‘informal’ legitimacy with 
closely involved individuals and organisations seems to dwindle. An important cause is the 
slow and uncertain development of the process, its activities and in particular the problem of 
autonomy and organisation development since 2009. This diminishes the trust in the creation 
of a dynamic network and undermines legitimacy. The current lack of active business 
involvement in the decision-making bodies can partly be explained by the slow progress and 
the uncertain added value, but in turn causes a legitimacy problem with the business sector. It 
is hoped that this can be resolved with the creation of the vzw Plan C and that some “big 
names” will somehow be involved and support the network. 
“Of course, you can ask yourself why that’s not the case now. I fear that some 
people have become reticent: we see the potential, it’s a good initiative, but it’s 
new, we will have to stick our neck out, and there’s always the danger that 
politics says ‘well, in the end, let’s just forget it’. (…) There are several actors 
that say ‘if it has been established, we absolutely want to be a member, preferably 
a member of the Board, or co-finance it’, but first they want to see that green 
light” (knowledge actor). 
 
 
4.2.5. Some reflections and interim conclusions 
 
With the start in 2006 of a TM-process in sustainable materials management, OVAM aimed at 
innovating its policies and creating a network of frontrunners that could help support a 
transition process and carry it forward. When we compare Plan C as an embryonic policy 
arrangement with the characteristics of the policy arrangement of the current waste regime (cf. 
part 3), several distinctions are obvious. In contrast with the waste regime, in the Plan C 
discourse waste has become a small part of an overarching materials system. Production and 
consumption activities and related policies are reoriented towards closing of material loops 
and a life cycle approach. The involvement of frontrunners – actors that are usually not in the 
driving seat when policy is developed – is an essential element in this reorientation of the 
discourse. The time and space they were allowed to develop as an arena in the shadow of 
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regular policy, was instrumental in formulating a transition agenda (with leitbild, transition 
pathways, proposals for experiments). In the first two years, financial means were more or 
less adequate for coaching the process. The legitimacy of the process seems high with the 
participants (around 60 persons mid 2008) and they side with an ambitious mission statement 
for the further development of Plan C.   
 
It can thus be concluded that during the first two years the transition management approach 
was successful in creating a  policy niche with some clearly distinctive characteristics: a new 
discourse, based on the contributions of frontrunners working under new interaction rules 
between government and societal actors. The financial means came from traditional funding 
sources. Nevertheless, by mid 2008 the tensions within the new policy niche are growing and 
during the following years these turn into problems that seriously hamper its further 
development. When observing the evolutions though the lens of the policy arrangement 
approach, several tensions are revealed: 
• In the actors dimension a shift is visible in the carriers of the Plan C network and process. 
The coalition between OVAM and the frontrunners involved starts to break up. It seems 
particularly difficult to keep the business world involved as carriers of the process. In 
general, there is a lack of “doers” and entrepreneurial individuals/organisations to bring 
the process to a next level. The declining participation in the lead of the process is partly 
accommodated by a switch in role of the consultants involved, from “facilitating” until 
end 2008 to “carrying” by 2011. Also, after a time of hesitation about the role of Plan C, 
OVAM itself seems to have made up its mind that it wants to invest in Plan C as a vehicle 
that can be useful in furthering the transition to sustainable materials management. 
• The tension at the actor level can be partly explained by the resources problem of Plan C. 
While the ambitions of the network were growing and the management of organisation 
and substance became more complex, the financial means for daily operations did not 
grow. These means where sufficient to coach a visioning process during the first two years, 
but they were no longer sufficient to manage a growing network in its different 
dimensions and ambitions. Besides, Plan C has no resources available for what according 
to TM theory is the main task after formulating a transition agenda (after phase 2 and 3 
above), namely developing and carrying out experiments. This creates a huge problem in 
attracting entrepreneurs and convincing them to risk the step to investing in transition 
experiments.  
• Some of the tensions are also related to presuppositions in the theory of transition 
management that do not seem to turn out well in the case of Plan C. The idea that 
transition management should lead to a self-organising process is clearly not an 
automatism. Working in the shadow of policy was helpful for developing the transition 
agenda, but now that the process wants to assert itself as an autonomous partner in the 
policy regime, the low profile hinders its positioning. This has in particular been the case 
for bringing the autonomy process forward. While end 2008 the hope was that Plan C 
would become autonomous within 8 to 12 months, the dragging on of this discussion and 
the lack of political decision-making weighed heavily on all activity development. The 
belief in the dynamic potential of the network is dwindling with actors that should take 
ownership of the process, although simultaneously the formal legitimacy is growing. The 
precise effect of the approval of the Materials Decree with a cooperation between OVAM 
and other government agencies (but without a legal Eigen Vermogen structure) is still 
unclear, but is at least intended to provide operational support – under the form of 
personnel and/or finance – to Plan C and coordinate government involvement. 
• One of the dimensions where the partial standstill is visible, is the state of affairs of the 
discourse. While in 2007/8 Plan C was at the front of the discourse in sustainable 
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materials management, three years later comparable ideas are spreading in policy circles 
at EU, UN and OECD level, in part of the business community and is also finding its way 
in innovation discourse in Flanders. This leads some actors to questioning the current 
added value of Plan C.  
 
The analysis in part 4 has so far focused on the characteristics of the Plan C process as a 
policy niche and has rather strictly been limited to the internal working of this niche as an 
embryonic policy arrangement for reorienting waste policy to sustainable materials 
management. The TM approach worked fairly well during the first two years to start 
developing the policy niche, but after 2008 becomes problematic for maintaining the niche. In 
fact, TM theory does not give any hint as to what should happen once the phase of 
experiments has been reached, certainly not if these do not get off the ground through self-
organisation, nor does it have guidelines of how to connect with regular policies. The analysis 
shows how the trial-and-error process of organisation and substance development that 
followed, has been hindered by problems such as a lack of funding to support the process and 
the development of experiments, a search by involved actors to define their role and position 
vis-a-vis each other, the difficult translation of the discourse into action, and uncertainty about 
the future status of the network. 
 
The analysis is however incomplete if we want to understand the potential role of transition 
management processes in the innovation of policy. First, it says nothing about the influence 
Plan C may have had on the policy arrangement of the waste regime such as if has been 
described in part 3. Second, one of the lessons of research in policy analysis is that the context 
in which new policy processes have to perform is of immense importance for explaining their 
success and failure. Explaining the influence and the problems of Plan C solely on the basis of 
the internal functioning of the policy niche, thus seems a bit simplistic. Therefore, part 5 
continues the analysis by investigating the position of Plan C in the ongoing evolution of the 
waste and materials regime.   
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5. A system in a state of flux: the changing waste regime, 
the role of Plan C, and beyond. 
 
Building on the observation that its waste policy had more or less come to a standstill, OVAM 
introduced a transition management process in 2006. As shown in part 4, the frontrunners that 
were gathered under Plan C succeeded in formulating a new discourse on a materials 
economy and then started building a network around it, which at the moment tries to find an 
autonomous position and start up experiments. How such a transition trajectory is 
accompanied by considerable tensions and difficult decisions at the level of Plan C as a 
process, was also clarified in part 4. The question now is: does a transition management 
process such as Plan C lead to innovation in the existing policy regime, and if so, can we 
explain how this influence happens and why? And how does this relate to changes in the 
broader policy context? 
 
Referring back to the analytical framework, the question is now whether we see changes in 
the waste regime and what influences these changes. Paragraph 5.1. discusses several 
influences on the current waste and materials system that can be interpreted as driving forces 
steering the system in a new direction. The MLP is used to group them according to landscape, 
regime and niche pressures. Plan C is obviously one force among many. Paragraphs 5.2. to 
5.5. use the dimensions of policy arrangements to try to get a grip on what is happening in the 
incumbent waste policy regime and on the role of Plan C. In the introduction to part 3 and the 
description of the current waste regime, I said that there is some arbitrariness in delineating 
periods and different policy arrangements. The same can be said here. There are several 
indications that we may currently (mid 2011) be witnessing the start of a new policy regime in 
Flanders. There is little doubt that new developments are under way, such as a noticeable shift 
in discourse from “waste” to “materials”. This renewal in discourse already finds some 
institutionalisation, for example in a Flemish Materials Decree that in 2011 will replace the 
old Waste Decree, but also in the new strategic plan and an internal reorganisation of the main 
governmental actor (the Public Waste Agency OVAM). Nevertheless, the current regime is 
still firmly in place and it is as of yet unclear how it will further develop. Researchers in 5 to 
10 years from now will be better able to judge the current developments.  
 
The focus of analysis in this part 5 is depicted in figure 5:  the analysis tries to understand the 
changes that are happening in the waste regime, taking into account the different pressures for 
change that arise from landscape, regime and niche developments, as well as the interactions 
between the levels. The focus is on how the policy arrangement of the regime is changing. In 
the course of my analysis, however, it became clear that this approach captures only partially 
the role that Plan C is playing. In fact, for understanding the current and potential role of Plan 
C it is not only necessary to look at the waste regime and its shift towards a materials regime, 
but also at interactions with fields such as socio-economic and innovation policy, the 
institutional organisation of government policy, and the broader environmental and 
sustainable development policy. The analysis of which changes take place, why and how, can 
thus get quite complicated due to a “fanning out” of relevant systems and policies. These kind 
of influences and interactions cannot easily be captured in the analytical framework. It leads 
in fact to a question about the appropriateness of analytical tools that are in use in transition 
studies. The MLP and TM focus on one socio-technical system; the policy arrangements 
approach focuses on one policy field, while here the relations between different socio-
technical systems and different policy fields also become important. I cannot go into this 
methodological discussion here, but where appropriate I try to accommodate for the problem 
by discussing the links with adjacent policy field more or less in the environmental domain 
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(such as renewable energy policy and minerals policy) or the interactions with socio-
economic and innovation policy and general environmental policy and sustainable 
development policy. In particular in these last cases, the fanning out to a broader agenda is 
also influenced by the combined dynamics of Plan C and the other Flemish TM process 
DuWoBo. 
 
 
Figure 5. The focus of analysis in part 5 is on the kind of change that is happening in the 
waste regime and the role and involvement of Plan C. Plan C is one influence among several 
influences resulting from developments at the level of the landscape, regime and niches. 
 
 
5.1. The waste regime under pressure: driving forces for change 
 
As will be shown below, Plan C has had influence in the changes that are currently taking 
place in the Flemish waste regime and its possible shift to a materials regime. However, Plan 
C is only one of the influences and the changes that can be observed result from an interplay 
between different levels and driving forces. This paragraph 5.1. gives a concise overview of 
important developments at landscape, regime and niche level. The overview is meant to 
introduce and better understand changes in the different dimensions of the policy arrangement 
that will be discussed next (5.2. to 5.5.). 
 
 
5.1.1. Landscape pressures / processes of structural transformation 
 
Part 3 showed how the Flemish waste system was build up during the eighties with a strong 
focus on waste removal and on cleaning up the most visible excrescences of landfilling. 
During the nineties the system was reoriented on the basis of the waste hierarchy, with most 
attention going to selective collection and recycling. These developments are of course not 
specific for Flanders but can in different degrees be observed in other industrialised countries 
as well. But in spite of a focus on recycling and more attention for prevention, the prevailing 
logic in current modern economies in relation to materials still is a linear one: resources are 
extracted and transported, materials manufactured, products designed, assembled, distributed 
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and consumed, and the materials finally ends up as waste. Over the last few years, this logic 
has come under pressure from different kind of developments: 
• Probably the most important trend is the fast rise in demand for resources worldwide. 
Global resource extraction was at 40 billion tonnes in 1980, in 2002 at 55 billion tonnes 
and is expected to rise to 80 billion tonnes by 2020 (OECD 2008). While over the past 
decennia this rise was mostly due to OECD countries, for the future the impact of fast-
growing economies, rapid industrialization and urbanisation of emerging countries such as 
China, India and Brazil will be a major factor. Still, at the moment inhabitants of the EU 
consume three times as many resources as inhabitants of Asia and more that four times as 
much as an average African (this rises to 10 times more for the US) (SERI 2009, p. 21). 
• Import dependency of OECD countries and in particular the EU. According to OECD-
figures, the supply-dependency of the OECD area on the rest of the world is rising for all 
commodities and groups of materials. OECD net imports have increased by 80% since 
1980 (OECD 2008, p. 38). In particular for the EU-27, there is a “massive asymmetry” in 
trade in fuels and mining products with  the rest of the world (EEA 2010, 16). In 2008 the 
EU imported six times more materials than it imported and this dependency is a long-term 
structural trend, since EU-27 imports in tonnes increased by 30% during the period 1999-
2008 (ibid.). 
• Distribution of reserves. Of course, reserves of resources are where they have always been, 
but the growth in resource consumption coupled with import dependency, have fuelled an 
alarm over the availability of resources for national economies and over easy access to the 
proven reserves. The EU, the US and China do not possess large domestic deposits of 
fossil fuels and metals (SERI 2009). The EU has even listed 14 raw materials as “critical” 
because they are in risk of supply shortage due to the fact that a high share of world 
production comes from a handful of countries such as China, Russia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Brazil (EC 2011a). China has already limited exports of some raw 
materials in order to ensure privileged access for its domestic industry (EC 2008b).  
• Rising prices for resources. As a result of rising demand and growing competition for 
access, the prices of a lot of resources have been increasing during the last decade. The 
prices in markets for energy, metals and minerals, agriculture and food reached a peak in 
2008, declined sharply in the second half of 2008, but have been increasing again since 
the summer of 2009 (EC 2011a). The markets have also seen a growing interdependence 
of commodity markets and financial markets, with a surge of flows into commodity 
derivative markets. 
• Increasing interference between systems of materials, energy, food and water. Awareness 
is growing that solving problems in one system has impact on others. High performance 
batteries and photovoltaic cells in the energy system require specific materials which may 
be in short supply or not easily accessible. Renewable biomass energy policies may hinder 
the development of a bio-based materials economy, or may have impact on food security. 
This nexus between systems and its policy impacts is labelled by the OECD as “one of the 
greatest challenges of policy assessment” in sustainable materials management (OECD 
2010, p. 10). 
 
As a result of these kinds of pressure, during the past years we have witnessed a rapid rise in 
attention for resources and materials at international policy level. An example is the working 
group on Sustainable Materials Management of the OECD. The initiative started in 2005 with 
a workshop in Korea, a second workshop in 2008 in Israel and a third workshop in 2010 in 
Belgium, the last one organised by OVAM. Based on the observation of a “fundamental 
tension” (OECD 2010, p. 11) between environmental protection and the increasing demand 
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for materials associated with economic growth, the OECD tries to clarify the meaning of 
SMM and the policy principles on which it can be based.  
 
Of course, the attention for materials on international level is not isolated from other trends. 
On the one hand, it occurs in parallel to growing concerns over climate change, loss of 
biodiversity, water stress or food shortages. On the other hand, it is embedded in a broader 
discourse about greening of the economy, a transition towards a low-carbon economy, and 
sustainable development in general. 
 
Since this paper is interested in the changes in the Flemish waste regime, the developments at 
EU level are particularly important. The general framework for current European policy-
making is the Europe 2020 strategy, adopted in March 2010 as a follow-up to the Lisbon 
strategy. This strategy was launched as an answer to the economic and financial crisis and 
must “turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of 
employment, productivity and social cohesion” (EC 2010, p. 3). “Smart” refers to an economy 
based on knowledge and innovation, “sustainable” to promoting a more resource efficient, 
greener and more competitive economy, and “inclusive” to fostering a high-employment 
economy delivering social and territorial cohesion. The Commission formulated seven 
flagship initiatives to translate the goals into action. One of these is a flagship initiative for a 
“Resource efficient Europe”. In January 2011, European Commissioner for the Environment 
Potocnik presented the initiative that aims at boosting economic growth and competitiveness, 
creating new opportunities for innovation while simultaneously reducing resource use, 
fighting climate change and ensuring security of supply of essential resources. Over the 
following years, the Commission will propose resource efficiency strategies in areas such as 
energy, climate change, research and innovation industry, transport, agriculture, fisheries and 
environment policy (EC 2011b) 
 
A few years ago in 2008, the European Commission had already launched the Raw Materials 
initiative (EC 2008a). This initiative grew out of anxiety over the availability of resources for 
the European economy and has three pillars: ensuring access to raw materials on international 
markets under the same conditions as other industrial competitors; fostering sustainable 
supply of raw materials from within Europe; and boosting overall resource efficiency and 
promote recycling to reduce the EU’s consumption of primary raw materials and decrease the 
relative import dependence.  
 
A series of other EU initiatives are of importance for understanding the shifting landscape and 
the impact these policies have on shaping national and regional policy regimes. In the case of 
the waste system, these include the thematic strategy on the sustainable use of natural 
resources (2005), the thematic strategy on prevention and recycling of waste (2005), the 
action plan on sustainable consumption and production (2008), the ecodesign directive (2005), 
the integrated product policy (2001, 2003). A common characteristic of most of these 
initiatives is that they depart from a broad vision on resources and materials and in that way 
try to guard over the linkages between the different strategies and plans. 
 
Of particular significance for the developments in the Flemish waste system is the Waste 
Framework Directive (EU 2008). As part of the thematic strategy on prevention and recycling 
of waste, the existing EU legislation was revised, simplified and clarified. The revision of the 
Waste Framework directive included: introducing life cycle thinking, clarifying when waste 
ceases to be waste and the definitions of recovery and disposal, introducing a definition of 
recycling, and solving overlaps between different pieces of waste and other environmental 
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legislation (EC 2005). In general, the aim is to strengthen the waste hierarchy in the waste 
policies of EU member states and to reduce the discrepancies in waste policies between 
member states. As will be shown below, the implementation of the Waste Framework 
Directive is seized at in Flanders to reorient the existing Waste Decree to a Materials Decree, 
in that way anchoring the first rules of a new materials economy.  
 
 
5.1.2. Regime tensions 
 
Although current materials policy is strongly influenced by landscape factors such as the 
growing global demand for resources and the concern over access to reserves, this was not the 
main driver behind Plan C when the first ideas for such process were formulated in 2003.  
“The theme of scarcity of resources is something of the last five years (…) Five 
years ago, for example when the thematic strategy on natural resources was made, 
the discourse was ‘scarcity of resources is not a topic; the impact is most 
important.’ (…) But during the last five years, the industry has noticed an 
enormous shift in resource flows towards China and other growth countries, 
India is also an important player. I don’t think that was the most important 
impulse for an orientation towards materials policy here at OVAM. Our concern 
was more ‘we have to reduce impacts, we have to reduce the amount of waste, 
and therefore materials policy is necessary.’ In fact, resource scarcity is an 
opportunity we have used to say ‘look, this is not just an environmental story, it’s 
obviously also an economic story.’” (civil servant) 
 
As was already observed in part 3, the Flemish waste systems ranks amongst the top of 
Europe. Landfill taxes and bans have reduced dumping from almost 50% of total household 
waste in the early nineties to 3% in 2009. The recycling rate has increased from almost 20% 
to 75% in the same period (VMM 2008, 2010). However, the total amount of household waste 
has remained virtually constant around 550 kg per person since 2000. Furthermore, industrial 
waste is difficult to get under control. Total amounts fluctuate but remain constantly higher 
than in the beginning of the century. Around 63% of primary industrial waste was subject to a 
form of material recovery (re-use, use as secondary resource, recycling, composting) (VMM 
2010, p. 116). 
 
This kind of tension at regime level is much more obvious when looked at from a European 
point of view. Although the waste hierarchy has been the basis of EU waste policy for years, 
and although recycling and incineration are increasing, “overall waste volumes are growing 
(…) and the absolute amounts of waste landfilled are not decreasing because of the growth in 
waste generation” (EC 2005, p. 5). Even though waste management is improving, 51,5% was 
still landfilled in 2006, 43,6% recovered and recycled and 4,9% incinerated (EEA 2010, p. 24).  
 
While the global demand for materials is growing, several features of the waste system may 
hinder closing of material loops. Incineration, more and more combined with energy recovery, 
may be leading waste streams away from recycling, in particular when incineration counts as 
green electricity and is favoured through tariff systems (such as green electricity certificates in 
Flanders). Since the recycling industry does not receive these kind of subsidies, it is 
structurally put at a disadvantage. Furthermore, to keep incinerator ovens profitable they have 
to function at optimum level, which necessitates a guaranteed flow of waste. Until end 2010, 
EU waste policies were based on self-sufficiency and treatment of waste streams within 
national borders. This principle determined planning of incinerator installations within 
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Flanders. However, since 2011, the new Waste Directive determines that incinerators all over 
Europe that conform to a so-called R-1 status (mainly based on energy-efficiency of the 
installation) can attract industrial waste from other European countries. Again, this may lead 
materials away from recycling. Flanders seems particularly vulnerable because of 
overcapacity in incineration in the Netherlands and Germany, where the incineration sector is 
attracting waste flows with favourable incineration tariffs. Furthermore, a decision in June 
2011 of the Flemish Minister of the Environment Schauvlieghe to grant a licence to a new 
incineration installation of Bionerga in Houthalen-Helchteren and to extend the license of the 
ISVAG installation in Wilrijk, attracts criticism because it also threatens to install 
overcapacity in Flanders. 
 
 
5.1.3. Niche developments 
 
In part 2 of this paper, I defined Plan C as a policy niche where a network of frontrunners 
develops alternatives for current policies. In transition studies it is however more customary 
to look for technological niches that challenge the regime. The niche that over the past few 
years has probably been most challenging for the waste regime is the Cradle to Cradle 
approach (C2C), defined by Braungart and McDonough (2002). The approach not only wants 
to replace linear logics in materials management by closed cycles, but questions the resource 
efficiency approach at heart. Being efficient in a bad system makes no sense. The goal should 
not be to be less bad by minimizing resources and waste, but to be “eco-effective”: designing 
products from materials that have a positive impact on the environment. According to 
Braungart and McDonough, this can be done by creating two materials cycles: a technical 
cycle where non-renewable materials are kept in a closed loop, and a biological cycle where 
at the end of their lifecycle products can be discarded and serve as a nutrient for nature. The 
famous “waste equals food” maxim refers to this continuance of cycles. In 2010 and 2011, 
OVAM is one of the partners in the European Interreg IVC- project Cradle to Cradle Network. 
The project brings together EU regions to share and capitalise on regional good practice in 
implementing C2C principles in relation to waste prevention and management. OVAM is 
responsible for the governance part of the project. 
 
 
5.2. A change in discourse? 
 
So, what influence does the combination of trends at landscape, regime and niche level have 
at the discourse in the Flemish waste system? Do we see a change happening and is it possible 
to trace the role of the policy niche Plan C? As said in the introductory paragraphs of part 5, 
during the analysis it became clear that changes are visible in the waste regime as well as in a 
set of policies beyond waste policy, such as socio-economic and innovation policy, 
environmental and sustainable development policy. This distinction is followed in 5.2.1. and 
5.2.2. 
 
 
5.2.1. From waste to materials 
 
As discussed above, it is impossible to strictly delineate between policy arrangements. Traces 
of a shift from a waste to a materials discourse can be found for example in OVAM 
documents at least since 2003. But the implementation in Flanders of the Waste Framework 
Directive (EU 2008) definitely marks a change in discourse. As discussed above, the 
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Directive’s main goal is to strengthen the waste hierarchy in the waste policies of EU member 
states and to reduce the discrepancies in waste policies between member states. Although it 
introduces a few new elements such as life-cycle thinking and extended producer 
responsibility, conceptually it starts from the idea of management of waste streams, not 
material chains and cycles. The Flemish Minister of the Environment and OVAM proposed to 
translate the directive into a Materials Decree instead of a new Waste Decree, which should 
be in place by the second half of 2011. In the text of the Materials Decree, the well-known 
language of the waste hierarchy is extended with language on materials and material cycles. 
The explanatory memorandum explicitly refers to the need to develop a sustainable materials 
economy in the decades to come and to capitalize on upcoming trends at EU and OECD level. 
“Apart from the framework directive, there is a trend at Flemish, European and international 
level to situate waste policy in a broader context. To reduce the environmental effects of the 
waste phase, it is necessary to look at decision taken before the material has become waste 
(…) The final goal is to design material cycles that stay within ecological carrying capacity 
and generate wellbeing for current and future generations. This requires a far-reaching 
integrated policy that is known as ‘sustainable materials policy’ or ‘sustainable management 
of material cycles’” (Vlaamse Regering 2010). 
 
This discourse on materials and the step to go beyond traditional waste management is 
supported by important advisory councils such as the SERV, MINA Council and VRWI. In a 
common advice, SERV and MINA Council urge the government and OVAM to embed the 
Materials Decree in the resource efficiency flagship of the EU and to use it as an instrument in 
the greening of the economy. The VRWI “fully supports the transition from a waste 
management problem to cyclical thinking” (VRWI 2011, p. 5) and hopes the decree 
favourably influences innovation opportunities for a green economy. These councils also 
support the idea of a specific position for Plan C as a network where government and other 
societal actors meet, think and discuss new pathways towards a sustainable materials society. 
 
A notable example of the role and influence of the new discourse is to be found in the results 
of the Belgian EU presidency in the Environment Council26. It is worthwhile describing this 
in some detail because it shows by which mechanisms discourses can flow through policy-
making. Because Belgium is a federal state, the preparation of a task such as a European 
presidency requires a lot of coordination between the federal and the regional level. During 
the preparation process, the presidency of each policy domain is divided between the levels. 
In that way, Joke Schauvlieghe, Flemish Minister for the Environment became responsible for 
the presidency of the EU Environment Council. It is a tradition at European level that each 
presidency formulates a few own priorities, so during the preparations for the environmental 
presidency at Flemish level, OVAM proposed materials policy as one of the priorities. 
Together with climate and biodiversity, this was accepted.  
“I think that this can be attributed to two things. First, OVAM has a good 
reputation for its European policy work. That has strengthened the confidence 
when we brought up a theme for the presidency, ‘okay, when it is assigned to 
OVAM, it will run well’. Second, materials policy is mentioned in the government 
declaration, it is in the policy note of the minister, it is mentioned in ViA, so the 
cabinet was willing to put the theme in the picture.” (civil servant) 
 
The Belgian presidency formulated “sustainable materials management” as one of its 
environmental spearheads and in July 2010 an informal Environment Council in Ghent was 
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 Belgium was president of the EU in the second half of 2010. 
 58 
devoted to the theme. A background study for the informal council (Rossy et al. 2010), 
ordered by the Flemish government, situated sustainable materials management against a 
broad background of respecting ecological limits and the need for “breakthrough system-level 
innovations” (ibid., p. 5). It explicitly mentions the need for knowledge networks for 
transitions and uses Plan C as an example. It recommends the establishment of “a multi-
stakeholder European SMM Transition Platform, similar to the Flemish ‘Plan C’” (ibid., p. 
65)27. OVAM served as penholder for preparing the conclusions of the informal council and 
of the formal Council of December 2010. These mention inter alia the need of system 
innovation for a sustainable and resource-efficient Europe and they invite the Commission to 
“consider how the objectives on resource efficiency can be supported and implemented by the 
creation of a multi-actor transition platform on resource efficiency”, in that way making the 
link with the flagship initiative on resource efficiency. 
“It is partly thanks to Plan C that this reached the conclusions. The line is very 
direct: OVAM prepared the conclusions, we are penholder, so we put these 
concepts in there. You can see a clear causal link between what lives in Plan C 
and what was discussed at the Council (…). For example, the Council asks the 
Commission to set up a European transition platform to help in drawing up a 
resource efficiency roadmap. However, the Commission does not know very well 
what to do with it, so now they ask us ‘do you have concrete ideas for that?’ So 
now we have a chance to translate the transition approach to a European level. 
But that will of course be quite challenging, because how do you do that?” (civil 
servant). 
 
In early 2011, OVAM received an invitation from the Commission to discuss their experience 
with Plan C. OVAM organised one meeting with experts on which kind of input could be 
given to the Commission, but this got no further follow-up. 
 
 
5.2.2. From waste to a broader agenda 
 
It has already been hinted at several times: the shift form a waste to a materials discourse has 
implications that go beyond the strict materials system. In fact there are three movements of 
‘fanning out’ visible. In the first the materials discourse is linked up with a broader discourse 
about the need for transformation of the Flemish economy and innovation for a green 
economy. In the second the transition element of the discourse is taken up in Flemish 
sustainable development policy. In the third and a very recent development at the moment of 
writing of this paper, the transition discourse also seems to move to the heart of the socio-
economic and innovation discourse. 
 
The first movement is linked to what is currently the most important initiative for innovating 
the socio-economic web of Flanders, the Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA) agenda and the Pact 2020. 
ViA was introduced in 2006 under the Leterme government, was revived under the Peeters I 
government and has with the start of Peeters II and its explicit link to the governmental 
declaration 2009-2014 gained even more strategic importance. One of the prominent results is 
the so-called Pact 2020, signed in 2009 by the government, social partners and civil society 
organisations. It is meant as a long-term strategy for Flanders, aimed at turning the region 
“into a trend-setting knowledge economy with strong entrepreneurship and a strong 
international orientation that can create welfare in a sustainable manner” (Vlaamse Regering 
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 One of the authors of the study, Peter Tom Jones, was a member of the Plan C transition arena in phase 1 to 3 
(see 4.1.2-4.1.4). 
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2009, p. 8) and thus belonging amongst the top 5 regions of Europe by 2020. The Pact 2020 
also expresses the intention to take steps for a transition towards a sustainable energy, 
materials and mobility system. The intentions of ViA and Pact 2020 found their way into the 
Flemish governmental agreement 2009-2014 that uses several terms to refer to the needed 
transformation of the Flemish economy, such as “breakthroughs”, “a renewal of the dna of the 
Flemish economy”, “green economy” and “big projects for societal renewal”.  
“ViA has put the idea of ‘transformation’ on the Flemish agenda, although this is 
not necessarily green transformation (…). Until recently, greening was a bonus to 
make entrepreneurs more competitive; it was not really fundamental for economic 
policy. But with transformation policy, the core is that in order to be competitive 
you also have to be sustainable. That legitimisation comes form ViA and Pact 
2020, the transformation of our economic web, a new dna, greening, whitening: 
all these terms have been brought in there, but perhaps not everybody realises 
their potential to effectively go for structural changes” (civil servant). 
 
As said above, Plan C has tried to position itself as a partner in this innovation debate but with 
limited success. However, mainly under impulse of several European developments (such as 
the Waste Directive / Materials Decree, the flagship resource efficiency, the experiences 
during the EU Belgian presidency, the Europe 2020 strategy), the sustainable materials 
discourse is rapidly attracting attention and being perceived as an essential ingredient of an 
innovative, job-creating and greener economy. Proof of that is the fact that, when early 2011 
all Flemish ministers had to propose a flagship initiative for the ViA-strategy, Minister of the 
Environment Schauvlieghe proposed sustainable materials management, with that positioning 
materials as an essential part of the transformation and innovation of the Flemish economy. 
This resulted at 6 June 2011 in a Round Table on Sustainable Materials Management where 
industry, knowledge centres and other societal partners signed a Declaration in which they 
engage themselves to work towards a Materials Pact and an operational plan on sustainable 
materials by June 2012. The pact and the plan will be prepared by a steering group of public 
and private actors. A sounding board group “with broad societal representation” will do the 
follow-up of the process. Although the declaration uses terms such as ‘multi-stakeholder 
processes’, ‘support for frontrunners’, ‘government as partner and facilitator’, Plan C is not 
mentioned in the declaration and its role in the process and vis-a-vis the new steering group is 
unclear. As said earlier (in 4.1.5), Plan C tried to position itself during the Round Table by 
presenting the ambitious iMade project. 
 
So, in a first movement of ‘fanning out’, we do not only see how the discourse of the waste 
regime changes to a materials discourse, but also how the materials discourse becomes 
embedded in a broader discourse of innovation and transformation of the Flemish economy. 
Elements of this are also visible in the Witboek Nieuw Industrieel Beleid voor Vlaanderen 
(White Paper New Industrial Policy for Flanders) that formulates a future vision for the 
industry in Flanders. The central insight of the Witboek is that the industry is in need of new 
productivity growth and new models of value creation. Energy and materials efficiency are 
elements of this transformation, including concepts such as design for recycling (C2C) and 
product-service combinations. The document also uses the term “system innovations” 
(Vlaamse Regering 2011, p. 43) to refer to the need to develop new infrastructures to support 
space for experiments and niches that can grow into seeds for a new growth model. Elements 
from the transitions discourse are placed here exclusively in a competition and productivity 
discourse. 
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A second movement of fanning out is not related to the ‘materials’ part of the discourse, but 
to the ‘transitions’ and ‘transition management’ part of the discourse of Plan C. The Flemish 
government initiated two transition management processes as forms of innovative 
environmental policy, DuWoBo in 2004 and Plan C in 2006. Although these processes are 
relatively small, over the years the attention for their approach has been growing slowly. An 
important breakthrough for the transition discourse was realised during the preparation for the 
second Flemish Sustainable Development Strategy28 (VSDO). The first strategy was adopted 
in 2006 and followed a ‘traditional’ approach, building on Brundtland, the UNCED-process 
and in particular the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development. The process for the 
preparation of the second strategy was started early 2010. Several elements converged at the 
time to lead to the decision that ‘transitions’ would become a central theme in the new 
strategy. These included: the past experience with DuWoBo and Plan C and the realisation 
that the transition discourse had a strong appeal for strengthening and reframing the 
sustainability debate, a new team leader (Ilse Dries) for the administrative Cell Sustainable 
Development who was also project leader of the DuWoBo-process and was thus familiar with 
the transitions discourse, the input from the scientists of the Policy Research Centre on 
Sustainable Development who had amongst other things been working on sustainable 
development policy and transitions, and a ministerial cabinet that was supportive of a new 
approach for sustainable development policy.  
 
During the spring of 2010 an intensive process was set up with all Flemish administrations 
and relevant stakeholders to discuss the contents of the second strategy. This included 
amongst other things two workshops with all relevant stakeholders (2 April 2010, 20 May 
2010). The idea of transitions and transition governance for a series of socio-technical 
systems was the central element of the discussions. When by the Summer of 2010 the 
proposal for a new VSDO strategy went to the government, its main components were:  
• a long-term vision 2050 which states that we are in need of transitions in systems that are 
central to our welfare. The vision consists of short sketches of the situation in 2050 after 
transitions in seven systems: housing and building, materials, energy, mobility, agriculture 
and food, health, knowledge. It also formulates short visions for the economic, socio-
cultural, ecological, international and institutional dimensions of society.  
• A series of midterm and short-term objectives and actions for the seven systems and five 
dimensions. These are mainly based on the Flemish Pact 2020 and the Europe 2020 
strategy, when necessary supplemented with objectives from the governmental declaration 
or the EU SDS. 
• A methodological framework that proposes transition management as a key element of a 
Flemish policy for sustainable development. It states that for complex societal problems, 
we are in need of ‘governance beyond government’ with shared responsibilities between 
public actors, market parties and civil society actors. It also promotes new and better 
participation processes. 
In May 2011, the government approved the strategy with these elements. 
“The VSDO has been a means to present these kind of fundamental change 
processes as the core of policy, in a way and at a scale and with a horizontal 
spread that we have never seen before. That makes me optimistic for what may 
happen with it. A second reason for optimism (…) is that those societal actors that 
want to use it as a means for exercising political pressure and to refer to, that 
they can use it that way. That was not the case with the previous strategy, which 
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 For a detailed discussion of the different aspects of Flemish sustainable development policy, I refer to 
Spillemaeckers and Bachus (2009). Kris Bachus and Matthias Bussels (HIVA/KULeuven) are currently 
preparing a new paper on the latest developments around the VSDO. 
 61 
was too weak (…) This one has potential for developing agency (…) I think that 
this is the first document in Flanders that couples a long-term vision with mid- 
term policy planning and a fundamental vision on what has to change if we ever 
want to move into the direction of sustainability” (knowledge actor). 
 
The fact that fundamental change processes have been formulated as the core of policy, brings 
me to the third movement of fanning out of the discourse: since the Spring of 2011, the 
transition discourse seems to move to the centre of the ViA discourse and thus becomes a 
central part of the transformation and innovation agenda. The approach of transition 
management is seen as promising for realising breakthroughs and contributing to the goal of 
making Flanders a top 5 region in Europe by 2020. Several interviewees confirm that over the 
past two years, the ViA process had trouble in finding a suited approach that fitted the high 
ambitions. A lot of administrative processes have been launched in particular on the level of 
planning and monitoring, but involving business and civil society is more difficult than 
foreseen. Furthermore, the transformational changes that ViA aims for, require more than 
business-as-usual policy. However, the policy system seems to run into limits to formulate 
these new kind of solutions.  
“Everybody seems ready, these sustainability things are ripe, it is mainstream. 
Policy coordination, that’s also almost evident that we should do that. But our 
structures prevent that (…) But something like a transition approach, the way it is 
slumbering now, that has the potential to fill the vacuum. There is a vacuum of 
how to work with a long-term perspective (…) so now there is a supply that can 
capitalize on the demand of the policy market. And then you need policy-makers 
that are ready (…) and when the right moment is there can supply the right 
approach, a good combination of features that catches on” (civil servant). 
 
At the same moment, in parallel to the observation in the ViA process that it is difficult to find 
a suited approach for its ambitions, the VSDO process was underway. A lot of the people that 
were involved in the VSDO process – all departments and all advisory councils were present 
in the preparatory meetings – are also somehow involved in the ViA process. Furthermore, 
the Cell SD organised a seminar about transitions and transition management for civil 
servants that are involved with ViA (on 28 April 2010). 
“It seems that the fundamental ideas that were present in the VSDO, have seeped 
through more than previous documents – except perhaps for Pact 2020 (…) And 
the ideas that were in there have intellectually been picked up by a number of 
people present, on a kind of cognitive level, and that the two [transitions and ViA 
– EP] have somehow become coupled” (knowledge actor). 
 
One element in effectively translating the transitions idea from the VSDO and DuWoBo/Plan 
C to the ViA circles, is the role played by the so-called Council of the Sages, an advisory 
body of stakeholders and scientists that as part of the ViA process has been installed by the 
Flemish government. During a meeting of this Council in March with Flemish ministers and 
the top of the Flemish administrations, the potential of a transitions approach for furthering 
ViA was discussed. Members such as scientist Hans Bruyninckx had already repeatedly 
stressed the potential of it29. Furthermore, important civil society actors such as ACW (the 
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 Hans Bruyninckx (KULeuven) is also coordinator of the Policy Research Centre for Sustainable Development 
(Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling). He played an important role during the preparatory phase of the VSDO. 
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umbrella of Christian workers’ organisations) strongly supported the transitions approach30, 
while also several administrations were in favour of trying it. 
“The question is of course what will happen with all this. We have witnessed the 
post-Rio period when everything was going to change (…) But I have the 
impression that this discourse is more fundamental and less soft, which keeps 
actors on board. It is about innovation, that’s the first word. And the second word 
is ‘systems carrying our economy’ and that brings you immediately to the actors 
carrying our economy (…) However, we are still in embryonic processes.” 
(knowledge actor).  
 
Another element that played a role in translating the transitions discourse between VSDO and 
ViA, is their institutional embedding. ViA and VSDO both fall under the competence of 
Minister-President Peeters, and as a consequence are both coordinated from within the DAR-
department. This has considerably simplified contacts and cooperation between the Cell SD  
and the ViA team. One of the result of all these dynamics is that within the ViA process 
several projects were defined as ‘transversal projects’ and that these should be further 
developed on the basis of a transitions approach. No less than eight transversal projects were 
identified for a transitions approach: ranging from international entrepreneurship over poverty 
and smart grids, to sustainable housing and building and sustainable materials management. 
 
The final picture thus looks quite complicated and gives an impression of parallel initiatives, 
with a lot of links between them, but without clear coordination: the initiatives in the 
framework of the Materials decree, the Round Table with its ambition of a Materials Pact 
guided by a steering group and a sounding board, the transversal ViA initiative on sustainable 
materials, elements of industrial transformation in the White Paper on New Industrial Policy, 
and of course Plan C itself. OVAM officials admit that coordination and mutual 
reinforcement of initiatives will be of utmost importance in the governance of this 
breakthrough of the materials discourse.  
 
 
5.3. A change in the rules of the game? 
 
Under what form does the materials discourse find a reflection in rules? The most visible form 
has been mentioned a few times already: the Materials Decree, which is the Flemish 
implementation form of the Waste Framework Directive. As discussed under 5.2.1., the 
discourse in the Materials Decree goes several steps further than the Directive. However, this 
does not imply that the rules go further than Europe requires. The Materials Decree has 
conceptually been built in such a way that it provides a legal basis not only for the 
management of waste, but also for the management of materials and material chains. For 
example, under its Article 4, the waste hierarchy is reformulated as a materials hierarchy in 
such a way that it becomes possible to focus policy instruments not only on waste streams, but 
also on non-waste materials streams. This means that it becomes possible to define conditions 
for the use of materials. Another example is that the extended producer responsibility has 
been relaxed so that it becomes possible to go beyond the current acceptance obligation (see 
also 3.2.). Under the acceptance obligation, producers are only responsible for waste that has 
been collected through their collection system. The system stimulates separate collection and 
recycling, but is unsuccessful in stimulating greener products or ecodesign. The new proposal 
                                                 
30
 Christian and socialist workers’ organisations are currently also part of the transition network of civil society, 
cf. footnote 20. 
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creates the possibility to make producers and even each actor in the chain between extraction 
of a resource and end-use, responsible for all waste that results from products they bring to the 
market. It also allows the introduction of new instruments to stimulate prevention of waste 
and materials use.  
“However, when you look at the hard obligations, then [the Materials Decree]  is 
restricted to traditional waste policy. You cannot say that the Materials Decree 
will contain more stringent rules than the Waste Framework Directive. So, on the 
level of hard rules we just apply what Europe says. But conceptually, the 
philosophy with which it has been made and the potential it contains, go a lot 
further than the Directive” (civil servant). 
 
The real impact of the Materials Decree will thus depend on how over the following months 
and years the legislation and policy instruments are formulated and implemented. In dialogue 
with relevant stakeholders, OVAM foresees a reformulation of policy instruments such as 
implementation plans, a revision of economic instruments such as environmental levies or a 
different implementation of extended producer responsibility. A new division within OVAM, 
the division Policy Innovation, is partly responsible for the renewal of these policy 
instruments (see also 5.4.). 
 
An element that is repeatedly stressed by the involved actors is that the broadening from 
waste to materials requires more consultation and harmonisation between different policy 
domains, in the first instance with domains that belong more or less to environmental policy, 
such as renewable energy policy, extraction of minerals in Flanders, and environmental 
permits policy. OVAM officials expect that the process of cooperation will lead to a 
reformulation of several policies. 
 
In the cooperation with ALBON (the division amongst other things responsible for policy on 
extraction of minerals in Flanders), the possibility for the use of alternatives for primary 
minerals extraction in Flanders is an important theme. The policy of the Flemish government 
is to make minerals extraction in Flanders more sustainable and to extract no more than 
absolutely necessary. This means that alternatives for primary materials, so-called secondary 
minerals, become more important. The new Materials Decree can have an impact on the 
availability of these alternatives, more in particular it broadens the potential for deployment of 
certain waste streams as secondary minerals. For example, the Materials Decree introduces 
the concept of a “materials declaration” that can be granted to a producer and which states 
that a particular material is no or no longer waste, thus providing the opportunity to bring it 
back into the materials cycle.” 
 “When they ask us for alternatives to primary extraction, we automatically end 
up with OVAM, because alternatives means either recycled waste, excavated soil 
or dredged materials, and all these fall under the competencies of OVAM. They 
are also responsible for the legislation. The new Materials Decree is a very good 
evolution for the sections waste and dredged materials. You have this materials 
declaration, the whole philosophy changes, the change from what is considered 
waste to what is materials will come earlier according to the legislation… for us 
these are all positive evolutions from the point of view of secondary minerals. The 
next step is to consider excavated soil, because in the current soil legislation this 
is only considered from the point of pollution control, while from the point of view 
of minerals, this can also be defined as secondary material (…) but OVAM seems 
to have the willingness to cooperate in this discussion (…) In fact, the Decree has 
led to a better understanding of each other’s needs.”  (civil servant) 
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In the cooperation with VEA, the question of the role of biomass and of waste as a materials 
source or as an energy source has a central role. Under the European Directive on the use of 
energy from renewable resources (2009/28/EC) Belgium has an objective of producing 13% 
of its energy from renewable sources by 2020. Since this is being regarded as an ambitious 
objective, input from all possible sources will be necessary. This implies possible interference 
with materials policy on several levels. A first level is the use of biomass: in order to fulfil its 
obligations on renewable energy, Flanders counts on 70% production of renewable energy 
from biomass. However, biomass will also be necessary as a resource in a bio-based chemical 
industry, or it is needed as resource in the manufacturing industry (such as the wood industry). 
A second level is the incineration of waste to produce energy instead of recycling the waste as 
materials, which threatens to undermine the recycling industry. In both cases, the subsidy 
system for the production of green energy – such as the green electricity certificates – attracts 
biomass or waste as a resource for energy production instead of a resource for closed material 
loops.  
“Current policy already tries to take account of some of these aspects. The 
Flemish legislation gives priority to material recycling and to wood as an 
industrial resource, which cannot qualify for green electricity certificates. We are 
currently working on an action plan for green warmth, but will follow the same 
line there. The problem is less a Flemish one, because of our specific legislation 
that prohibits support for these uses, but the problem is rather Europe and also 
Wallonia, where they do not have these bans. Our fear is that these flows will be 
exported abroad or to Wallonia to use it as renewable energy. In that case it 
cannot be used for our wood sector, nor for energy, so we lose twice.” (civil 
servant)  
  
From the discussion so far it can be concluded that, in general terms, with the Materials 
Decree a framework is in place for formulating new formal rules from a materials perspective, 
but that the rules themselves are still under discussion and construction. There are as of yet no 
major indications that the governance of the new materials policy domain will substantially 
differ from what until now has been the case in the waste regime. As discussed earlier (3.2.), 
in the development of policy, government stays in control but draws in stakeholders and target 
groups to create more involvement and develop a better founded and supported policy. 
OVAM has developed a tradition of stakeholder consultation and has a good reputation as to 
how it conducts its consultations. This was confirmed again during the preparation of the 
Materials Decree. In their common advice, the SERV and MINA Councils “find that OVAM 
has treated the process transparently and that there has been consultation with the involved 
stakeholders” (MINA/SERV 2011, p. 12). An interviewee mentions that “OVAM has given a 
lot of room for input (…) OVAM plays that game earnestly” (societal  actor). 
 
The main instrument that is currently available to follow a different governance approach is 
Plan C. But as shown above, the current functioning of Plan C hardly allows for a strong 
support of such an approach. The difficult position of Plan C is also visible in how the 
preparation of the Materials Pact is structured. The approach taken seems to fall back on the 
trusted consultation approach with a balanced representation of stakeholders, instead of on the 
Plan C TM approach with frontrunners. The role of Plan C in the process is not defined. With 
the creation of an Eigen Vermogen Plan C as part of the Materials Decree, OVAM hoped to 
create a legal structure for a government organisation to support a transition governance 
approach. Although this did not succeed – as explained in detail above – a ‘softer’ institution 
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has been created under the form of a cooperation between OVAM and other government 
agencies (in Chapter 6 of the Materials Decree).   
 
Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how in the development of the transversal ViA-projects (cf. 
5.2.2.) and in the VSDO the transitions approach will be filled in. These evolutions at the 
ViA-level and the VSDO, coupled with the dragging on of the weak institutionalisation of 
Plan C (and also DuWoBo), leads some interviewees to the conclusion that the government’s 
ambition is less to initiate a structural transition process, but rather to initiate co-creation 
networks for the renewal of policy. In this interpretation, the use of the transition storyline 
shows how the government is searching for more flexible governance approaches (or new 
rules of the game), but not necessarily for transitions such as interpreted in transition studies, 
namely deep changes in structure, culture and practices. 
“It shows the willingness of the government to co-create and it tries to use the 
transition storyline to do this. According to me, they use transitions as a synonym 
for co-creation (…) But transitions are more fundamental than facilitating 
networks and bringing people together. What happens now answers more to a 
need for co-creation in policy, which they need for idea generation, identifying 
new trends, identifying obstacles, and then agreeing on a policy concept with 
involved actors. But consolidation and real change, I do not have the feeling that 
it’s the ambition to go into that direction.” (knowledge actor) 
 
Since almost all of these processes are only just starting, it is too early to judge the direction 
they will take. Time will teach which interpretation has to be given to current developments. 
 
 
5.4. A change of actors? 
 
Does the materials orientation lead to a change of actors in the existing policy arrangement? 
Or do we notice changes with the actors that are already involved? And is there a connection 
with the Plan C process?  
 
When examining the main government actor OVAM, it quickly shows that the materials 
discourse has had its impact on OVAM during the past five years. The first traces of a 
materials discourse can be found in internal OVAM documents as early as 2003 in the context 
of the BBB administrative reform (see 4.1.1.). It then appears in the strategic plan of OVAM 
for 2005-2009 – around the same time that the Plan C process is prepared – as a third policy 
line for OVAM along with waste and soil management. Parallel to the Plan C process, OVAM 
installed an internal learning forum, called The fifth floor31, where the new developments were 
discussed and where the insight grew that materials management should not be regarded as a 
third policy line, but that the waste system should be regarded as part of a ‘higher’ system, the 
materials system. This implied that materials policy “was not something new for us, we were 
already doing it under the form of waste policy, we just had to change our perspective. We 
also started to understand that this meant an evolution within the organisation itself that was 
going to take some time” (civil servant). 
 
The new orientation is translated at several levels within OVAM, with as outstanding 
examples an internal reorganisation of the OVAM departments and a strategic plan 2010-
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 The OVAM office in Mechelen has only four floors. The idea of a fifth floor was that the initiative did not 
belong to a specific OVAM department, but tried to form a bridge between departments where the new concept 
of sustainable materials management could be discussed. 
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2014 with an explicit materials orientation. “In a sense, the plan is a consolidation of all 
preceding developments, such as those around the reorientation towards sustainable 
materials management”, says an OVAM official. In the strategic plan, waste and materials 
are no longer regarded as separate policy lines but “in order to reach a green closed loop 
economy, the classic waste policy will once and for all be turned into a sustainable materials 
policy” (OVAM 2009, p. 7). The plan formulates four strategic objectives: reducing the use of 
primary resources in production and consumption, maximally limiting total materials 
dissipation, maximally limiting the use of materials per unit of production or unit of 
consumption, maximally limiting the total environmental impact of materials use. While in 
the past, the focus of attention was on households, OVAM now wants to target industry in a 
double track approach: first, set up ambitious experiments in chain management 32  with 
frontrunners; second, optimise eco-efficiency and use of secondary materials in the rest of 
industry. The strategic plan was formulated after a broad consultation process with 
stakeholders. These kind of contacts, and in particular the ones with frontrunners, are not only 
important for finding a support base for policy development, but also serve other strategic 
purposes. 
“It is important that these frontrunner companies support the idea of sustainable 
materials management, that for example Thomas Leysen [CEO of Umicore – EP] 
gives this message. There is more chance to get the message through with the 
Ministry of Economy when these frontrunner companies say ‘this is strategic for 
us’. When the industry says ‘we with our budget of a few milliard Euro, we want 
to invest in a materials economy over the next decades, but it has to be supported 
politically, and subsidy mechanisms have to be elaborated’, well then you have a 
message. These guys can open doors that we at OVAM cannot get open” (civil 
servant). 
 
Meanwhile, OVAM has gone through an internal reorganisation process that is meant to 
prepare the organisation for its role in the coming materials economy. Since 2010, the former 
department waste management has been reformed into the department waste and materials 
management. While the old department was organised around seven specific waste flows 
(such as organic waste, household waste etc.), the new department is organised around two 
chain services (“chain management and companies” and “chain management and local 
government”) and a policy innovation service. Within each chain service, specific teams are 
created that have the ambition to do the follow-up of a whole production and consumption 
chain, such as a team chemistry and a team biomass that try to cover the chemical and 
biomass cycle respectively. The reorientation is not complete, because the focus partly 
remains on target groups (such as local communities) where the waste perspective still 
dominates.  The objective of the policy innovation service is to evaluate the policy 
instruments OVAM currently employs and to formulate ideas for innovating instruments in 
such a way that they contribute to the waste-materials shift. It is interesting to note that the 
head of the new policy innovation service, John Wante, has played an important role in Plan 
C (he was amongst others the OVAM member of the first arena in 2006). 
 
In its communication, OVAM has always stressed that it wants to act as an initiator of the 
materials transition in Flanders, but that it cannot be the only one responsible. Still, there does 
not seem to be a lack of interest for the new orientation. Established actors as well as 
newcomers are adopting the sustainable materials discourse. Such an established actor in the 
waste system is the private waste management industry, grouped in FEBEM. This sector is 
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 Chain management (‘ketenbeheer’) is an approach that tries to minimise material use and environmental 
impact throughout the life cycle of a product. 
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rapidly repositioning itself from “handlers of waste” to “suppliers of materials and fuels from 
secondary processes”. The sector demands its place in the new industrial policy that is being 
developed at European and Flemish level.  
“Europe has its limits regarding primary resources. Therefore, the horizon has to 
be opened to secondary materials of which our region has large quantities 
available. Environmental companies can become the connection between 
companies that produce waste and side streams and those that need resources 
and fuels. Closing the loop is the core business of our environmental companies” 
(Annaert and Gimmelprez 2011, p. 11).  
 
It is not only government polices that are causing this shift, although they play an important 
role. There is on the one hand a growing demand in the market for secondary materials such 
as recycled plastics, while on the other hand producers are starting to cooperate with these 
environmental companies to design products that may be better recyclable and collectable. An 
interviewee confirms that the mindset of the sector has changed profoundly over the last years, 
but that actual practices are presently particularly a case of larger companies in the sector. A 
lot of companies still mainly focus on waste collection and sorting out of waste. Although 
they do not deliver final products under the form of secondary materials, they are part of the 
chain towards that final product. 
  
Perhaps the most important development that is taking place in the actor setting is the 
entrance of actors that were not really part of the waste system, but that will play a major role 
in a new materials system. Two federations and their members are currently playing an active 
role. One is Agoria, the federation of the Belgian technology industry, the other is Essenscia, 
the federation of the chemical and life sciences industry. 
 
The technology industry (with sectors such as metals and materials, automotive, construction 
products, automotive, aerospace, plastics and composites) uses ferrous metals, non-ferrous 
metals and plastics as one of its basic ingredients. The use of materials in the sector is mainly 
driven by  economic incentives such as the competitiveness of companies.  
“Most companies do not lose sleep over sustainability but over their competitive 
position. One aspect of competitiveness is the cost of materials: if I can sell a 
product with less materials but with the same functionality, then my company 
acquires a competitive advantage. So, economic incentives are the triggers, and 
the effects, such as using less materials, are regarded as an economic added 
value. For most companies, this is a part of their overall strategy” (societal 
actor). 
 
Still, some parts of the sector, in particular in the non-ferrous metals are being confronted 
with a possible future shortage of materials, partly because of strategic control and increasing 
competition over scarce resources by countries such as China, and partly because most of 
these metals are not recycled and either end up as waste or are illegally exported. This 
‘leakage’ of materials and precious metals that could be recycled is a growing concern, 
because if Europe does not have access to them, it will seriously hamper the development of 
new (and green) technologies and products. The industry has formulated the concept of 
‘urban mining’: the city and its waste heap of electronic devices as a mine of all kind of 
metals. An iconic example for Flanders is Umicore, which has the world's largest recycling 
facility for complex precious metals and is able to recover around 20 non-ferrous metals. 
These kind of frontrunners show which crucial role industry can play in redesigning the 
materials system and in making visions such as the Plan C leitbild tangible. Although he was 
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present an individual and not as a representative of Agoria, the participation of Patrick Van 
den Bossche (director at Agoria) in the first transition arena of Plan C, was important for the 
process and its link with the concerns and aspirations of the technology industry.  
 
Members of Essenscia got involved in Plan C through the transition pathway Green 
Synthetics. The discussions in the working group that formulated the transition pathway 
inspired an initiative by Essenscia, called Flanders strategic Initiative for Sustainable 
Chemistry (FISCH). The Plan C discussions capitalised on dynamics that were already 
playing within the chemical industry. The European chemical industry (Cefic) had launched 
the European technology platform SusChem in 2005, with the aim of strengthening the 
innovation potential of the chemical industry. At Flemish level, in 2006, a Roundtable of the 
chemical industry called for the start of new initiatives top strengthen the position of Flanders 
as a top region in chemistry. The FISCH-project tries to combine two goals: strengthening the 
competitive position of the Flemish chemical industry, while simultaneously acting as a 
catalyst for the transition of the chemical industry towards sustainable chemistry. The 
initiative is organised as an open knowledge organisation where industry and knowledge  
centres cooperate in what are meant to be “new innovative breakthrough collaborative 
programs”. Consortia are formed around projects such as micro alga, microtechnology, 
separation technology, renewable chemicals and valorisation of waste and side streams.  
 
Not only the industry is claiming its place in the new materials economy, the role of  
knowledge actors is also important to support the waste-materials shift. One of the most 
important actors on clean technology in the Flemish knowledge system is VITO, the Flemish 
Institute for Technological Research, set up in 1991 by the Flemish government as a strategic 
research centre. In September 2008 VITO was restructured in three groups (Industrial 
Innovation, Quality of the Environment, Energy). This last group contains a specific unit 
“Transition Energy and the Environment”, which employs amongst others two researchers 
that investigate the potential of the transition approach for VITO. With the announcement in 
April 2010 of the organisation i-Cleantech vzw, aimed at coordinating all initiatives in the 
Flemish clean technology sector, the Flemish Minster of Innovation, Ingrid Lieten, assertively 
positioned VITO as actor in the Flemish green economy. VITO is the central actor in the three 
organisations of which i-Cleantech will exist: Flanders Cleantech Association (FCA) is meant 
to strengthen the networking in the cleantech industry and provide business opportunities for 
the sector, to create an inventory of the Flemish cleantech sector and boost its international 
image. The Environmental and Energy Technology Innovation Platform (MIP) is a funding 
institute for research in cooperation between companies and knowledge actors (see also 
5.4.2.). Flanders Transition Arena (FTA) should inform the public about significance of the 
transition to a sustainable economy. I-Cleantech vzw stirred the political debate in February 
2011 because the Financial Inspection suspected that the initiative was merely an umbrella 
organisation that unnecessarily created new, high-paid jobs. Below the surface and away from 
the media, in particular the FTA caused unrest within circles of Plan C and DuWoBo because 
one of its original objectives was to coordinate all transition initiatives in Flanders. Most 
involved actors feared the dominance of VITO over their processes. For the moment, the 
precise role of FTA remains vague and is related to communicating towards the population 
about the need for transitions. 
 
Meanwhile, VITO and OVAM signed a cooperation agreement on 4 May 2011 to act as 
partners for a green, cyclical economy in Flanders, in particular for stimulating sustainable 
material use. The cooperation focuses on improving eco-efficiency and eco-effectiveness in 
business, through common projects and the creation of platforms to stimulate business 
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initiatives. These projects and platforms are primarily aimed at frontrunners that are willing to  
work with innovative materials, products, services, business models.   
 
Other knowledge actors such as the universities are also seeking their position in the starting 
materials transition and the green economy. Important examples include KULeuven, that has 
a front position in materials research with its Materials Research Centre, Ghent University has 
its Bio-Energy Valley (for bio-based products and bio-energy) and Hasselt University has 
created its own Cleantech platform.  
 
So, the shift to a sustainable materials discourse gets support from different sides: the 
government; traditional actors in the waste sector are trying to reposition themselves; the 
traditional technology and chemical industry that wants to reposition itself as a partner in 
more sustainable, circular economy; universities and knowledge centres such as VITO. There 
do not seem to be any major voices that oppose the shift. What is moreover noticeable, is that 
most of these actors cannot be categorised as small players of niche actors. The regime actors 
themselves, often larger companies, seem to be moving. 
 
 
5.5. A change in resources? 
 
New actors that enter a policy arrangement automatically imply a change in resources that are 
available and in the balance between different actors. Since the transition to a new materials 
system is only just starting, it is too early to make a detailed analysis of the new distribution 
of resources, but some elements can be noted. 
 
On the level of financial means, OVAM cannot count on extra resources. Although its tasks 
are expanding and getting more complex under a sustainable materials orientation, its overall 
budget remains the same. It was hoped that Plan C could gather a yearly budget of around 
465.000 Euro in the Eigen Vermogen structure and 200.000 Euro yearly in the vzw structure. 
Even though the EV has been replaced by a more informal cooperation agreement between 
OVAM and other government agencies, the hope still is that the planned budgets can be 
reached.   
 
The most important change in resources comes from the new actors, such as the technology 
and chemical industry. These companies and their federations are very influential in the 
Flemish and Belgian economy as a whole, as well as in the decision-making surrounding 
socio-economic political priorities. Furthermore, they can count on the growing budgets from 
innovation  funds. An example is SIM, the Strategic Initiative Materials, which was initiated 
by Agoria in June 2009, in cooperation with universities and research centres and the major 
materials producing and materials processing companies (including AGC Flat Glass, Agfa 
Gevaert, Arcelor-Mittal, Bekaert, Recticel, Solvay, Umicore). As part of the Flanders in 
Action strategy, the Flemish government invested 15 million Euro in SIM in 2009, and 20 
million Euro yearly from 2010 onwards. Its aim is to strengthen the competitive position of 
the Flemish materials industry through basic materials research and the establishment of 
knowledge platforms that should support industrial valorisation of findings.  
 
Another example form the innovation sector is the MIP3 fund that was launched in October 
2010. It provides 5 million Euro for companies and research institutes that want to develop 
sustainable technologies and products. The manual for writing projects under the MIP3-
project call explicitly situates the projects in a transition framework: “Within transition 
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thinking MIP-projects are considered experiments in the transition to a more sustainable 
economy. These experiments help us to make the abstract concept of a sustainable economy 
more concrete” (MIP, p. 4). Projects in the materials sphere have to take closing of materials 
cycle as starting point and the concept of Cradle to Cradle is promoted as guideline for 
projects. 
 
In the framework of the White Paper on New Industrial Policy (see 5.2.2), the Flemish 
government created the TINA-fund (Transformation, Innovation and Acceleration Fund), that 
is since 30 March 2011 operational under the Participatie Maatschappij Vlaanderen (PMV), 
and that has a capital of 200 million Euros at its disposal. The fund invests in industrial 
projects of consortia of companies, with the spearhead clusters of the governmental agreement 
2009-2014 as priorities. Of the six spearheads, at least three can be of direct relevance for the 
transition to sustainable materials management: “logistics, transport and supply chain 
management”, “new materials, nanotechnology and processing industry” and “energy and 
environment, including smart electricity grids”. 
 
The buildup of knowledge to support the reorientation to a sustainable materials society is 
growing, but is currently almost exclusively technologically oriented. This is the case as well 
at the level of companies, research centres (such as VITO or SIRRIS, the research centre of 
Agoria) as universities. The call that has been launched by the Flemish government in July 
2011 for a third generation of Policy Research Centres for the period 2012-2016, contains 
several Centres that will be of relevance for developing more knowledge on the governance of 
the required transition. These include a Research Centre “Transition Sustainable 
Development” and a research centre “Sustainable Materials Management”. This last centre 
was proposed by OVAM to the Minister of the Environment and approved by the government. 
It aims to do research on themes such as a system innovation approach to materials 
management, monitoring and evaluation, the link with socio-economic development, legal 
conditions and multi-actor governance. Cooperation between these centres could be of 
importance to strengthen the buildup of knowledge on governance issues, but past experience 
shows that these centres hardly cooperate. 
 
The legitimacy for developing initiatives and policy towards sustainable materials 
management and a green economy seems high. All important policy documents are full of 
green discourse. The reorientation is furthermore to a large extend influenced and supported 
by policy initiatives at European level, at OECD and global level. Support can also be found 
in the discourse development and initiatives from important actors such as industry and 
knowledge centres. The exact meaning and interpretation of central concepts is however open 
for a lot of contestation.  
 
 
5.6. Interim conclusions 
 
Part 5 of this paper has tried to give an overview of the change that is currently taking place in 
the waste system and its policy regime. There are enough indications to state that – at least on 
the level of the policy arrangement of the regime – we may be witnessing the start of a shift 
from an arrangement focused on waste to an arrangement focused on materials. This shows in 
most dimensions of the policy arrangement: 
• The change in discourse from waste to sustainable materials management is undeniable. It 
is not only taken up in the Materials Decree and propagated by OVAM as main 
government actor, it also seems to find support with all actors involved in the 
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waste/materials system: advisory councils, different sectors of the industry, knowledge 
actors such as universities and VITO, and ngo’s. Furthermore, the new discourse was 
deemed ripe enough by the Minister of the Environment to bring it to the European level 
during the Belgian presidency and to promote it as a flagship for ViA. 
• The change in discourse finds a translation in the rules of the Materials Decree, at least 
potentially. The hard requirements of the Decree still stick to the requirements of the 
Waste Framework Directive, but several openings have been made in the Decree that 
allow for the development of policy on the basis of a materials orientation. The actual 
form governance will take in the new materials system is still unformed, but for the 
moment the trusted approach of government taking the lead and searching for back-up 
from stakeholders through consultations seems to prevail. 
• New actors are entering the policy arrangement, while the old ones are reformulating their 
position. In the case of OVAM this also led to an internal restructuring which should 
better prepare the organisation for the challenges of the governance of the materials 
system. The traditional waste industry is trying to reposition itself as suppliers of 
secondary materials. The new entrants such as the technological and chemical industry 
represent important sections of the Flemish industry. Their entrance gives the new 
materials orientation more strategic importance. Important knowledge actors such as 
VITO and several universities are also preparing themselves to play a role. Most of these 
actors are regime actors and cannot be labelled as niche actors. 
• The resources and distribution of resources in the system are changing. New actors such 
as (the members of) Agoria and Essenscia bring in important financial and lobbying 
power. Furthermore they succeed in attracting support from traditional innovation funds. 
This seems less the case with the actors that until now dominated the waste system. In 
particular OVAM, which is currently taking the lead in the materials orientation, cannot 
count on extra financial means for the moment, even though its tasks are expanding and 
getting more complex. Even if a Plan C vzw is created, supported by a cooperation of 
OVAM and other government agencies, this will remain a small player in the materials 
system that is taking shape. On the other hand, the sustainable materials discourse has 
acquired legitimacy through interlinked policy initiatives at different levels and OVAM 
has been recognised as one of the Flemish initiators and frontrunners. 
 
While these changes on the level of the policy arrangement are taking place, it remains to be 
seen how they will turn out in actual practices of policy as well as in industrial practices. 
Policy and industrial practices are still in their infancy. They may be further supported, 
though, by the other development I described, namely the entry of both the sustainable 
materials discourse and the transition discourse in different policy areas such as the socio-
economic innovation process ViA and sustainable development policy (with the VSDO). First, 
we see how sustainable materials management is not only a new approach to waste, but how it 
is being regarded as an essential component of a greener economy. Second, the transitions 
approach seems to offer a framework for thinking about the ViA ambitions, while it also 
offers a method to discuss this change with a broad range of stakeholders and search for co-
creation of policies. It is too early to judge which form this co-creation will be taking and 
which kind of content will be discussed. Keeping in mind the ambitions of the ViA-process – 
turning Flanders into a competitive and innovative society, the top 5 of Europe by 2020 – it 
will not be self-evident to make the deep changes that transition studies propose at the level of 
structure, culture and practices, the focus of policy attention. 
 
The changes that can be observed in the waste/materials system and the changes in the 
innovation discourse are the result of a combination of factors: pressures from landscape level, 
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developments at regime level and new initiatives at niche level. Plan C is one factor amongst 
many: the analysis shows that Plan C has had influence on current developments, in particular 
on the discourse that is being used at several places. Further, several actors have found 
inspiration in the Plan C approach to sep up their own initiatives (such as the FISCH initiative 
of Essenscia). Yet, the first major initiative that is currently being taken at political level – the 
Materials Pact to be developed by June 2012 – seems to provide no explicit room for Plan C. 
Furthermore, it was not possible to create a legal EV structure for Plan C under the Materials 
Decree, although a more informal form of cooperation has been inscribed, but this still has to 
take shape. It can thus be said that the current position and the role of Plan C in the 
arrangement that is being formed, is under-defined: the only task description that is currently 
available for the future of Plan C is the business plan that was discussed in part 4. It was 
shown there that the implementation of that business plan is hindered by factors at the level of 
the different dimensions (discourse, actors, rules, resources) of the embryonic policy 
arrangement that Plan C tries to be. Therefore, one of the most urgent tasks of Plan C seems 
to be to redefine its role and position, taking into account the new and rapidly changing 
context with which it is confronted. 
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6. In search of policy lessons: understanding change and 
stability in policy 
 
As said in the introduction, the goal of this paper is to investigate the position and role of a 
transition management process such as Plan C in the reorientation of waste policy, how and 
why this TM process has influence (or not), which characteristics this influence has, and what 
the interaction is between this TM process and the broader political and societal context. The 
policy arrangement approach, in combination with the multi-level perspective, was used to 
chart the changes taking place. This has delivered a balanced image of the role of Plan C. The 
TM approach was useful for renewing the waste discourse and for creating a network of 
frontrunners around this discourse. Both have had an influence on what is currently happening 
in the starting shift from a waste to a materials regime. Their influence also goes beyond the 
strict waste/materials system and is a factor in how sustainable materials management is being 
perceived as an important element of a greener economy and a more sustainable society.  
Furthermore, the transition element of the approach is taken up in sustainable development 
policy, and more important, in the currently most influential socio-economic Flemish 
innovation process ViA. The analysis has also shown that Plan C is just one factor among 
many that explain these evolutions. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the dynamic Plan 
C process of 2006-2008 could not be maintained during the last two years and that at the 
moment Plan C has difficulty in finding its position in a rapidly changing policy environment.  
 
In this part of the paper, I look at some of the mechanisms that underlie these kind of 
developments and that can help to understand how change is happening and/or how stability 
is maintained (6.1.). I then try to characterise the occurring changes on the basis of the policy 
arrangements literature as discussed in part 2 (6.2.) and make a brief comparison with insights 
from international research on political implications of TM (6.3.). 
 
 
6.1. Mechanisms at work 
 
Political science has provided a lot of explanations for how and why policies change, or how 
and why they remain stable. These range from explanations that focus on how the actions of 
self-interested decision-makers shape politics, over explanations focusing on the constraints to 
change that are imposed by institutions, to explanations that stress the influence of ideas. In 
this section, I highlight some mechanisms that stand out in the Plan C case and its relation 
with change and stability in the waste/materials regime and with change and stability in 
policies beyond the waste/materials regime. Finally, there are some thoughts on policy 
recommendations. 
 
 
6.1.1. Converging policy streams and the role of policy entrepreneurs 
 
The importance of converging policy streams for the breakthrough of a particular agenda 
shows several times in the Plan C case. It already happens at the very beginning of the process, 
when the BBB reform, the internal policy developments in OVAM and the MINA-plan with 
its project 1 converge to create an opportunity that leads to the start of Plan C. It happens 
again when developments at EU level such as the Waste Framework Directive and the Raw 
Materials Initiative, and the OECD SMM process, are integrated by OVAM to bring the 
materials agenda to the legal domain in the Materials Decree (including a specific place for 
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Plan C). And it shows in the tying together of agendas through the transitions and green 
economy discourse in ViA.  
 
It seems that an intelligent tying together of dynamics at different levels is important to 
further a transition agenda. At the moment such a “policy window” (Kingdon 1984) opens, 
changes can go faster than at other times. However, this does not happen as an automatism 
but needs “policy entrepreneurs” (ibid.) or “institutional entrepreneurs” (Lowndes 2005) that 
recognize the possibility for change, see the opportunity and are able to combine agendas. In 
the case of Plan C, a name that is often mentioned in this respect is Walter Tempst (OVAM), 
who according to one interviewee “is someone who is constantly alert for opportunities in 
which different initiatives can be combined” (societal actor). Tempst is not the only one, 
however, because several public servants (from OVAM and other administrations) testify for 
example that they try to follow a kind of “detour”-strategy: initiatives that are unfamiliar to a 
policy environment – such as transition management – can be supported by using ongoing 
dynamics in other policy fields or at other levels (such as the EU). 
“What you have to do is try to make documents that tie in with what higher levels 
say that can happen, for example when Peeters [the Flemish Minister-President] 
and ViA say ‘transformation’, then you already have a headstart. And then you 
have to look how you can make it operational (…) You have to be ready at the 
right moment, and you need a capacity for drawing up documents that respond to 
a willingness from above and that you push a little bit further into the direction of 
topics that of which they do not even realise that they fall outside the traditional 
path” (civil servant) 
Furthermore, this can work in two directions. Interviewees explain how, on the one hand, 
initiatives as international level (EU, OECD) can be used to push forward Flemish initiatives 
such as Plan C; on the other hand, the EU and the OECD always look at existing initiatives in 
member states when developing new ideas. When intelligently using this reciprocal dynamics, 
even a small state or region can make a difference and become a good practice to be followed 
by other countries. This is the case with Flemish waste management and several interviewees 
hope this may become the case with sustainable materials management.  
 
 
6.1.2. The influence of discourse 
 
The discourse of sustainable materials management in general, and the Plan C interpretation 
of it, seem to be one of the major influences in the evolutions that are currently taking place in 
the waste/materials system. In his analysis of the Dutch energy transition, Kern also found 
that discourse (or storylines) was a major factor in explaining policy and institutional changes 
(Kern 2009) 33. Some of the mechanisms that he distinguishes also appear in the Plan C case 
(ibid., p. 173-189): 
• New storylines transform interests: a new discourse can redefine a policy problem and 
lead actors to redefine their interests. The SMM discourse clearly redefines the 
waste/materials problem. The analysis shows how important actors are also redefining 
their interests: FEBEM members want to change from waste handlers to material suppliers, 
materials companies begin perceiving existing products as a source of materials and urban 
mining, the chemical sector is discovering sustainable chemistry as innovation strategy. 
The new discourse also has an influence on government agencies such as OVAM, that 
                                                 
33
 Kern himself builds in particular on the work of Maarten Hajer and Vivien Schmidt. 
 75 
discovers its interest in positioning itself as an innovation partner in ViA and the green 
economy debate. 
• A new storyline can have a positioning effect and be functional for actors’ strategies: a 
new storyline redefines an actor as a problem solver, or as a perpetrator, or as a victim (or 
something else). This may be functional for other strategies actors adhere to. In particular 
storylines that have a certain malleability can be used this way, because they allow actors 
to re-interpret a policy idea in a way which links with established norms or policies. This 
happened for example within OVAM, where the materials discourse was formulated in 
such a way that it was not a new task, but something OVAM had already been working on 
for years. Another example is the translation of the transitions storyline to the ViA-
process: the interpretative flexibility of the transition idea provides an opportunity to 
connect it with the transformation agenda focused on competition and innovation, and to 
focus in particular on aspects of co-creation and stakeholder involvement. 
• Need for sensory experience: this mechanism refers to the role of direct contact with 
problems or new solutions, but also to the role of meetings, group discussions, symposia 
and face-to-face contact with experts. These experiences generate credibility and trust and 
are thus important in processes of change and persuasion. The intensive arena process 
during the early phases of Plan C was important for building the initial network of 
‘believers’ in the materials storyline and it created trust within OVAM that the new 
discourse was robust enough to build policy on it. It also worked in the direction of 
stakeholders that got acquainted with another side of OVAM and OVAM officials. An 
interviewee recalls how “Plan C has been helpful here to talk in less traditional settings 
and from a less defensive position. It also changed the attitude of some actors towards us. 
In a traditional setting, in which the government is preparing new legislation, their main 
concern is ‘please, not too much red tape’, (…) but at such moments you don’t get real 
debates about innovation and green economy. That’s something Plan C made possible.” 
(civil servant) 
• Policy domains have historically grown, structured ways of arguing. These can be used to 
give a new storyline more credibility, but they can also limit the impact of the new 
storyline. By presenting SMM as an innovation exercise and as part of a green economy, 
OVAM and Plan C are able to catch the attention of the ongoing ViA debate about the 
transformation of the Flemish economy. However, the innovation domain has always 
stressed technological innovation at the service of competitiveness and economic growth. 
The consequence may be that some elements of the transition discourse – such as the need 
to put the regime under pressure, or the alert consumer pathway of Plan C – may 
disappear from view. An example of how this mechanism works, can be found in the 
White Paper on New Industrial Policy that takes elements from the materials transitions 
discourse but places them exclusively in a competition and productivity discourse.   
• Looking for new ideas from outside: policy makers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo can 
lead them to start looking for lessons from elsewhere to rejuvenate their own policy 
domain. Examples in the Plan C case are obvious. The TM approach, developed and used 
in the Netherlands, was brought in by OVAM to broaden its waste policy. Presently, the 
transition discourse is transferred to the ViA process to help in long-term thinking and co-
creation. 
 
So, ideas (discourse) are important in explaining policy change, but they do not function 
unambiguously. Ideas get interpreted in a particular context and can there acquire new 
meanings or lose others. Plan C was first in Flanders to better define the meaning of 
sustainable materials management and has had influence on policy and several initiatives. But 
now that new actors are moving in, different interpretations of sustainable materials 
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management may gain ground. This is also the case with the meaning of transitions and 
transition management. Other researchers (such as Kern 2009, Vosz et al. 2009) have noted 
the interpretative flexibility of these concepts. Now that they are being used in different 
forums, their meaning and application in practice may begin to shift. In particular when being 
applied in environments that have strong historically grown ways of arguing – such as the 
economic and innovation policy field – the concepts may lose their flavour of radical change 
and become embedded in a rather business-as-usual competition and productivity discourse. 
 
 
6.1.3. The prevailing modes of policy-making 
 
Attempts at new forms of governance, such as a transition management process (Plan C), 
have to find their way amongst existing practices of policy-making. Several interviewees refer 
to this when they assert that new governance practices remain quite problematic, in particular 
when they transcend individual policy domains and competences, such as is the case with the 
sustainable materials agenda: it does not only touch on questions of waste and materials, but 
has important links to the energy system, the food system, product development and to more 
generic policies such as innovation and technology policy or socio-economic policies. Most 
interviewees think that the linking of such different agenda’s demands some form of long-
term strategic thinking and horizontal coordination between policy departments. The lack of 
this kind of coordination hinders the institutionalisation of The Plan C agenda. At least two 
dynamics play a role here.  
 
The first is the administrative logic that rules the functioning of departments.  Traditionally, 
the functioning of departments has been subject to compartmentalization, and this has not 
diminished with the BBB-reform that I referred to above: a reform building on principles of 
New Public Management, with a strict assignment of competences to administrations that 
functions as an obstacle in tackling multi-dimensional problems. The general principle is that 
the approach to such problems should be discussed in the highest administrative body, the 
CAG (Committee of Administrator-Generals), and that appropriate actions for cooperation or 
harmonisation should be taken. In practice, this does not lead to structural initiatives, although 
some interviewees think that the experiences with ViA may lead to new forms of cooperation. 
It is somewhat ironical of course, that it is also the BBB-reform that has created room for the 
materials orientation within OVAM. So, this dynamic does not work unidirectional. Still, it is 
revealing that in its advice on the EV Plan C, the advisory council on administrative matters 
VLABEST (Vlaamse Adviesraad voor Bestuurszaken) states that it understands why OVAM 
looks for a structure outside BBB: according to the council the BBB-reform did not prepare 
the Flemish administration for complex, domain-exceeding challenges (see also 4.1.5). 
VLABEST advises the Flemish government to quickly evaluate and adapt its set of 
institutional instruments because of “a policy context that attaches ever more importance to an 
inclusive and transversal approach of important societal questions, with all relevant 
stakeholders (cf. coalition agreement, VIA, pact 2020, VSDO …)”  (VLABEST 2011, p. 3). 
 
A second dynamic is a result of the political decision-making culture. The logic dominating a 
lot of Flemish government politics is one of mutual exchange of space to act and score: 
individual ministers guard over their competences, on the one hand not allowing others to 
interfere, on the other hand giving each other free play in their respective domains. But as said 
already, new policy questions such as a sustainable materials agenda transcend individual 
policy domains and competences, so this logic becomes more difficult to apply. Several 
interviewees relate to experiences where this leads to either blockages because individual 
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political agendas cannot be transcended, or a multiplication of initiatives because everyone 
wants to occupy part of the terrain with his of her own initiative. One of the interviewees 
formulates the challenge as “countering blocking mechanisms and finding a modus vivendi to 
allow scoring with common results. We should try to organise the governance of domain-
transcending problems in such a way that it allows for ‘co-development’ and ‘co-glory’” 
(civil servant).  
 
One of the results of the combination of these two dynamics is a multiplication of initiatives 
from different ministers and ministries, for example in the domain of innovation and 
economic policy. The challenge for Plan C, an initiative that was launched as part of 
environmental policy, is to position itself in this complicated tangle of different action plans, 
initiatives, funding mechanisms etcetera, and to find suitable partners to take its agenda 
forward. The failure of finding a place for the Plan C EV in the Materials Decree can be 
interpreted as result of these prevailing modes of policy-making. Although OVAM and the 
Minister of the Environment argued that new forms of cooperation between administrations 
were necessary to support the Plan C process, and that they tried to show with extensive legal 
argumentation that the EV Plan C was the most suited form for this, the proposal was not in 
line with the structures of the BBB-reform. This led to a blockade of one of the government 
parties (N-VA) against the proposal. This brings some closely involved actors to the 
conclusion that there is a gap between on the one hand initiating and supporting a governance 
experiment such as Plan C, seeing what happens and using some of its results, and on the 
other hand taking steps that go beyond a business-as-usual scenario and changing established 
structures and procedures. 
 
 
6.2. Characterising the developments around Plan C 
 
In part 2.2. I described how Arts and Leroy define three types of emergence of new policy 
arrangements (Arts and Leroy 2006) and how Kern and Howlett (2009) distinguish four 
processes that determine the outcome of efforts for policy renewal. Is it possible to 
characterise the Plan C process and its results, using these insights? 
 
Arts and Leroy see three types of how policy arrangements emerge (cf. 2.2.). One possibility 
is the introduction of a new arrangement that next has to succeed in maintaining itself as a 
more or less autonomous arrangement. Since in its dimensions (discourse, actors, rules, 
resources) it differs quite importantly from the existing waste arrangement, a TM process 
such as Plan C could possibly lead to such a new arrangement. However, this potential that 
surfaced during the first two years, has clearly not been realised. The main change that is 
currently visible can be characterised through the second form of renewal that Arts and Leroy 
observe: the discursive and/or organisational renewal of existing policy arrangements. A new 
discourse was introduced through Plan C and in combination with institutional changes (such 
as the Materials Decree), this currently leads to a renewal of the existing arrangement: a 
discourse around sustainable materials management, new actors that enter the arrangement 
and traditional actors that reposition themselves, new resources entering the arrangement, and 
rules that can potentially be reformulated on the basis of the Materials Decree (but that are 
currently largely unchanged).  
 
The third form of renewal that Arts and Leroy define – integration of arrangements – seems to 
be a possibility for the future. Since the (formal and informal) rules of this broader 
arrangement are still under construction, there is manoeuvring room for Plan C to find its own 
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position. Plan C may become embedded and hierarchically nested as a TM-arrangement 
within the broader materials arrangement, where OVAM is the main government actor. With 
the establishment of a Eigen Vermogen Plan C structure under the Materials Decree, this 
could even have been given a headstart. In spite of the abandonment of the EV Plan C, also 
the cooperation between OVAM and other government agencies that has been inscribed in the 
Materials Decree, can still imply an evolution towards an integration between arrangements. 
 
Kern and Howlett distinguish four processes that determine the outcome of efforts for policy 
renewal (cf 2.2.). If we compare these to the Plan C case, it can be argued that during the first 
years, Plan C as a TM-process seems an example of ‘layering’: new goals (the TM vision and 
pathways) and instruments (the arena with its TM-approach) are added to old ones in an 
existing regime without abandoning previous ones. However, meanwhile the waste regime is 
reinventing itself as a materials regime. But the instruments to do this are not yet in place, 
although there are clear intentions to develop them. This looks currently more like ‘drift’: new 
goals replace old ones without changing the instruments used to implement them. The main 
new instrument that was available to work towards new goals, Plan C, is itself somewhat 
adrift, while OVAM is still in the preparation phase of new instruments (in particular in its 
policy innovation division). The whole analysis thus shows the difficulty of policy renewal in 
a fast changing environment. New and old policy goals and instruments exist along side each 
other and consequently create complex coordination problems.  
 
These kind of observations are not unique, though, for the Flemish Plan C process and the 
embedment in its context. Similar experiences can be found in TM processes in the 
Netherlands, such as in the best studied process, the Dutch energy transition. Kern and 
Howlett observe that at the time when the energy transition was implemented in 2001, the 
Dutch energy regime was already complex, and that after the implementation “a sub-optimal 
regime has emerged based on the layering of new policy goals (energy security, long-term 
‘system innovation) and instruments ( (…), energy transition project) upon an existing regime 
based on liberalization” (Kern and Howlett 2009, p. 401).  
 
An overview article by Vosz et al. (2009) presents an opportunity to compare the analysis of 
Plan C more systematically with results and observations of international research on 
transition management. Voss et al. examine the main results of research into transition 
management such as I defined it above – with the typical characteristics of transition arenas, 
pathways, experiments. A lot of this research has been based on the experiences in the 
Netherlands, such as the Dutch energy transition process and the mobility transition process. 
Figure 6 gives an overview of the results of Voss et al. What is of interest here, is whether 
their conclusions on “transition management in practice” (third column of figure 6) can also 
be observed in the case of Plan C. I make a brief comparison. 
• Goals. The goal of TM is to contribute to realising a transition in important socio-
technical systems, such as the waste and materials system, but Voss et al. find that in 
practice, the goal is often narrowed to promotion of technological niches with commercial 
potential for the world market. This does not seem to be case for Plan C, where from the 
beginning the goals were formulated as a combination of ecological modernisation and 
transformation elements that go beyond technological niches and market opportunities. 
Also today, Plan C still uses a broad discourse on sustainable development and is thus 
close to what Voss et al. perceive as necessary in a re-design of TM. 
• Organisation of transition arena. TM-theory advises to work with a combination of 
visionary regime actors and innovative newcomers, but in practice arenas are often 
dominated by regime incumbents with vested interests, according to Voss et al. Plan C has  
  
Figure 6. A summary of experiences with transition management (from Voss et al. 2009). The second column summarises the propositions of TM-
theory on central design issues of TM. The third column summarises actual experiences, mainly drawn from research in Dutch TM-processes. 
The fourth column contains proposals from Voss et al. to improve TM.  
 
been able to follow closely the theoretical advice and consisted during the first two years 
of a dynamic combination of frontrunners from regime and niches. The problem since 
2009 has rather been the opposite of the one in the Netherlands: it has been difficult to 
keep regime incumbents on board. More in particular, it proved impossible to keep 
business representatives aboard in the strategic steering organs of Plan C (such as SCIA 
and SCOO), while in the autonomy discussion, several powerful actors are hesitant to 
commit themselves. While this hesitation can partly be explained by the absence of a 
government decision on stable funding, it also shows signs of interest and power games. 
The power to withhold commitment and/or keep others in uncertainty about commitment, 
constantly reminds engaged actors of the possible fragility of the process. It also testifies 
to the constant weighing up of pros and cons that actors make in deciding between 
commitments to different processes. As one actor phrased it: “Do I need Plan C for what I 
want to do? Is Plan C the right channel or can I reach my objectives through other means, 
other platforms?” (societal actor). 
• Role of visions. In TM-theory, visions are constructed by the frontrunners in the arena and 
are meant to give guidance to strategic choices (such as transition pathways) and design of 
experiments. In TM-practice, Voss et al. find that visions are often constructed by 
incumbents and that they lack concreteness to inform strategies or select experiments. In 
the Plan C case, the leitbild has been created by the first transition arena that consisted 
mainly of visionary regime players and some niche players. During the second phase of 
Plan C, the leitbild could be translated in five transition pathways and 33 experiments, and 
at later moments, even more proposals for experiments were formulated. The problem for 
Plan C has never been to draw strategic orientation or experiments ideas from the leitbild, 
but rather to make the step towards concrete implementation. 
• Experimentation. A TM-process should lead to a portfolio of practical experiments that 
can inspire and initiate system innovation in existing socio-technical systems. In practice, 
all kinds of experiments are supported but political choices for or against particular 
technologies in a frame of system innovation for sustainable development are evaded. In 
Plan C, a procedure has been designed to select experiments and link them to the leitbild 
and transition pathways. The framework has been used for developing experiment ideas 
and coaching several projects, but the step towards entrepreneurial action remains 
problematic, partly because a lack of funding hinders connecting the procedure to project 
proposals. Furthermore, differences of opinion exist within the SCIA on the desirability of 
a specific procedure for approving experiments. In any case, the lack of tangible examples 
of what sustainable materials management means in practice, risks to reduce Plan C to 
mainly discourse and in that way undermine its credibility. 
• Evaluation and learning. With respect to selection, implementation and evaluation of 
experiments, TM is based in principles of evolutionary economics where the transition 
vision is meant as an alternative selection environment that can influence market choices 
towards projects with system innovation potential. However, Voss et al. state that 
experiments are mainly evaluated on narrow techno-economic criteria, such as short-term 
cost effectiveness and potential economic success. In the case of Plan C, this characteristic 
is difficult to judge, on the one hand due to the lack of clearly defined experiments linked 
to Plan C, on the other hand because hardly any explicit learning or evaluation has been 
undertaken.  
• Sources of legitimacy. In theory, TM should derive its legitimacy from the road towards 
more sustainable development that society is supposed to take. In practice, Voss et al. find 
that legitimacy builds on the features of participants, such as their current economic and 
technological position or their expertise. The experience in Plan C is more mixed. The 
process partly derives its legitimacy from the growing perception that the switch from 
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waste to sustainable materials management is unavoidable. Over the last two years, this 
has been further strengthened by policy documents at regional, national and international 
level. However, it is also obvious that this does not seem enough to maintain a dynamic 
process. The fact that important business actors are hesitant about further active 
engagement in the process, coupled with the refusal of the government to provide an 
autonomous legal structure for funding the process, threatens to undermine the legitimacy. 
So also here, we find that features of participants are important for legitimacy. 
• Embedding in political context. TM theory supposes that an enlightened government 
perceives the need for transitions and for a new governance approach to initiate these, 
because conventional policy approaches do not seem able to resolve the encountered, 
persistent problems. The vision and transition pathways of the TM process can then be 
framed as the long-term policy perspective within which current policies have to evolve, 
and the new networks and experiments as first steps on the transition curve. In practice, 
however, the transition discourse is presented as an innovation in governance but hardly 
implemented, because existing institutions and power constellations succeed in 
reformulating the original TM concept in such a way that it fits their interests. In the case 
of Plan C, we see how OVAM and the Flemish government perceive the need to innovate 
waste policy and reorient the waste system, and strategically use a TM-process to initiate 
this transition. The analysis of Plan C showed that the process has had influence on the 
discourse of the regime and on several actors. It thus contributed to the change processes 
that are currently developing. However, it is equally clear that the new governance 
approach mainly worked when Plan C was still relatively closed and shielded from outside 
pressures and from the need to position itself in the rapidly evolving political and societal 
context. Now that the change seems to have been set in motion, it is less obvious which 
role Plan C can and should play.  
 
This discussion reveals that the experiences in Plan C are not fully identical to the Dutch 
experiences. Plan C is less techno-centred and has been more shielded from pressures from 
incumbents. An important underlying reason is probably the fact that it was a rather small-
scale process, with limited means available, that could develop in the shadow of policy. When 
the shielded environment falls away, it becomes much more difficult to find a position in a 
rapidly evolving policy environment, in particular when the process is ambitious but hindered 
by limited funding and a lack of clarity about its legal status. At that moment, problems 
surface around legitimacy and embedding in the political context. But should that come as a 
surprise? 
  
That is the question James Meadowcroft asks when discussing the experiences of the Dutch 
TM-processes. I end these reflections on the characteristics of Plan C with a long and 
thoughtful quotation from Meadowcroft, that is also relevant for the Plan C case. 
Meadowcroft states that innovative forms of policy innovation never entirely escape “the orbit 
of economic and political power”. And he continues:  
“It is entirely understandable that transition-management-in-practice looks a bit more like 
policy-as-usual than would be recommended by transition-management-in-theory. What 
is surprising is that an idea that explicitly talks of system change ever got adopted into 
official circles in the first place. And the fact that regime actors have been motivated to 
participate in transition arenas and experiments tells us that at some level they take these 
initiatives seriously—at least seriously enough to allocate the time of important personnel. 
Of course, ‘regime players’ (like other players) may try to bend the process to 
accommodate their interests. But if they were not at the table this would be as likely to 
indicate that the transition management initiative was entirely irrelevant to real 
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developments as to signal that it was the seat of breakthrough anti-regime innovation. In 
any case, transition management is itself an experiment, so it may be possible to do better 
in the future—to draw lessons and try to increase openness and reflexivity of future 
iterations. Most importantly, reflexivity in governance for sustainable development should 
be understood primarily as a property of the governance system as a whole, rather than as 
a special product of transition forums. It is something that can occur in many sites and 
across many levels of the governance system (Hendriks and Grin 2008). Research 
institutes, educational establishments, business and civil society organizations, and 
representative political bodies can all contribute. Of course, transition arenas may 
contribute to this process, but much will necessarily take place within a wider institutional 
matrix” (Meadowcroft 2009, p. 336). 
 
 
6.3. Some recommendations 
 
The analysis made in this paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the 
characteristics that a transition management process such as Plan C exhibits, to insights in the 
role such a process can play in innovation of policy and to opportunities it creates and 
problems it encounters. The results in this paper have partly grown out of literature and 
document study and interviews, and partly out of participating observation, numerous 
discussions during Plan C meetings, during personal contacts, and also several moments of 
explicit feedback on research design and on interim results by people that are involved in the 
Plan C process itself or in the growing Flemish transition community. The results are thus 
also partly a result of co-creation between a researcher and practitioners. They do not attempt 
to be ‘objective and final truths’ about Plan C from a detached observer, but hope to be 
acceptable claims of how Plan C and the context it functions in, work.  
 
A comparable reasoning holds for the policy recommendations that follow. The presentation 
of the interim results of this research about Plan C (on 14 March 2011) led SCIA-members to 
propose an “initiative group” to prepare a discussion on the future positioning and structure of 
Plan C. The following recommendations should not be read as the infallible advice of an 
‘objective’ researcher, but as elements of the ongoing discussion about the position and role 
of Plan C, based in the preceding analysis. So, which direction for Plan C? 
 
1. Thinking about the future role of Plan C preferably starts from an analysis of the position 
the process had in the past and the position it currently has. When OVAM initiated the 
process, it was intended as a way of reorienting its waste policy. The transition 
management approach that was used to initiate Plan C succeeded in creating a new 
discourse for Flanders about sustainable materials management and in starting a network 
of frontrunners that, certainly until 2008, was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable 
materials management. But it can be argued that during the last two years, political and 
societal dynamics have accelerated and have more or less overtaken the TM-process Plan 
C: important companies and business networks claim that they are starting to implement 
SMM, research institutes are investing in knowledge generation on SMM, the SMM 
discourse finds its way in socio-economic innovation policies such as ViA and the green 
economy, European policies initiatives (e.g. on resource efficiency, raw materials) are 
shaping the policy environment and – not in the least – OVAM itself wants to be a central 
player in the starting transition. The result of these dynamics is that a lot of actors have 
moved towards Plan C’s position and also occupy part of the SMM-terrain, invariably 
supported by more financial resources and organisational capacity. From the lone player 
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on a previously almost unoccupied terrain, Plan C has become one small player among 
many. Furthermore, it cannot count on the legal status that was hoped for in the Materials 
Decree.  
So, recommendation 1: make a detailed analysis of Plan C’s current position and how this 
relates to the position of other actors and the developments in different policy streams. It 
is the ambition of this paper to serve as a valuable part of that analysis.  
2. If the analysis in 1 can more or less be shared, the next step should be to ask oneself 
which specific role Plan C can play in this new and fast evolving context. In my opinion, 
the analysis presented in this paper shows that Plan C has at least two features that make it 
still unique in the new setting: 
a. Most actors take a view towards SMM that is almost exclusively technologically 
and economically driven. This view gets more and more support though different 
policy instruments and funding mechanisms (such as MIP3) and thus seems to be 
finding its way. Plan C has from the beginning stressed the importance of socio-
technical innovation. This broader perspective is, according to transition theory, 
inevitable for initialising deep changes in incumbent regimes, because it not only 
builds on technology and economic incentives, but states the necessity to combine 
these with changes in political and social institutions, social organisation, 
knowledge and capabilities of various actors, cultural meanings, everyday 
practices, routines and lifestyles. This is not a plea against technological 
experiments, on the contrary. Plan C should also intervene in the technology 
debate, but through embedding these kind of experiments and learning from them 
in a broader societal perspective, with a set of actors that goes beyond the 
traditional triangle industry-science-government, with goals that start from societal 
needs, with an approach that balances technological with different forms of social 
innovation, and with not only product and process innovation but system 
innovation on the agenda. Articulating this point of view, trying to set up 
projects/experiments in this vein, gathering learning experiences about socio-
technical changes, defining policy directions and giving policy advice can not only 
be a unique position of Plan C, but is also a necessary addition to the prevailing 
socio-economic and innovation policy discourse that is predominantly technology-
driven and based in economic competitiveness.  
Recommendation 2a: create a distinct profile for Plan C by focusing on what 
makes the sustainability transitions discourse unique, namely its emphasis on 
socio-technical system innovation. This point of view is currently underdeveloped 
in the starting sustainable materials transition. 
b. Plan C has built experience with transition governance, which is not the case for 
other initiatives in the materials system. The basic analysis under transition 
governance – that current problems in regimes cannot only be solved with 
traditional policy approaches – has lost none of its relevance. So, a transition 
governance process on materials still has a role to play in the Flemish context, but 
the pallet now has to be broadened beyond the TM approach. The vision and 
transition pathways – updated if so desired – can still serve as orientation, and 
trying to set up experiments remains necessary. However, these typical TM-
activities are probably not enough in the new context. A working programme 
could be designed that also draws inspiration from other transition governance 
approaches, such as the TIS-approach (Hekkert et al. 2007) or the modernisation 
approach (Grin 2010, Grin and Van Staveren 2007). In the TIS case, this involves 
not only experimenting, but particularly trying to influence the conditions and 
functions that the innovation system has to fulfil in which the experiment is 
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embedded. The modernisation approach tries to combine a strengthening of agency 
at niche-level (through explicit attention to learning processes and buildup of 
power, trust and legitimacy in niches) with a redesign of structures at regime level 
(through e.g. policy advice and lobbying activities). This redesign can be inspired 
by the vision and by the problems and solutions found in innovative practices. 
Additionally, and in the light of point a., it is necessary to investigate whether Plan 
C should not link up more with social movements (such as the Transition Network 
Civil Society) to build a broader base for change in the materials system. 
Recommendation 2b: update the vision and pathways of Plan C, but do not only 
rely on these typical TM ingredients for developing Plan C activities. Invest in 
activities that build up learning and power in niches, and that aim at redesign of 
structural conditions. Connect with different networks, not only business and 
technology networks, but also networks that aim for societal change beyond 
technology. Do not forget to reserve time for collecting learning experiences and 
discussing them. 
3. An important question is from which position Plan C would be able to fulfil such a 
programme. As shown in the analysis, Plan C’s position vis-à-vis OVAM’s own 
ambitions and initiatives in the frame of a materials transition, and its position vis-à-vis 
processes such as ViA and other innovation programmes, is currently far from obvious. 
Although Plan C has aspired to an autonomous position over the last few years, it has 
become clear that the process remains strongly reliant on OVAM, and furthermore, that 
OVAM is not willing to let the process simply drift away. The consequences of inscribing 
in the Materials Decree a cooperation between OVAM and other government agencies are 
not fully clear yet at the moment of writing, but it is probable that at least in the short term, 
this has only reinforced the dependence on OVAM. It therefore seems logical that a 
renewed dialogue between OVAM and the actors involved in Plan C is needed about the 
role and position of the process. A clearly defined role in the coming materials transition 
and the starting Flemish green economy, strongly backed up by OVAM (and other 
cooperating government agencies), can possibly revive Plan C and start a new process of 
learning how to do transition governance in practice.  
Recommendation 3: clarify the position of the government agencies involved in Plan C, in 
particular OVAM’s position. Negotiate a well-defined role for Plan C in relation to 
OVAM’s tasks in the materials transition, and demand a well-defined role in socio-
economic innovation policies such as ViA and its derived initiatives such as the Flemish 
flagship sustainable materials management and the Round Table on sustainable materials 
management. 
4. Obviously, such a revival requires an organisational structure and a funding base that are 
suited for the role that is being defined. The draft business plan that has been developed 
for the vzw Plan C seems a good starting point, but several of its preconditions have not 
yet been fulfilled. First, it supposes a stable funding base from government sources, and 
since the EV Plan C is no longer available, this will depend on the cooperation agreement 
between different government agencies (OVAM, EWI, DAR, VITO). Second, it requires 
an active and engaged cooperation between the central members of the vzw. It is currently 
far from clear how engaged these partners are and in how far they see themselves as 
owner of the process. Third, it requires a solution for the problem of funding experiments. 
Since most actors do not think Plan C has to manage its own experiment fund, it will be 
necessary to investigate how specific transition experiment funding can be attached to 
existing innovation funds. 
Recommendation 4a: negotiate a stable and adequate funding base from government 
sources. Do not start a vzw Plan C without clear engagements. 
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Recommendation 4b: clarify the positions of potential vzw partners and their willingness 
to actively invest in Plan C. 
Recommendation 4c: negotiate specific transition experiment funding as part of existing 
innovation funds, or try to link ongoing projects to Plan C. 
5. Referring to the quotation of Meadowcroft earlier (6.3.), it should on the one hand be 
realised that transition governance processes remain experiments in their own right, 
searching for new forms of openness and reflexivity in governance. On the other hand, 
while transition platforms such as Plan C are places to experiment with such approaches, 
the openness and reflexivity of the governance system as a whole has to increase. This is 
thus also a task for more traditional institutions and public and private actors that operate 
in the waste/materials system and beyond.  
Recommendation 5: give advice on how institutions and public and private actors that are 
part of the materials system can increase their openness to new governance approaches 
such as transition governance. 
  
Apart from these specific recommendations on Plan C there are other lessons that can be 
learned for transition governance (including TM) from the experiences so far. These are 
mostly related to the mechanisms and characterisation that were discussed earlier in this 
chapter (6.1.-6.2.). A concise overview: 
• Policy entrepreneurs that are able to connect between policy streams are important to 
bring a process forward. While such entrepreneurs can come from different backgrounds, 
it is noticeable that in this case they are often civil servants, or in other words, people that 
are part of the ‘policy regime’. To be able to make these connections, they need to have a 
relatively good overview of ongoing developments at regime level, while simultaneously 
being able to link these with the ambitions of the TM process. A TM process that hopes 
for some form of success, needs these kind of people. 
• The role of different regime actors to take the process forward shows throughout the 
whole case study. This works in two directions: sometimes as a stimulus, sometimes as an 
obstacle. This is most visible in the roles played by OVAM and industry in the process. 
From the beginning, OVAM has been essential as a driving force behind Plan C and it 
may be even more now, but its search for an adequate relation with Plan C has also at 
times hindered the process. After an initial phase of interest that was important for 
profiling Plan C, the hesitating position of industry representatives in committing 
themselves to the process has brought uncertainty and a lack of possibilities to connect 
with ongoing projects. This role of regime players resonates with Grin’s point (Grin, 
forthcoming) that a reconsideration of TM’s strong focus on frontrunners may be 
necessary, leading to a better balance with strategies that also aim at influencing regime 
players. 
• The previous point does not mean that frontrunners are unimportant. The Plan C case 
clearly shows how they are necessary to break open a discourse and create dynamics that 
go beyond existing regime practices. According to TM theory this should further be 
supported by experiments that create visible, tangible examples of the ideas. The limited 
amount of such experiments in the Plan C case and of other projects that can be linked to 
Plan C, risks to reduce Plan C to pure discourse and undermine the credibility of the 
process. This need of showing tangible results is something that should be kept in mind 
during the further development of Plan C, in particular since sustainable materials 
management is as yet far from a common practice (in contrast to for example sustainable 
housing and building, where the Flemish DuWoBo TM-process is less in need of its own 
experiments because large segments of the building sector are experimenting and realising 
examples of sustainable building in practice).  
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• The case study shows that discourse is an important element in explaining policy change. 
A new discourse, such as the ‘sustainable materials’ or the ‘transitions’ discourse, can 
redefine a policy problem and lead actors to redefine their interests. However, discourses 
are not stable and do not function unambiguously. Ideas get interpreted in a particular 
context and can there acquire new meanings or lose other meanings. This is in particular 
the case when new actors move in and when discourses find their way in environments 
that have strong historically grown ways of arguing, such as the economic and innovation 
policy field. This implies that TM processes constantly have to be sensitive to discourse 
development and interpretation, for example through guarding over interpretations, 
adapting their discourse to new environments, or bringing discourse up to date in a 
changing context.   
• TM processes such as Plan C inevitably run into existing structures and modes of policy-
making. In the case of policy, this can be interpreted as “alarm signals” of how structures 
and institutions do not function adequately to tackle domain-exceeding challenges such as 
sustainable materials management. In the Plan C case, this even led to an advice from 
VLABEST to the Flemish government to adapt its institutional instruments. Experiences 
with TM processes can thus serve to identify obstacles in integrated and long-term policy 
development. 
• The case also shows the difficulty of policy renewal in a fast changing environment. New 
and old policy goals and instruments exist along side each other and consequently create 
complex coordination problems. Although this observation is not unique for Flemish 
policy or the Plan C process, it shows the need for transition practitioners to be aware of 
this context and search for ways to increase coherence, consistency and congruence with 
other policies as a way of gaining influence (cf. 2.2. and footnote 4). Taking time for 
learning from experience in the development of new policy approaches such as TM, can 
simplify this difficult task somewhat. 
• Methodologically, the TM-approach starts from a closed arena with a limited group of 
actors (around 15 in phase 1, around 60 in phase 2), relatively shielded off from outside 
pressures. This allows for creative thinking and building networks, but Plan C shows that 
once the shielded environment disappears and the process has to prove itself “in the real 
world”, difficult political questions have not disappeared and still have to be dealt with, 
such as questions of trust between actors, legitimacy of the process, resistance from 
incumbent actors and institutionalised ways of policy-making.  
• The term “management” in transition management suggests a high degree of steerability 
of a transition. In contrast, the presented analysis of Plan C shows a high degree of 
complexity and unpredictability, in particular in how the landscape develops and how 
regime actors will react to a combination of different pressures and policy processes (such 
as TM). As amply shown, the interventions from actors through Plan C – for example in 
discourse development or policy entrepreneurship – did make a difference, but the results 
were difficult to predict.  In general, the case study shows how the performance of a TM 
process such as Plan C depends partly on its internal functioning (strategies of and 
dynamics between actors, discourse development, institutional structures, availability of 
resources…), partly on evolutions in the external context (policy developments at 
different levels, competing niches, positioning of outside actors and their resources…) and 
partly on how actors in the TM process are able to deal with these external evolutions and 
connect them to their own goals. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
The analysis in this paper has shown that the waste system, such as it developed during the 
eighties and the nineties, is under pressure. A series of developments at international, 
European and national/regional level indicate that we may be witnessing the start of an 
orientation where materials are no longer passing through our societies in a linear way, but 
where closed loop economies and sustainable materials management become the new norms. 
Current practices in almost all countries, in industry, with consumers and in policy plans are 
however still far from that new norm. Over the last decennia, Flanders has been a trendsetter 
in the waste regime and it seems willing to take on a leading role in the new materials 
economy as well. With the start of Plan C five years ago, OVAM showed its early awareness 
of these new upcoming developments. The transition management approach that was used to 
initiate Plan C succeeded in creating a new discourse for Flanders about sustainable materials 
management and in starting a network of frontrunners that, certainly until 2008, was the main 
voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management.  
 
Over the last years, Plan C has not really been able to keep that position. This can partly be 
explained by problems in the internal functioning of the network: the trial-and-error process 
of organisation and substance development has been hindered by problems such as a lack of 
funding to support the process and the development of experiments, a search by involved 
actors to define their role and position vis-a-vis each other, the difficult translation of the 
discourse into action, and uncertainty about the future status of the network. At least equally 
important for explaining the current position of Plan C are developments in the context: 
pressures at landscape, regime and niche level lead to a situation where different kind of 
actors (government, industry, knowledge sector, ngo’s) in different policy domains 
(waste/materials, socio-economic innovation) are catching up with Plan C. It can in fact be 
argued that in particular during the last two years, political and societal dynamics in the 
materials system have accelerated and have more or less overtaken the TM-process Plan C. 
The result of these dynamics is that a lot of actors have moved towards Plan C’s position and 
also occupy part of the SMM-terrain, invariably supported by more financial resources and 
organisational capacity. From the lone player on a previously almost unoccupied field, Plan C 
has become one small player among many in a field that quickly gets crowded. Although Plan 
C cannot count on the legal Eigen Vermogen structure that was hoped for in the Materials 
Decree, the Decree still installs a cooperation between OVAM and other government 
institutions to support Plan C. 
 
The mentioned dynamics are clearly visible in the waste and materials system, in first instance 
in its policy arrangement. At Flemish level, the discourse is changing rapidly towards 
sustainable materials management. Visible signs can be found in the Materials Decree. 
Although no new ‘hard’ rules have yet been installed, the Materials Decree creates openings 
that allow for a renewal of policy on the basis of the a material orientation. Other signs of 
change are the positioning of the existing waste industry and of newcomers from the 
technological and chemical industry. As important actors in the Flemish industry, these 
newcomers change the distribution of resources in the system. Meanwhile, although its tasks 
are expanding and getting more complex, OVAM, the main government actor until now, 
cannot count on extra financial means.  
 
The dynamics with which Plan C is confronted go beyond the materials system and are also 
visible in innovation and socio-economic policies and in sustainable development policy. On 
the one hand, the transitions discourse is coupled with the growing interest in the development 
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of a greener economy. On the other hand, the transitions approach seems to offer a framework 
for thinking about the ambitions that ViA has formulated, while it also offers a method to 
discuss this change with a broad range of stakeholders and search for co-creation of policies.  
 
Plan C has been an element in these evolutions. It has in particular had influence on the 
discourse and on the orientations of different actors. However, as mentioned, Plan C is just 
one influence among many. In particular structural transformation processes at the landscape 
level, such as EU policy initiatives on resource efficiency and raw materials, and the growing 
competition worldwide for resources, are hugely influential for current and future system 
developments.  
 
The analysis further draws attention to the mechanisms that underlie the role that a TM 
process such as Plan C plays in influencing change and stability in policy. Changes are made 
easier when policy streams from different levels or different domains can be coupled. The role 
of policy entrepreneurs that are engaged in a transition process, is crucial for actively working 
on these couplings. Different discourse mechanisms can work in favour of change. The new 
sustainable materials storyline that was developed by Plan C, was influential in redefining the 
policy problem, which next led to a redefinition of the interests of actors involved in the 
waste/materials system. However, the analysis also shows that when the new materials and 
transition discourse is embedded in policy domains with long established and broadly carried 
storylines – such as in innovation and socio-economic policy – the more transformative 
elements may disappear from view in order to fit in a competition and productivity discourse. 
Finally, prevailing modes of administrative logic and of policy-making work as a stabilising 
force and hinder the institutionalisation of a transition approach and the Plan C agenda.  
 
The paper thus shows the difficulty of policy renewal in a fast changing environment. New 
and old policy goals and instruments exist along side each other and consequently create 
complex coordination problems. This is not unique for the Flemish situation; comparable 
although not identical experiences can be found in Dutch TM processes. In general, Plan C 
seems to work with a broader vision and is less influenced by incumbents than is the case in 
the Netherlands. An important underlying reason is probably the fact that it was and still is a 
rather small-scale process, with limited means available, that could develop in the shadow of 
policy. When that shielded environment falls away, it becomes much more difficult to find a 
position in a rapidly evolving policy environment, in particular when the process is ambitious 
but hindered by limited funding and a lack of clarity about its legal status. At that moment, 
problems surface around legitimacy and embedding in the political context. 
 
Still, the analysis also suggests that there is a place in the Flemish context for a transition 
governance process such as Plan C. First, most actors in the materials system and in the 
realms of innovation and green economy are predominantly technologically and economically 
driven. But initialising transitions also demands changes in political and social institutions, 
social organisation, knowledge and capabilities of various actors, cultural meanings, everyday 
practices, routines and lifestyles. Articulating this point of view of socio-technical system 
innovation, trying to set up projects/experiments in this vein, gathering learning experiences 
about such changes, defining policy directions and giving policy advice can not only be a 
unique position of Plan C, but is also a necessary addition to the prevailing socio-economic 
and innovation policy discourse. 
 
Second, one of the insights of transition governance theory has lost none of its relevance, 
namely that current problems in regimes cannot only be solved with traditional policy 
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approaches. Also here, the experience of Plan C with TM makes it a suited environment for 
further developing transition governance in the materials system. An updated vision and 
transition pathways can still serve as orientation, while trying to set up experiments remains 
necessary as a material manifestation of the desired change. However, these typical TM-
activities are probably not enough in the new context. A working programme could be 
designed that also draws inspiration from other transition governance approaches, that pay 
amongst other things much more attention to the context of transition processes and the 
politics at work in them.  
 
A repositioning of Plan C along these two lines seems improbable without a renewed dialogue 
about the role of the process between OVAM and the actors involved in Plan C. A clearly 
defined role in the coming materials transition and the starting Flemish green economy, 
strongly backed up by OVAM, with an organisational structure and a funding base that are 
suited for the role that is being defined, can launch Plan C for a new round of learning how to 
do transition governance in practice. 
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Annex. List of interviews. 
 
Interviews were conducted during two periods. A first series mainly in 2007-2008, a second 
series end 2010 – early 2011. Some of these interviews were more related to the general 
policy context of Plan C, than to the process itself.  
 
Interviews 2007-2008 
Name Organisation Date Function 
De Jonge Walter CDO, UGent 31/05/07 Knowledge actor  
De Leeuw Els WSE  19/05/08 Civil servant 
De Smedt Peter Studiedienst Vlaamse regering  21/12/07 Civil servant 
Dries Ilse LNE 03/07 Civil servant 
Larosse Jan DG research 23/05/07 Civil servant 
Loorbach Derk Drift 11/07/07 Knowledge actor 
Tempst Walter OVAM 03/07 Civil servant 
Van Acker Karel KU Leuven  25/02/08 Knowledge actor 
Van de Velde David LNE  28/11/07 Civil servant 
Van Humbeeck Peter SERV 10/03/08 Societal actor 
Van Lieshout Michael Pantopicon 22/01/08 Knowledge actor 
Vereecken Frank EWI 03/03/08 Civil servant 
Wouters Guido MIP 25/02/08 Civil servant 
 
 
Interviews 2010-2011 
Name Organisation Date Function 
Annaert Werner FEBEM 11/05/11 Societal actor 
Bruyninckx Hans KU Leuven 26/05/11 Knowledge actor 
De Brabandere Kristof BBL  22/06/10 Societal actor 
Dries Victor OVAM 22/06/10 Civil servant 
Geerts Hugo Cabinet Minister of the 
Environment 
15/02/11 Policy advisor 
Larosse Jan EWI 23/11/10 Civil servant 
Moyersoen Johan i-propeller 17/05/11 Knowledge actor 
Nevens Frank VITO 27/01/11 Knowledge actor 
Tempst Walter OVAM 14/02/11 Civil servant 
Van Acker Karel KU Leuven  20/01/11 Knowledge actor 
Van den Bossche 
Patrick 
Agoria  26/11/10 Societal actor 
Van Lieshout Lieven VEA 25/05/11 Civil servant 
Van Roo Jan ALBON 25/05/11 Civil servant 
Vrancken Karl VITO  14/12/10 Knowledge actor 
Verheecke Jan MINA council 21/01/11 Societal actor 
Wante John OVAM  30/11/10 Civil servant 
 
 
 
 
 91 
References  
 
 
Annaert, W., Grimmelprez, D. (2011), “Milieubedrijven verdienen een centrale plaats in 
Nieuw Industrieel Beleid”, Febem Focus 20, p. 11-12. 
 
Arts, B., Van Tatenhove, J. (2004), “Policy and power: a conceptual framework between the 
‘old’ and ‘new’ policy idioms”, Policy Sciences 73, p. 339-356. 
 
Arts, B., Leroy, P. (eds.)(2006a), Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Governance, 
Springer, Dordrecht. 
 
Arts, B., Leroy, P. (2006b), “Institutional processes in environmental governance: lots of 
dynamics, not much change?”, in Arts, B., Leroy, P. (eds.), Institutional Dynamics in 
Environmental Governance, Springer, Dordrecht, p. 267-282. 
 
Arts, B., Leroy, P., van Tatenhove, J. (2006), “Political modernisation and policy 
arrangements: a framework for understanding environmental policy change”, Public 
Organization Revue 6, p. 93-106. 
 
Arts, B., Van Tatenhove, J. (2006), “Political modernisation”, in Arts, B., Leroy, P. (eds.), 
Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Governance, Springer, Dordrecht, p. 21-43. 
 
Bachus, K., Bogaert, S., Franchois, E., Desmet, L. (2007), Historisch milieubeleidsevaluatief 
onderzoek van 15 jaar afvalpreventiebeleid van het Vlaamse Gewest, uitgevoerd door de 
OVAM 1991-2005, OVAM, Mechelen. 
 
Bouwen, R., Taillieu, T., 2004. Multi-party collaboration as social learning for 
interdependence: developint relational knowledge for sustainable resource management. 
Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 14, p. 137-153. 
 
Bouwen, R., Craps, M., Sips, K., Taillieu, T., Tempst, W., Van Acker, K., Van Lieshout, M., 
Vincke, J. (s.d.), Diverging-converging action strategies to generate actionable knowledge for 
sustainable material management, unpublished research paper. 
 
Braungart, M, McDonough , W. (2002), Cradle to Cradle. Remaking the way we make things.  
New York: North Point Press. 
 
De Bruyn, T., Bachus, K., Gysen, J. (2003), ”Uitvoeringsplan Huishoudelijke Afvalstoffen 
1997-2001”, in Van Steertegem M. (red.), MIRA-BE 2003, Milieu- en natuurrapport 
Vlaanderen: beleidsevaluatie, Vlaamse Milieumaatschappij, Aalst, p. 163-196. 
 
Claes, K., Van der Linden, A., Briffaerts, K., Putseys L., Umans, L., De Goorf, M., Wille, D., 
Vandeputte, A., D’Haese, A., Dons, V., Vander Putten, E. (2007), Milieurapport Vlaanderen. 
Achtergronddocument Thema Beheer Afvalstoffen, VMM, Aalst. 
 
Crivits, M., Paredis, E., Boulanger, P.-M., Mutombo, E.J.K., Bauler, T., Lefin, A.-L. (2010), 
“Scenarios based on sustainability discourses: constructing alternative consumption and 
consumer perspectives”, Futures 42, p. 1187-1199. 
 
 92 
De Jonge, W. (2003), Voorraadbeheer binnen de milieugebruiksruimte. Duurzame 
Ontwikkeling en systeeminnovatie, CDO, Gent  
 
European Commission (2005), Taking sustainable use of resources forward: a thematic 
strategy on the prevention and recyclng of waste, COM(2005) 666, Brussels. 
 
European Commission (2008a), The raw materials initiative. Meeting our critical needs for 
growth and jobs in Europe. COM(2008) 699, Brussels. 
 
European Commission (2008b), Commission staff working document accompanying the 
communication from the Commission to the European parliament and the council. Raw 
materials initiative. SEC(2008) 2741, Brussels. 
 
European Commission (2010), Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth. COM(2010) 2020, Brussels. 
 
European Commission (2011a), Tackling the challenges in commodity markets and on row 
materials. COM(2011) 25, Brussels. 
 
European Commission (2011b), A resource-efficient Europe. Flagship initiative under the 
2020 strategy. COM (2011) 21, Brussels. 
 
European Environmental Agency (2009), Diverting waste from landfill. Effectiveness of 
waste-management policies in the European Union, EEA Report 7/2009, EEA, Copenhagen. 
 
European Environmental Agency (2010), The European Environment. State and outlook 2010: 
Synthesis, EEA, Copenhagen. 
 
European Union (2008), Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, Brussels. 
 
Geels, F.W. (2005), Technological Transition and System Innovations. A Co-Evolutionary 
and Socio-Technical Analysis, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham. 
 
Geels, F.W., Schot, J. (2007), Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research 
Policy 36, p. 399-417.  
 
Geels, F.W. (2010), “Ontologies, socio-technical transitions (to sustainability), and the multi-
level perspective”, Research Policy, vol. 39, no. 4, p. 495-510. 
 
Geeraerts, K., Leroy, P., Bursens, P. (2005), Overeenkomstig sturen? Centraal-lokale relaties 
in het Vlaams water- en afvalbeleid, Steunpunt Milieubeleidswetenschappen, Universiteit 
Antwerpen. 
 
Grin, J. (2010), Understanding transitions from a governance perspective. In Grin, J., 
Rotmans, J., Schot, J., Transitions to Sustainable Development. New Directions in the Study 
of Long Term Transformative Change, Routledge, p. 221-319. 
 
Grin, J. (forthcoming), “The politics of transition governance. Conceptual understanding and 
implications for transition governance”, International Journal of Sustainable Development. 
 93 
Grin, J., Van Staveren, A. (2007), Werken aan systeeminnovaties. Lessen uit de praktijk van 
Innovatienetwerk, Van Gorcum, Assen. 
 
Grin, J., Rotmans, J., Schot, J. (2010), Transitions to Sustainable Development. New 
Directions in the Study of Long Term Transformative Change, Routledge, New York. 
 
Hekkert, M., Suurs, R., Negro, S., Kuhlmann, S., Smits, R. (2007), “Functions of innovation 
systems: a new approach for analysing technological change”, Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change 74, p. 413-432. 
 
Hopwood, B., Mellor, M., O’Brien, G. (2005), Sustainable Development: mapping different 
approaches. Sustainable Development 13, p. 38-52. 
 
Kemp, R., Shot, J., Hoogma, R. (1998), “Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of 
niche formation: the approach of strategic niche management”, Technology Analysis and 
Strategic Management 10, p. 175-196. 
 
Kemp, R., Rotmans, J. (2009), “Transitioning policy: co-production of a new strategic 
framework for energy innovation policy in the Netherlands”, Policy Sciences 42, p. 303-322. 
 
Kenis, A., Mathijs, E. (2011), “Unravelling the (post)-political in transition management: 
challenges for sustainable change”, Paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on 
Sustainability Transitions, Lund, 13-15 June 2011. 
 
Kern, F. (2009), The politics of governing ‘system innovations’ towards sustainable electricity 
systems, PhD thesis, SPRU/University of Sussex. 
 
Kern, F., Howlett, M. (2009), “Implementing transition management as policy reforms: a case 
study of the Dutch energy sector”, Policy Sciences 42, p. 391-408. 
 
Kingdon, J.W. (1984), Agenda, alternatives and public policies, Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston. 
 
Larosse, J. (2004), Towards a ‘Third Generation’ Innovation Policy in Flanders: Policy 
Profile of the Flemish Innovation System, IWT-Studies 49, IWT, Brussels. 
 
Leroy, P., Arts, B. (2006), “Institutional dynamics in environmental governance”, in Arts, B., 
Leroy, P. (eds.), Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Governance, Springer, Dordrecht, p. 
1-19. 
 
Liefferink, D. (2006), “The dynamics of policy arrangements: turning around the tetrahedron”, 
in Arts, B., Leroy, P. (eds.), Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Governance, Springer, 
Dordrecht, p. 45-68. 
 
LNE (2008), Actualisatie Milieubeleidsplan 2003-2007 voor de periode 2008-2010, Brussel. 
 
Loorbach, D. (2004), Discussienotitie. Een dynamische analyse van de ontwikkeling van het 
Vlaamse afvalbeleid 1970-2000, ICIS, Maastricht. 
 
 94 
Loorbach, D. (2007), Transition Management, new mode of governance for sustainable 
development, International Books, Utrecht. 
 
Loorbach, D., Rotmans, J., Rensma, A., Tempst, W. (2004), Stof tot nadenken. Standpunt can 
de OVAM over de invulling en de aanpak van “stofstroombeheer”. Ontwerp adviesnota aan 
de leden van de directieraad van de OVAM, 16 juli 2004, internal note, ICIS/OVAM, 
Maastricht/Mechelen. 
 
Loots, I., Van den Broeck, J., Leroy, P. (2008), “Vlaams milieubeleid na 1980: een schets van 
de institutionalisering”, in Cursus Milieubeleid, Open Universiteit Nederland.  
 
Lowndes, V. (2005), “Something old, something new, something borrowed… How 
institutions change (and stay the same) in local governance”, Policy Studies 26 (3), p. 291-309. 
Meadowcroft, J. (2009), “What about the polkitics? Sustainable development, transition 
management, and long-term energy transitions”, Policy Sciences 42, p. 323-340. 
 
MINA-raad, SERV (2011), Advies Materialendecreet, Brussel. 
 
Nooteboom, S.G. (2006), Adaptive Networks. The Governance for Sustainable Development. 
Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers. 
 
OECD (2008), Measuring material flows and resource productivity. Synthesis report, OECD, 
Paris. 
 
OECD (2010), “Summary paper 4: considerations for developing a path forward”, Working 
document for the OECD Global Forum on environment focusing on sustainable materials 
management, 25-27 October 2010, Mechelen, Belgium. 
 
OVAM (2009), Strategisch plan OVAM 2010-2015. Samenvatting van de beleidsthema’s 
afval, materialen en bodem, Mechelen. 
 
Paredis, E. (2008), Transition Management in Flanders. Policy context, first results and 
surfacing tensions. Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling, CDO/UGent, Gent. 
 
Paredis, E. (2009), Socio-technische systeeminnovaties en transities: van theoretische 
inzichten naar beleidsvertaling. Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling, CDO/UGent, Gent.   
 
Paredis, E. (2010), Naar een verdere onderbouwing van het Vlaamse beleid voor 
duurzaamheidstransities. Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling, CDO/UGent, Gent. 
 
Paredis, E., Tempst, W., Moyersoen, J. (2010), “Developing Enhanced Landfill Mining as a 
transition experiment : context, framing, methodology, questions”, in Jones, T., Tielemans, Y. 
(ed.), Enhanced Landfill Mining and the Transition to Sustainable Materials Management. 
Proceedings of the International Academic Symposium on Enhanced Landfill Mining, 4-6 
October, Houthalen-Helchteren, Belgium. 
 
Peeters, K. (2004), Beleidsnota leefmilieu en natuur 2004-2009, Vlaamse Regering, Brussel. 
 
Rotmans, J. (2003), Transitiemanagement: Sleutel voor een duurzame samenleving, 
Koninklijke Van Gorcum, Assen. 
 95 
 
Rotmans, J., Loorbach, D., Kemp, R. (2007), “Transition Management: its origin, evolution 
and critique”, paper gepresenteerd tijdens de Workshop ‘Politics and Governance  in 
Sustainable Socio-Technical Transitions’, 19-21 September 2007, Schloss Blankensee / 
Berlin. 
 
Rotmans, J., Kemp, R. (2008), “Detour ahead: a response to Shove and Walker about the 
perilous road of transition management”, Environment and Planning A, 40, p. 1006-1012. 
 
Rossy, A., Jones, T.J., Geysen, D., Bienge, K. (2010), Sustainable Materials Management for 
Europe, from efficiency to effectiveness, Sustenuto/KULeuven/Wuppertal Institute, Brussels. 
 
Scrase, I., Smith, A. (2009), The (non)-politics of managing low-carbon socio-technical 
transitions. Environmental Politics, 18, 5, 707-726. 
 
SERI, Gobal 2000, Friends of the Earth Europe (2009), Overconsumption? Oour use of the 
world’s natural resources, Vienna, Austria. 
 
Shove, E., Walker, G. (2007a), “Caution. Transitions ahead: politics, practice and sustainable 
transition management”, Environment and Planning A, 39, p. 763-770. 
 
Shove, E., Walker, G. (2008), “Transition ManagementTM and the politics of shape shifting”, 
Environment and Planning A, 40, p. 1012-1014. 
 
Smith, A., Voß, J-P., Grin, J. (2010), ”Innovation studies and sustainability transitions: the 
allure of the multi-level perspective and its challenges”, in Research Policy, vol. 39, no. 4, p. 
435-448. 
 
Sondeijker, S., Geurts, J., Rotmans, J., Tukker, A. (2006), Imagining sustainability: the added 
value of transition scenarios in transition management. Foresight vol. 8, 5, p. 15-30. 
 
Spillemaeckers, S., Bachus, K. (2009), Het governancemodel van het Vlaamse 
duurzameontwikkelingsbeleid, Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling, HIVA/KULeuven, 
Leuven. 
 
Van den Bosch, S. (2010), Transition Experiments. Exploring societal changes towards 
sustainability, PhD thesis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 
 
Van der Brugge, R. (2009), Transition dynamics in social-ecological systems. The case of 
Dutch water mùanagement. PhD thesis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.  
 
Van Humbeeck, P. (2003), Naar een industrieel beleid voor het milieu. Technologie en 
innovatie als sleutel voor een duurzame welvaart, SERV, Brussel. 
 
Van Humbeeck, P., Dries, I., Larosse, J. (2003), Linking Innovation Policy and Sustainable 
Development in Flanders. Contribution to the OECD-TIP Project MONIT, IWT Studies nr 50, 
Brussels. 
 
Van Lieshout, M. (ed.)(2008), “Visie netwerk”, in Intern referentiedocument Plan C, versie 
28 april 2008, OVAM, Mechelen. 
 96 
 
Vlaamse Regering (2009), Pact 2020: een nieuw toekomstpact voor Vlaanderen. 20 
doelstellingen, Brussel. 
 
Vlaamse Regering (2010), Memorie van toelichting bij ontwerp van decreet betreffende het 
duurzaam beheer van materiaalkringlopen en afvalstoffen, Brussel. 
 
Vlaamse Regering (2011), Witboek Nieuw Industrieel Beleid voor Vlaanderen, Brussel. 
 
VLABEST (2011), Briefadvies verzelfstandiging Plan C, Brussel. 
 
VMM (2008), MIRA Indicatorenrapport 2008, VMM, Aalst. 
 
VMM (2010), MIRA Indicatorenrapport 2010, VMM, Aalst. 
 
Voß, J-P., Smith, A., Grin, J. (2009), “Designing long-term policy: rethinking transition 
management”, Policy Sciences, vol. 43. no. 4, p. 275-302.  
 
VROM (2001), Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan 4: een wereld een wil. Ministerie van 
volkshuisvesting, ruimtelijke ordening en milieu, Den Haag. 
 
VRWI (2011), Advies 154. Duurzaam beheer van materiaalkringlopen en afvalstoffen. 24 
februari 2011, Brussel. 
 
